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Abstract
This dissertation offers an account of the different ways in which putatively idealist and
transcendental models of sociality, which grounded the subject’s relation to other human beings
in the subject’s own cognition, were rejected and replaced. Scrapping this account led to a
variety of models of sociality which departed from the subject as the ground of sociality, positing
grounds outside of the subject. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig,
and Dietrich Bonhoeffer represent alternative positions along a spectrum of models of sociality
which reject the idealist concept of sociality.
The central argument of this dissertation claims that the responses to idealism and
transcendental models of sociality ultimately find fault with an inadequate ontology, one which
grounds sociality (as well as all of reality) in the cognition of the subject. The ontology of the
transcendental model locates the subject as initially unconnected to other subjects such that the
first move in relating them together must be epistemological. The social relation is grounded in
the subject’s cognitive grasp. Each of the thinkers I examine identifies this as the key problem
with idealism; however, their solutions to this problem differ. The differing solutions of
Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer can be identified as occupying different
representative positions along a continuum, call it the “scale of social grounding.” What I offer
here is a topography of responses to the idealist model of sociality.
The ontological ground of sociality, instead of being the subject, is posited as situation of
dialogue (Gadamer), the face of the other (Levinas), or divine revelation (Rosenzweig and
Bonhoeffer). In each of these alternative models, we see that the subject is conditioned rather
iii

than autonomous, that sociality is enacted through temporality and language, and that sociality is
principally a normative relation rather than an epistemological one. The story that emerges from
my analysis, then, is a richer topography of responses to idealism than has hitherto been mapped
out. The responses, represented by Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer each provide
an alternative ontology on which any adequate model of sociality must rest.
While my account of the spectrum of ontological responses to idealist sociality does not
claim to be exhaustive, it does give a better topography of the field of responses than has hitherto
been offered in studies of models of sociality in the 20th century. Finally, this dissertation shows
the centrality of providing an alternative ontology to idealism in these projects. Far from
rejecting ontology wholesale or merely offering moral revisions to the existing social order, each
of the figures I examine in this study radically revise the ground of sociality by articulating a
fresh ontological vision which can support social life.
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Introduction
The shadow of Hegel cast itself long into the 20th century, forcing both philosophers and
theologians to grapple with the legacy of Hegel’s philosophical system. His early and influential
critic, Søren Kierkegaard, is well-known both for his arguments against idealism and for
inspiring the 20th century movement of existentialism, which can be thought of as a response on
behalf of the individual to the impassive system of philosophy which Hegel was seen to have
promoted. While the rejection of idealism based on concerns of the individual has been well
charted, idealism was just as frequently faulted in the 20th century for producing an inadequate
model of social relations. This dissertation offers an account of the different ways in which
putatively idealist and transcendental models of sociality, which grounded the subject’s relation
to other human beings in the subject’s own cognition, were rejected and replaced. Scrapping the
I-centered model led to a variety of models of sociality which departed from the subject as the
ground of sociality, positing grounds outside of the subject. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel
Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer represent alternative positions along a
spectrum of models of sociality which reject the idealist concept of sociality.
The concept of sociality in this context, while relating to the whole social life of a human
being, expresses both a descriptive and a prescriptive content. Descriptively, sociality expresses
the ways in which one human being comes into contact and relation to another human being,
whether this be through sensory contact, intentionality, language, etc. The key question here is
whether one has correctly described what happens in social relations. Prescriptively, sociality
expresses the ways in which an individual genuinely or ought to come into relation with others.
1

Two key questions arise here: whether the prescription is correctly articulated, and what it is that
is required to move from a state of inauthentic sociality to a state of authentic sociality, that is,
from what is to what ought to be. The criticisms of idealism examined in this project operate at
both descriptive and prescriptive levels. Gadamer and Levinas argue that idealism has
misdescribed the basic way in which human beings come into relation with each other, and on
that basis, it has misunderstood the ways in which human beings ought to rightly be related to
each other. Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer, for their part, argue that idealism has fairly accurately
articulated the basic ways in which humans relate to each other; only, idealism has taken this
identification as persons relating rightly to each other while in fact it has only correctly described
inauthentic or even harmful forms of sociality.1 At any rate, sociality is considered to be a
relation, considered together with the means of that relation, between two or more human beings.
The most influential narrative offered with regard to concerns over the social implications
of idealism, Michael Theunissen’s The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl,
Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, has flattened out the variety of responses to idealism. While
Theunissen sees this response as consisting of just the dialogical philosophy movement spurred
on by Martin Buber, I argue for a more diverse set of alternatives. Theunissen articulates a
typology of what he calls transcendental models of social ontology in contrast to dialogical

I have chosen to use the term “sociality” instead of “intersubjectivity” or “social ontology” for multiple reasons.
First, “intersubjectivity” is often, though not always, taken to refer to the epistemological relationship between
subjects which is at issue in the criticism of idealism. Hence, Gadamer rejects the concept of intersubjectivity as
correctly articulating the social relation between individuals. Next, “social ontology,” while getting at the heart of
my argument in this project, itself is of dubious usefulness in part because of Levinas’ suspicion of anything called
ontology in traditional terms. Further, “social ontology” is used in multiple ways in different philosophical
discussions. In addition to being used to describe the subject matter of my dissertation by Michael Theunissen’s
project cited below, “social ontology” has been a topic of discussion in 20 th century Marxist theory, following the
writings of Georg Lukács. More recently, “social ontology” has come to denote ideas of group agency and collective
intentionality as discussed by John Searle, Raimo Tuomelo, and their commentators. Following Searle, the
“Cambridge Social Ontology Group” uses the phrase to describe the structures of social reality, however, primarily
in an economic sense. In order, therefore, to avoid a measure of confusion, I have opted for “sociality,” a broadly
applicable term which is operative in both theological and philosophical circles and which has not been co-opted for
particular polemical or partisan purposes.
1
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models of social ontology. Theunissen’s classification of transcendental and dialogical social
ontologies is meant to provide a representative, though not exhaustive, exposition of twentieth
century continental views of the self-other relationship. Although Theunissen admits that
“transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of dialogue are not the only positions from which
the thought of the first half of the twentieth century approached ‘the Other,’” he asserts that “the
standpoints that we have selected constitute the extreme limits comprising all the other
possibilities of thematizing the Other that have actually been developed to date.”2 And although
Theunissen leaves the question open whether these two positions suffice “to cover the field in its
entirety,”3 the upshot of Theunissen’s analysis is that the movement of dialogical philosophy
represented by Buber constitutes the principal alternative to transcendental and idealist models of
sociality in the 20th century.
Theunissen documents this counter-idealist movement, the philosophy of dialogue, as
marked by its departure from grounding the subject’s relation to other persons in the subject
itself. Instead, “dialogicalism” posits the locus of that relationship in between self and other.
Quoting Buber, Theunissen notes that Buber’s thinking invokes “a relation that is ‘no longer
grounded in the sphere of subjectivity, but in that of the between.’”4 The contrast that Theunissen
draws, therefore, between transcendental models of social ontology and the philosophy of
dialogue concerns the grounding of the social relation. While the transcendental and idealist
models ground sociality in the subject’s cognition, dialogical sociality is grounded in the
dialogue itself, in the space “in between” I and Thou.

2

Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, trans.
Christopher Macann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 3.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 271.
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While the dialogical model of sociality represents one rejection of idealist and
transcendental models of sociality, it was by no means the only nor the most radical response in
the 20th century. Beyond the transcendental and dialogical models of sociality lie models which
ground the social relation neither in the subject nor in the dialogical encounter between subjects
but rather in the “other.” Instead of the social relation being engendered through the subject’s
constitution or through the situation of dialogue which encompasses interlocuters, these otheroriented models argue that idealism is only overcome when sociality finds its origin and account
in the personage of the other. I split these other-oriented models into two camps: the ethical
responsibility model as articulated by Levinas and the revelational model as exemplified in
Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer. A common theme among these models is the idea that the subject
lacks the capacity for initiating proper social relations on its own; in fact, when it attempts to do
so, it fails by absorbing the other into the subject. In other words, idealism fails to secure
appropriate relations with others on behalf of the subject because it enables the subject to
comprehend the other in abstraction from the subject’s normative obligations to the other. Hence,
there is no concrete obstacle to prevent the other from appearing as an extension of oneself.
The inadequacies in Theunissen’s oft-cited account call for a renewed examination of
20th century models of sociality which self-consciously departed from their transcendental
heritage. The central argument of this dissertation claims that the responses to idealism and
transcendental models of sociality ultimately find fault with an inadequate ontology, one which
grounds sociality (as well as all of reality) in the cognition of the subject. The ontology of the
transcendental model locates the subject as initially unconnected to other subjects such that the
first move in relating them together must be epistemological. A subject must first gain
knowledge of the other in order to rightly relate to it. Thus, the social relation is grounded in the
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subject’s cognitive grasp. Each of the thinkers I examine identifies this as the key problem with
idealism; however, their solutions to this problem differ.
The differing solutions of Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer can be
identified as occupying different representative positions along a continuum, call it the “scale of
social grounding.” What I offer here is a topography of responses to the idealist model of
sociality. Gadamer exemplifies the dialogical approach, which sees that persons are not initially
unconnected from each other from the outset. Instead, all persons participate in the ontology of
language whereby the ground for sociality is not in one subject or in another, but in the dialogue
between them. Gadamer, who fits appropriately into Theunissen’s typology of dialogicalism,
serves as a prominent and influential advocate of a model of sociality which is grounded not in
the subject’s epistemological power nor in the power of any other subject, but in their both being
caught up in the being of language which encompasses them.
Levinas exemplifies the ethical responsibility approach, which in fact depends upon the
independence of the subject, that is, the separation between persons, but argues that the effort to
relate persons through cognition is bound to failure. Instead, the social relation is initiated
through the expressive presence of the other person, a command which precedes cognition and
binds one person to another in responsibility. Rather than grounding sociality in the subject or in
the “space between” persons, sociality has its ground in the other person who faces me. Sociality
is preeminently defined on this model as being responsible for the other rather than as
comprehending or understanding the other person. Ethical responsibility here precedes
epistemology.
Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer exemplify the revelational approach, which grounds
sociality in the divine other in contrast to a merely human other. Both Rosenzweig and
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Bonhoeffer maintain that persons exist at a baseline level of connectedness in the context of
everyday social relations in society. Yet, in different ways, this relation between persons is found
to be covered over by a profound tendency to isolation and self-enclosure on the part of the
individual. It is therefore necessary for the isolation of the self to be broken open by divine selfrevelation, an encounter which alone makes possible authentic relationships. The break with
idealism on the part of Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer runs along a number of fronts, but the
deepest fault line is in the rejection of the epistemological approach as providing an adequate
account for sociality. The knowing subject ends up knowing only himself or herself, i.e. only
perpetuating isolation.
These three approaches, the dialogical, responsibility, and revelational models therefore
share the same diagnosis of the idealist/transcendental prioritizing of cognition in sociality. Yet,
as we have seen, their solutions lie along a spectrum: grounding sociality in between self and
other, grounding sociality in the human other, grounding sociality in the divine other. Because
the issue at hand is the grounding of sociality, the solution must provide an adequate ontology
which avoids the problem of grounding sociality in a cognizing subject. However, we must first
understand what is meant by the notion of grounding sociality in the subject, why that is so
problematic, and what it could mean to say that sociality is grounded elsewhere.
The charge that sociality is “grounded” in the subject means that sociality has its origin,
both logically and temporally, in the cognitive faculty of the subject. In other words, the social
relation is made possible by – has its necessary and sufficient conditions in – the subject’s
intellect. In order for one person to relate to another, the subject must have knowledge of the
other person. In classical terms, this means engendering an adequation between the intellect and
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the thing cognized. The mind of the subject encompasses and brings into itself the object of
cognition; in this case, that object is another subject.
In their introduction to the concept of the self in classical German philosophy, David E.
Klemm and Günter Zöller write,
The classical German way of thinking about the self is characterized by a decidedly
idealist bent. The self is understood not only as the ground of all knowledge concerning
the world, but also as the ground of the very reality of the world. The idealist extension of
the self's original, epistemological function to a larger, metaphysical role made it
imperative to develop a specific terminology that addressed the radical, worldconstituting function of the self. The absoluteness of the self as the universal condition of
reality was expressed by such constructs as ‘subject,’ ‘subject-object,’ and ‘spirit.’5
This characterization of self and world in German idealism is perhaps not as nuanced as one
would like with regard to the particular subtleties of thinkers typically lumped into this category
such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Nevertheless, the figures I examine for the most part
(though Gadamer may be an exception to this) care less about accurately detailing a particular
philosopher’s position than identifying idealism as a kind of perennial trap that philosophers of
different time periods get sucked into. Hegel is perhaps most often identified as the antagonist in
these narratives, but Husserl and other 20th century figures are routinely identified as falling
prey to idealist tendencies.6 The common target, therefore, is less a particular philosopher or set

David E. Klemm and Günter Zöller, “Introduction,” in Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and Others in
Classical German Philosophy, ed. David E. Klemm and Günter Zöller (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1997), vii.
6
See, however, the assessment by Walter Jaeschke that Hegel does not fit this criticism: “Hegel, the philosopher of
the principle of subjectivity, begins the epoch of his systematic philosophizing as a critic of the principle of
subjectivity, as a critic of the absolute subject, one can even add, as a critic who prefigured the same objections that
are raised against the principle of subjectivity today. For Hegel's critique of the standpoint of subjectivity is also a
critique of a relation of predominance, a critique of the predominance of the understanding over sensibility, a
critique of the tyranny of the concept over that which is alive.” Walter Jaeschke, “Absolute Subject and Absolute
Subjectivity in Hegel,” in Figuring the Self, 194. Jaeschke explains this a few pages later by arguing of Hegel that
“one cannot object to his approach, at least not with justification, that it is a model of the predominance of the
monological or even a monomaniacal subject, and that it excludes intersubjectivity. In fact, the opposition of
subjectivity and intersubjectivity is post-Hegelian abstraction. The fact that thinking does not belong merely to the
subject qua individual subject, like an opinion that is only 'mine,' but rather that thinking is the very element in
which the identity of all the individual subjects is realized, is for Hegel precisely the characteristic mark of thinking.
5
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of philosophers as it is the continual temptation of idealism, namely to ground our relation to
others through the subject’s cognizing powers. Hence, this work is not concerned to justify a
particular criticism of German Idealist philosophers as valid. I leave that question aside,
concentrating instead on what Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer do with their
criticisms, regardless of their accuracy in application to the likes of Hegel, Husserl, et al.
The model (or caricature) of the ramifications of idealism is as follows: the subject is the
fundamentum inconcussum, the foundation for all knowledge of and relation to the world. This
feature of subjectivity means that it is different in kind from the objects it relates to, and that it
has freedom or autonomy with regard to those objects.7 Even when the object of knowledge is
acknowledged to be another subject, with its own powers, the other subject is still presented to
one’s own subjectivity as something to be identified, known, and related to. All normative
relationality is subsequent to the epistemological grasp. Further, because rationality is the
primary means of relating to others, this relation takes on the character of rationality: being
timeless and above the varying contingencies of context and language. Sociality is therefore
construed as the rational comprehension of those around me. All normative or affective
commitments are seen to flow out of this primary determination of the subject’s cognition.
Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer each share this basic articulation and
critique of the idealist model and position themselves as providing an alternative, rooted in a

Without the moment of intersubjectivity, thinking would always in fact stand exposed to the danger of being private,
unable to realize the universality claimed by thinking.” Ibid., 201-202.
7
See the assessment, from a theological point of view, of Eberhard Jüngel, God as Mystery of the World, trans.
Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 1983), 83: “Since Descartes, the ‘I think’ (‘cogito’) is
regarded as the actual foundation of all that exists. The human ego is subiectum to the extent that it thinks, is
mentally active…When this ego then ‘knows,’ what it knows becomes its ‘object.’ In knowing, the ego goes forth
from itself as a seeker, finds something against which it ‘collides,’ and thus finds its ‘object’…That the knowing
subject in the act of knowing draws the object into itself, overcomes its object as object and destroys it, reveals the
extent to which the ‘subject’ desires as ego to be the absolute subiectum. All objects should ultimately be dependent
on the subject, which can endure its dependence on the world of objects only temporarily but not permanently.”
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curative ontology. The ontological ground of sociality, instead of being the subject, is posited as
situation of dialogue (Gadamer), the face of the other (Levinas), or divine revelation
(Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer). In each of these alternative models, we see that the subject is
conditioned rather than autonomous, that sociality is enacted through temporality and language,
and that sociality is principally a normative relation rather than an epistemological one. The story
that emerges from my analysis, then, is a richer topography of responses to idealism than has
hitherto been mapped out. The responses, represented by Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and
Bonhoeffer, far from merely criticizing the idealist model of sociality, actually each provide an
alternative ontology on which any adequate model of sociality must rest.
Chapter One is devoted to articulating the dialogical model of sociality laid forth by
Gadamer. I show how Gadamer’s criticisms of the subject-object ontology of his German
forebears leads him to develop a hermeneutic ontology of language, wherein being emerges in
the history of the events of language. This event ontology serves as the ontological ground of
sociality. Social relations occur in the event of language which occurs in the dialogue between
two persons. Gadamer clearly argues that the ground of sociality lies in neither of the persons
who engage in the dialogue, but in the being which is presented in language between them. The
persons participate in something which surrounds them and guides them, and which carries the
initiative in sociality. In Gadamer’s account, then, we find a fully developed ontology which is
capable of undergirding a philosophy of dialogical sociality.
Chapter Two presents the ethical responsibility model of sociality as articulated in the
writings of Levinas. In many ways, Levinas represents the complete inversion of the idealist
model of sociality insofar as Levinas endeavors to ground sociality in the subject which faces
and opposes one’s own subjectivity. While Levinas explicitly rejects the correlation between
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reality and subjective cognition which he sees at the heart of idealist ontology, he does affirm an
ontology, a vision of reality, one which is unavailable to the impartial observer, but which
nevertheless serves as the foundation for all sociality. Levinas sees sociality as bound up with the
responsibility for others. On Levinas’s account, this responsibility is revealed as the rupture of
the human face into the self’s egoism and is insistent that the self lacks the capacity to initiate or
enact social relations. The first move is made by the one who faces me, engendering my
responsibility. Foundational to Levinas’s account is the idea that sociality cannot be described in
a system which lines up subjects and orders the relations between them as in a diagram. The
ontology which Levinas rejects conforms to such a pattern; it sets out the beings which are to be
related to one another then sketches the lines of relationality between them. Levinas’s own view
is that the experience of the relation itself reveals what the other is and what I myself am. Only
one invested in and by that social relation can truly articulate what is. While Levinas often uses
religious language in articulating his model, in the final analysis, the concept of God does not
ground sociality; instead, that relation must have its necessary and sufficient conditions in the
human being who faces me.
Chapter Three introduces and sketches out the ontology and subsequent model of
sociality developed by Rosenzweig in response to the failures of idealism to adequately account
for time, language, and religious experience. In contrast to models which ground sociality in the
subject, in dialogue, or in the human other, Rosenzweig argues that sociality can only find its
ground in divine revelation, in the divine action upon the human being which opens up the soul
to relate rightly to the world around it. Rosenzweig’s ontology, which serves as an influence on
Levinas’s account, begins in the fundamental separation and closedness of the elements of
reality, God, world, and the human, from each other. This represents a stark contrast to
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Gadamer’s account of ontology wherein all beings are open to each other by their participation
with each other in language. On Rosenzweig’s view, language in its true sense is only given to
the self through divine revelation. While Levinas shares Rosenzweig’s view that human beings
originate from a place of separation and relative isolation from each other, Rosenzweig maintains
that no human being can of her own accord generate authentic social relations with another
person. Instead, God, human beings, and the world come into relationships with each other
through the unfolding of divine initiative in dialogue and revelation. The soul who receives this
self-revelation of the divine is then empowered with the capacity to relate rightly to others,
ultimately bringing the world to redemption through the religious community. Rosenzweig thus
constructs an elaborate and interwoven system of reality in which sociality and the redemption of
all things unfolds through their temporal relations.
Chapter Four lays out the model of sociality which Bonhoeffer charts in his doctoral
dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, as well as in his Habilitationsschrift, Act and Being.
Bonhoeffer’s account of sociality is an explicitly theological reckoning of the ways in which
persons rightly relate to one another, grounding social relations in divine revelation. Much like
Rosenzweig, Bonhoeffer argues that human beings cannot place themselves into genuine
sociality, and that God alone can serve as the grounding for such an activity. Bonhoeffer, too,
delivers a detailed critique of idealist conceptions of sociality, and presents his own account of
the ontological basis for right relationality. This revelational model of sociality, however, lays
out a different ontological vision than does Rosenzweig. Although many components of what
constitutes true social life are shared in common between the two thinkers, they part ways on the
configuration of these features as well as the ultimate locus of social grounding. For Bonhoeffer,
divine revelation comes in the person of Christ, who is revealed in the church community. From
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this claim emerges an ontology which accounts for the way in which persons are encountered by
Christ and related to each other. On Bonhoeffer’s account persons always exist within a broader
ontological category which he calls “collective persons.” Persons exist and relate to one another
by means of the social-basic relations inherent to each collective person. Authentic sociality,
however, is grounded through the initiative of Christ’s self-revelation in and as the collective
person of the church.
I conclude in Chapter Five by recalling that the ways of dealing with models of sociality
in the secondary literature, most prominently represented by Theunissen, are insufficiently
attentive the spectrum of responses to idealism in 20th century continental thought which develop
an alternative to ontologically grounding sociality in the subject. Not only do Gadamer, Levinas,
Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer articulate explicit criticisms of this idealist project, but they also
recognize that the solution to the problems they point out must have its sources in an ontological
configuration of sociality. These figures offer a variety of replacement ontologies which lay
claim to be the ground of genuine sociality, and in this way succeeding where idealism has
failed. While my account of the spectrum of ontological responses to idealist sociality does not
claim to be exhaustive, it does give a better topography of the field of responses than has hitherto
been offered in studies of models of sociality in the 20th century. Finally, this dissertation shows
the centrality of providing an alternative ontology to idealism in these projects. Far from
rejecting ontology wholesale or merely offering moral revisions to the existing social order, each
of the figures I examine in this study radically revise the ground of sociality by articulating a
fresh ontological vision which can support social life.
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Chapter One: Gadamer and Dialogical Sociality
The purpose of this chapter is show how Gadamer’s criticism of idealism paves the way
for his alternative view of social relations which I characterize as an original dialogical account
of sociality. Gadamer sees the enactment of language in conversation as constituting the self’s
relation with others. This dialogical view situates Gadamer at a kind of midpoint between models
which ground sociality in the subject and those which ground sociality in the other who
encounters the subject. In his criticism of German idealism, Gadamer rejects the notion that the
social relation is grounded in the initiative of a constituting subject. By the same token, he rejects
the idea that sociality could be grounded in the free initiative of an other, as Levinas,
Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer in different ways assert. Thus, I show in this chapter how Gadamer
articulates his view of dialogue as not just an incidental event that occurs between persons, but as
a founding event which constitutes the ground of their relationality.
I begin by showing how Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology is articulated as a response to
the features he finds problematic in the idealist tradition. His alternative ontology thus provides
the cure to the diagnosis of idealism as providing an inadequate basis for social reality.
Gadamer’s ontology accordingly drives other features of his philosophy. Gadamer views
(intelligible) being as the history of the events of its coming to presence in language. This event
is a movement that begins in the prior continuity of language, which becomes disrupted in the
encounter with otherness and resolves in the integration of that otherness into a fuller linguistic
understanding. Gadamer’s view of sociality follows this general pattern of the event of
understanding in the concrete movement of dialogue between self and other. Here, dialogue is
13

enacted neither by the agency of the self nor by the agency of the other, but rather through the
initiative of the play of language itself which encompasses both parties. Thus, sociality is
grounded, on Gadamer’s view, in the “in-between” of language rather than from the I or the
Thou. In the concluding section, I show how Gadamer represents an innovative account of
dialogical sociality which rejects idealist and transcendental models while avoiding the criticisms
that Theunissen levies against other dialogical models.
Gadamer’s Critique of Idealism
While discussing the contemporary philosophical trends, Gadamer asserts that the
critique of the philosophy of the subject in the 20th century has made an advance over the
German idealism of the 19th century through what he calls the critique of the idealist naïveté of
reflection. In Gadamer’s telling of the story of philosophy, the concept of substance in Aristotle,
as “that which underlies,” was transformed in modernity to the concept of subject. Since
Descartes, says Gadamer, the only thing which truly underlies all changes and remains constant
is the I. Gadamer asserts that German idealism, following Kant, “recognized the function of
subjectivity in the transcendental synthesis of apperception, which must be able to accompany all
our ideas, and which gives them unity.”1 This led to the primacy of subjectivity as the absolute,
as the abiding foundation for knowledge of both the self and the world in Kant and his
followers.2 This means that knowledge is grounded in the subject’s certainty; its accompaniment
of the object of knowledge certifies any claims to knowledge.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person,” trans. Peter Adamson and David
Vessey, Continental Philosophy Review 33 (2000), 277.
2
See ibid., 278: “Transcendental idealism gives subjectivity the rank of the absolute.” See also, ibid.: “the
successors of Kant grounded all knowledge on the first, highest principle of self-consciousness. This represents
precisely, as Kant called it, a ‘Copernican turn.’ It fell to Kant’s successors to give content to the formal notion of
self-consciousness.”
1

14

Of particular interest here is the notion that the subject knows itself: the I is self-reflective
or reflexive. Because the subject knows itself, it has clear access to itself. The subject is able to
distinguish itself from what surrounds it, lifting it out of the field of objects. Yet on Gadamer’s
assessment, this idealist subject documents the objects it cognizes as pure objects and assimilates
them into itself. In Truth and Method, Gadamer writes that this concept of self-consciousness
“consists in its ability to make everything the object of its knowledge and yet in everything that it
knows, it knows itself. Thus as knowledge it differentiates itself from itself and, at the same time,
as self-consciousness, it folds back on and returns to itself.”3 This process of knowledge by
which the subject arrives at the comprehension of an object implies the autonomy of the subject
with regard to what it knows. Gadamer notes, “It seems at first as if the reflective spirit is the
absolutely free spirit. In coming back to itself it is completely at home with itself [bei sich]. In
fact, German idealism – for example, in Fichte’s concept of action or even Hegel’s concept of
absolute knowledge – considered this achievement of the spirit that is at home with itself as the
highest mode of existence or presence.”4 The subject knows its object, integrating the object into
its own abode. The subject has certainty with regard to the object of knowledge because it
certainly knows its own self, which is present in each act of intellection. Hence, the validation of
the object is confirmed in abstraction from the context out of which it is intended.
Gadamer makes this point emphatically with respect to what he regards the idealist
objectification of the work of art. The idealist concept of aesthetics, on Gadamer’s view,
abstracts the work of art from its situatedness in tradition and culture, and demands it be

3

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York:
Continuum, 2004), 244.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics,
trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 122.
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experienced as pure aesthetic object.5 Because the work of art is abstracted in this way, it is
considered in-itself, “existing in its own right,” untouched by the environment it in which it was
embedded. Hence, Gadamer sees the idealist model of aesthetics as an exemplar of the idealist
concept of reflection.
Gadamer criticizes this conception of reflection primarily by arguing that this concept of
reflective consciousness is falsely objectifying. In promoting a model of identifying objects
independently of their context, idealist reflection abstracts from the concreteness of life and
therefore distorts the understanding of both the subject and the object. Gadamer appeals to the
phenomenological tradition which he maintains shows that consciousness is not primarily an act
which targets an object and identifies that object’s being-in-itself.6 Instead, “not all reflection
performs an objectifying function, that is, not all reflection makes what it is directed at into an
object.”7 It is a prejudice inspired by the modern scientific mindset which suggest that being is
encapsulated in measurability. Thus, in perhaps a somewhat surprising move, Gadamer claims
that the idealist concept of reflection errs in precisely the same way that scientific realism does:
by reducing entities to the status of empirically measurable objects.
What figures like Husserl and Heidegger show us, says Gadamer, is that being is given in
manifestly different ways than simply or primarily in a thing’s empirical dimensions. The
objectifying mindset distorts not only the concept of the object perceived but also the concept of

See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 74: “What we call a work of art and experience (erleben) aesthetically depends
on a process of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted (its original context of life, and the
religious or secular function that gave it significance), it becomes visible as the ‘pure work of art.’ In performing this
abstraction, aesthetic consciousness performs a task that is positive in itself. It shows what a pure work of art is, and
allows it to exist in its own right. I call this ‘aesthetic differentiation.’”
6
See Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,” trans. G.B. Hess and R.E.
Palmer, in Philosophical Hermeneutics, 35: “from Husserl (in his doctrine of anonymous intentionalities) and from
Heidegger (in demonstration of the ontological abridgment evident in the subject-object concept in idealism), we
have learned to see through the false objectification inherent in the idealist conception of reflection.”
7
Gadamer, “Philosophical Foundations,” 123.
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the subject which is said to reflect its own image back into itself. Gadamer writes, “Heidegger’s
critique shows the narrowness of such a conception of being. He shows that on this conception,
the primary, fundamental composition of human Dasein is misjudged. Dasein is not constituted
in the always retrospective attempt to recognize oneself in the very act of becoming aware of
oneself.”8 Gadamer sees himself following in Heidegger’s path, participating in this critique of
idealism, extending it to disciplines to which it has not been specifically applied.9
Gadamer finds that this concept of subjectivity corresponds to the objects of study in the
human (and natural) sciences such that the object of understanding is bound up with selfunderstanding. One of his most important theses in Truth and Method maintains that “long
before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand
ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of
subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the
closed circuits of historical life.”10 That is, consciousness is not primarily objectifying, but rather
is permeated by bringing one’s preunderstandings to bear upon the world and having those
preunderstandings altered. There is neither an isolated consciousness nor an isolated object; both
are surrounded and conditioned by their historicity.
While Gadamer shows that the idealist model of aesthetics is a symptom-bearer of the
failure of its subject-object ontology, he also argues that idealism’s model of sociality bears
witness to its process of reflective abstraction. Whether in the reiteration of this process in the
romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher or in the historical school of hermeneutics culminating
Gadamer, “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity,” 280.
See ibid., 281: “My own works have proceeded in this direction, asking what interpretation in fact is when one
goes so far as to fundamentally question the ideal of the self-transparency of subjectivity. This does not mean only
that de facto one will always find every understanding to be limited. It also means that an unlimited understanding
would cut away at – indeed, abolish (aufheben) – the very meaning of understanding, just as a perspective that sees
everything would abolish the very meaning of perspective.”
10
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 278.
8
9
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in Dilthey, Gadamer argues that other persons whom we are trying to understand are abstracted
from their actual historical conditions. In the case of Schleiermacher, “the individuality of the
Thou” presents us with an alienation which must be overcome by extracting the pure kernel of
“free production” expressed by the individual.11 In other words, a subject come into proper
relation with its other by means of a process of “divination,” abstracting both subject and object
from their historical contexts. In the case of Dilthey, despite focus on historical knowledge, this
knowledge relies on a common bond of human nature.12 The achievement of understanding relies
on an appeal to something beyond history, a timeless human nature, which again is an
abstraction from concrete historical relations. Either attempt, then, to understand others falls into
the idealist pattern of a subject freely abstracting others from history.
In his writings, Gadamer often praises Heidegger for decisively demonstrating the failure
of the lack of consideration for the historical in these ultimately idealist ways of thinking.
However, in telling the story both of his following of and deviation from Heidegger, Gadamer
explains that though he agreed with Heidegger’s account of the facticity and thrownness
[Geworfenheit] of Dasein, this could not fully account for the human being set in sociality.
Gadamer writes, “It is not only that everyone is in principle limited. What I was concerned with
was why I experience my own limitation through the encounter with the Other, and why I must
always learn to experience anew if I am ever to be in a position to surpass my limits.”13 In other
words, while Heidegger’s thought monumentally marks the departure from idealism’s
assumption of subjective autonomy in demonstrating the fundamental limitation or
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conditionedness of the human being, simply asserting this limit is not enough to capture the
human condition.
Instead, Gadamer maintains that the experience of sociality paradigmatically exemplifies
the way in which persons relate to the being which surrounds them and therefore is intrinsically
tied to his project of hermeneutic understanding. As he puts it:
the very strengthening of the Other against myself would, for the first time, allow me to
open up the real possibility of understanding. To allow the Other to be valid against
oneself – and from there to let all my hermeneutic works slowly develop – is not only to
recognize in principle the limitation of one’s own framework, but is also to allow one to
go beyond one’s own possibilities, precisely in a dialogical, communicative, hermeneutic
process.14
Although Truth and Method opens with idealist conceptions of art as the symptom-bearer of the
inadequacies of the subject-object ontology, this autobiographical recollection suggests that
Gadamer’s point of departure in articulating a corrective vision of ontology was actually located
in conceptualizing the self-other relationship.
Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Ontology
The identification of the failures of idealism’s subject-object ontology leads Gadamer to
propose what he calls a hermeneutic ontology, out of which his account of dialogical sociality
unfolds.15 This ontology can be broadly characterized as a participatory or an event ontology in
which the temporal manifestations of entities are not distinct from their true being but rather
constitute that very being itself.16 Gadamer articulates this ontology in opposition to the idealist
view that there exists an abstracted being-in-itself which can be fixed by means of scientific
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objectivity and the subject’s properly and methodically intending such an object.17 Characterized
in this way, Gadamer’s polemic targets 20th century scientific empiricism as much as it does
German idealism. Contrary to these views, Gadamer maintains that the being of entities does not
exist in or as an inert object, but is rather an event of coming to presence in understanding. Being
is not dispersed in static or discrete units, but temporally unfolds in self-presentation.18
In the final part of Truth and Method, Gadamer explains his ontology in relation to the
Platonic concept of the beautiful and suggests that in the course of his investigation “the mode of
being of the beautiful proved to be the characteristic of being in general,” namely, that “what
presents itself in this way is not different from itself in presenting itself. It is not one thing for
itself and another for others”19 Gadamer here claims that just as there is no gap between a
purported beauty-in-itself and beauty-for-us, so there is no dichotomy between reality-in-itself
and reality-for-us either. This expression of reality allows Gadamer to link human understanding
of a being with that entity’s very being.
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Because our understanding of being is not divorced from reality, the process by which
human understanding comes about becomes constitutive of being, on Gadamer’s view. Whereas
idealism abstracted subject and object in order to overcome their opposition in reflective selfconsciousness, Gadamer sees what he takes to be a more primordial unity between being and
consciousness. This bond is one wherein the ground of the unity is not in the subject’s cognition
but in the self-presentation of being in the process of understanding. Because understanding
comes about only fully through language, being comes to presence paradigmatically through
language. Thus, as Gadamer puts it, recognizing that being emerges in the event of the
understanding of language means that “this activity of the thing itself, the coming into language
of meaning, points to a universal ontological structure, namely to the basic nature of everything
toward which understanding can be directed. Being that can be understood is language.”20 For
Gadamer, the world of human beings comes to presence in language such that the human world
is essentially a linguistic world; without language, being would not come to presence for us, at
least not in the form of world. Further, language’s expression of the world is not different from
the being of the world itself. Rather, the being of what is exists just through and as the language
that expresses it.
The presentation of being in language is not a diminution of being but rather is the very
manifestation and realization of being as it is there presented. As Gadamer puts it, “Not only is
the world world only insofar as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being only
in the fact that the world is presented in it. Thus, that language is originarily human means at the
same time that man’s being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic.”21 On Gadamer’s view, then,
“language is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their original belonging
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together.”22 In other words, any relationship between I and the world is the continuity of I and
world in language which is enacted by the process of understanding.
If being is truly expressed in language, Gadamer maintains that language has its true
being in conversation. He writes, “language has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an
understanding…For language is by nature the language of conversation; it fully realizes itself
only in the process of coming to an understanding.”23 For Gadamer, it is the linguistic exchange
which presents the world in language for human understanding. Like the work of art, each
presentation of the world in language engenders an increase in the being of the world, in the
sense that the world is more richly articulated through the proliferation of presentations and
therefore more fully realized in its being. Gadamer’s ontology therefore can quite appropriately
be called a dialogical ontology. The being which is presented in the language of the dialogue is
the very being of the thing itself, die Sache selbst. The Sache emerges, not as an object which an
unaffected subject gains mastery over, but rather through the speaker’s participation in the event
of dialogue with the other person and with the subject at hand. Gadamer applies this model of
conversation to the way that texts and history come to presence in their true being as well. 24
One might be tempted think, on this account, that so long as language is spoken, whether
in dialogue or in monologue, the world achieves progressive fulfillment simply by virtue of the
propagation of language. However, this would leave out the crucial element of understanding in
Gadamer’s account. Gadamer thinks that language is fundamentally expressed for understanding,
for presenting and receiving an articulation of the world to and from those around us. Thus, that
the world is both presented in language and understood through language is what constitutes the
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world come to fruition. Understanding is the human event of participating in the unfolding of the
being of the world in language. Hence, Gadamer’s specific account of the structure of
understanding comes into play at this point.
The Structure of Understanding
On Gadamer’s view, understanding is, following Heidegger, a constitutive feature of
human Dasein, as well as constituting a temporal event.25 That is, understanding the primary way
in which humans interact with the world. Further, understanding is conceived as a temporal event
which persons are constantly experiencing as they move about the world. Gadamer describes the
temporal structure of understanding as a dialectical process of participating with the world which
is enacted in language. For Gadamer, understanding is the mode of engaging the world, made
possible by the way that the human and its world belong together through language, which can
be applied across different domains. Gadamer speaks of understanding texts, works of art, and
history as concrete examples of the general structure of understanding.
Gadamer’s distinct articulation of the nature of understanding corresponds to his
participatory ontology and its rejection of the idealist subject-object model. With reference to
understanding history, he writes, “Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than
as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are
constantly mediated.”26 With reference to understanding texts, Gadamer maintains, against
romantic hermeneutics, that understanding is not the excavation of the mind of an author or other
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person, but it is rather a process of grasping the Sache, or subject matter, of what presents itself
in language.27
According to Gadamer, Schleiermacher’s approach to hermeneutics attempts to abstract
the meaning of the text from the linguistic tradition in which is rooted in order to come to a pure
psychological or spiritual [geistige] meaning. Thus Gadamer writes, “understanding means,
primarily, to understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to isolate and
understand another’s meaning as such.”28 For Gadamer, grasping the intentions of an author is an
abstracting, derivative, and in fact inauthentic,29 hermeneutic operation which overlooks the
fundamental continuity of humans who have their being in language. Because the world is
presented through language, “it is always a human – i.e., verbally constituted – world that
presents itself to us. As verbally constituted, every such world is of itself always open to every
possible insight and hence to every expansion of its own world picture, and is accordingly
available to others.”30 Because humans always have the verbally-constituted world in common,
no tradition, text, or spoken word is alien to me as object is to subject. Thus, understanding
moves from the commonality of the world given in language to the more specific grasp of the
subject matter at issue in a particular presentation of language.
In this way, Gadamer presents understanding as a movement or process which originates
from the “facticity” of language, that is, the “being situated within an event of tradition, a
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process of handing down, [which] is a prior condition of understanding.”31 Gadamer here utilizes
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity to argue that we are always already embedded in a
linguistic world which affects the way in which understanding, especially in the human sciences,
proceeds. Thus, the achievement of mature understanding relies on what Gadamer calls “foreunderstandings.” Accordingly, Gadamer claims that “the most basic of all hermeneutic
preconditions remains one’s own fore-understanding,”32 which is one’s originary grasp of the
world as presented in language. Seeking to overcome the pattern of historical consciousness
which immediately projects history as something foreign to the present, Gadamer argues that the
otherness of history can only become apparent by presupposing the continuity of a tradition
which has mediated that history to us. Thus, Gadamer posits the understanding of history as a
process which begins in fore-understanding and only subsequently is confronted by otherness.
Further, in understanding, the otherness of the horizon of history does not remain
alienated from the present, for it is at the same time fused with the horizon of the present.33 In
this account, the process of understanding history is a process of tradition mediating the
otherness of history to us and our capacity to integrate that history into the present.34
Extrapolating from this case, then, we can say that the process of understanding involves (1)
anticipations of meaning rooted in fore-understandings, (2a) being addressed or provoked by the
otherness of the text or person, (2b) projecting a separated horizon, and (3) the fusion or
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reintegration of the encounter with otherness into a larger horizon or framework, one with a
broader scope of vision.35
Hence, the process of understanding articulated by Gadamer has a basic tripartite
structure. It is the recognition of a discontinuity which emerges out of continuity, which then
reintegrates into more robust continuity, one with a greater degree of coherence. This dialectic,
continuity-discontinuity-continuity, becomes for Gadamer the basic structure through which
humans experience and interact with the world. This structure serves to replace the structure of
knowledge implemented by idealism in which objects are freely abstracted by subjective
cognition, reconstructed apart from their context according to subjective conditions, and thereby
patterned after and integrated into the subject. In contrast to this, Gadamer argues that
understanding is not a subjective/cognitive event, but the participation of persons in the context
which surrounds it. The social relationship necessarily falls into this movement as well: we relate
to others first through the continuity of language, then through the disruption of the other, then
through a renewed continuity which moves us into a higher field of vision.
Self and Other
Gadamer argues that the self’s relation to other persons is conditioned by the ontology of
understanding which he has developed. Because for Gadamer being in genuine relationship with
another person means achieving an ever deeper understanding with the other, the self properly
engages and relates to the other through the dialectical process of understanding described in the
previous section. What this means for Gadamer and for his critics is that the person to person

See Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Gadamer, ed. Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44: “We start off with vague
anticipations of the whole, which are, however, revised the more we engage the text and the subject matter itself.
The basic hermeneutic experience (in the strong sense of Erfahrung), Gadamer will argue, is the experience that our
anticipations of understanding have been shattered.”
35

26

relation itself depends on his more global ontology of understanding. In other words, sociality,
for Gadamer, is dependent, to a certain extent, on ontology.
Gadamer describes the relationship between the self and its human other as occurring in
language, and preeminently in conversation or dialogue.36 The interpersonal dialogue is for
Gadamer the most paradigmatic embodiment of his ontology. He writes, “When two people
come together and enter into an exchange with one another, then there is always an encounter
between, as it were, two worlds, two worldviews and two world pictures.”37 In conversation, the
world is presented in language, meets another presentation of the world, and ultimately, the
world as such increases in its being. The other person presents to the self a world which causes
the self’s own world to be enlarged.38
As with Gadamer’s concept of understanding, the concept of conversation is operative at
multiple levels. It plays the role of a condition or initial moment of the self-other relation as well
as the role of the telos of that relation. A conversation or dialogue on Gadamer’s view can be an
empirical event, one which may fail to achieve a normative sense of understanding or agreement
in content; that is, there may be a basic level of communication but which fails to bring forth a
true interchange between individuals. Gadamer explains, “In any form of dialogue, we are
building up. We are building up a common language, so that at the end of the dialogue we will
have some ground. Of course, not every dialogue is fruitful, but it should at least aim at being a
dialogue. (Very often it is the opposite of that: two monologues following one upon the other.)”39
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There is a sense here in which a dialogue can fail to be a dialogue; two people talking to each
other can in reality be talking past each other, and this can happen either intentionally or
unintentionally. Thus, there is a normative sense of conversation or dialogue that Gadamer often
has in mind which reaches at least a certain level of understanding and agreement about a subject
matter. It is in this kind of linguistic exchange that Gadamer sees the locus of genuine self-other
relations being enacted. Gadamer claims that “conversation has a transformative power”40
because it can open up and change one’s own field of vision.
Thus, in a genuine dialogue, the worlds presented in language are mutually realigned by
virtue of the fusion of each person’s linguistic horizon. Gadamer writes, “The historical
movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one
standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something
into which we move and that moves with us.”41 This notion is that, in coming to understand the
subject matter, the horizons of both interlocutors do not remain static, but undergo an important
change.42 Gadamer explains what is involved in our “movement” by means of his famous image
of the fusion of horizons: “understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly
existing by themselves.”43 This movement “always involves rising to a higher universality that
overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other.”44 Though Gadamer uses a
Hegelian methodology to describe the process of the fusion of the horizons, he denies that this
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“higher universality” can ever reach a final, absolute position. Rather, the movement is an
ongoing process by which different horizons continue to be fused into one another.
Gadamer describes a conversation or dialogue as requiring a few conditions in order for it
to accomplish this fusion and broadening of horizons. The first condition is that both partners
must be attuned not to each other as individuals, but to the subject matter at hand. In other words,
in a true dialogue, the process of understanding does not involve understanding the other person
as such, in her subjectivity, but rather it involves understanding the other person’s claim, that is,
what is said. The otherness which is presented in dialogue, then, is not the otherness of the
person but of the claim.45 Thus Gadamer describes the true conversation as the creation of a
shared language46 in which both dialogue partners are participants of the bringing to presence
the common subject matter.
The second and related condition is that the participants in the dialogue must be open to
the superiority of the other’s claim. This condition represents the way in which Gadamer
understands himself to move beyond Heidegger’s position in which each Dasein is
fundamentally limited and conditioned in its existence. Beyond this claim, Gadamer insists that
the principal limits we find ourselves exposed to are revealed to us in the claims of the other
person with whom we are in conversation. Dasein comes to authenticity only in the
“strengthening” of the other against myself. Hence, for a genuine dialogue and understanding to
occur, the self must recognize that the other’s view on the world bears a truth that my own
horizon lacks. Gadamer asserts, “Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself
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must accept some things that are against me even though no one else forces me to do so.”47 The
implication of this view is that true dialogue and understanding occur only when each dialogue
partner is open to giving up mastery of his or her own horizon and position as the unchanging
central field of meaning.48 This marks a crucial distinction between Gadamer’s view and
idealism, in which the subject is necessarily the ground of meaning.
The third and overlapping condition is that the interlocutors must really listen to what the
other has to say. One could say that this is really an aspect of being open to the other. Gadamer
maintains that “the general condition of conversation” is “that in order to be capable of speech,
one must listen.”49 Gadamer recognizes the difficulty of this requirement and acknowledges that
there is often a failure of listening in conversations. Nevertheless, he suggests that even business
negotiations can be genuine conversations, that “the encounter with the other rises above the
limitations of its concern with dollars or with the interests of power.”50 Thus it appears that there
is no kind of conversation which in principle obstructs listening to the other person’s claim. For
Gadamer, then, it is always and again possible to listen with openness to the other, for in
Gadamer’s words, “to become always capable of conversation—that is, to listen to the Other—
appears to me to be the true attainment of humanity.”51
Through these conditions, we can see that the self-other relation in an authentic linguistic
encounter conforms to the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity. It begins in the continuity of
language and pre-understanding, gets ruptured through openness to the other’s claim, then forms
a more comprehensive and integrative continuity. Again recounting his differentiation from
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Heidegger, Gadamer notes, “what I was concerned with was why I experience my own limitation
through the encounter with the Other, and why I must always learn to experience anew if I am
ever to be in a position to surpass my limits.”52 The dialogue with the other person contains a
moment of self-negation; the other’s claim functions to disrupt my preconceptions and my selfcontinuity. However, Gadamer remarks that ultimately, “the elevation of the dialogue will not be
experienced as a loss of self-possession, but rather as an enrichment of our self, but without us
thereby becoming aware of ourselves.”53 Through the reintegration of the other’s horizon into an
enlarged field of vision, the disruption of the self’s understanding by the other is overcome.
However, the self neither remains fragmented from the encounter nor returns to simple
self-identity in the integration, on Gadamer’s account. Gadamer is quick to maintain that “the
otherness of the Other is not overcome in understanding, but rather preserved.”54 The
understanding that is reached in dialogue with the other is always a provisional understanding,
one continually marked by the situatedness of history and linguistic perspective. Understanding
is provisional because it is temporally situated such that the next moment can always bring about
further negation and revision. In Gadamer’s words, “we are in this ongoing process of
approximation and overcoming error by dialectically moving towards truth.”55 This dialectical
movement is the movement from pre-understanding to ever-enriched understanding.
This theory of the dialectic of dialogue is sketched out as an activity between two poles,
self and other. Over the course of his writing, the way in which Gadamer articulates the character
of these poles shifts, and thus the way in which his theory of sociality is constituted by and
stretches over these poles should be investigated more closely. Gadamer picks up and uses the
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language of Ich and Du in articulating his thinking on sociality in some of his earlier writings as
well as in Truth and Method, a usage which he will later eschew.56
Gadamer introduces his discussion of I and Thou in Truth and Method in his discussion
of the negativity of genuine hermeneutic experience.57 He notes that “‘experience’ in the genuine
sense – is always negative.”58 This means that any true experience is one which refutes
preconceptions and makes possible the growth of one’s view on the world. In contrast to the
ways in which we experience texts or history in general, Gadamer notes that “the experience of
the Thou must be special because the Thou is not an object but is in relationship with us. For this
reason the elements we have emphasized in the structure of experience will undergo a change.
Since the object of experience is a person, this kind of experience is a moral phenomenon.”59 In
other words, because the encounter with the other person involves a different kind of relationship
with the self than a text or a piece of artwork, Gadamer’s analysis must adapt to the conditions of
this interaction. Texts or works of art cannot be morally violated, while persons can.60
Gadamer speaks of three ways in which one might confront the human Thou. The first is
a knowledge of human nature which does not actually confront the other person as such, but
rather reduces the other to a commonly given set of human characteristics.61 This way does not
do justice to the other person, for it treats her as an object. The second is the experience of the
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Thou which recognizes the Thou as a person, yet is still a form of self-relatedness because it too
quickly claims to understand the other person.62 Gadamer is instead interested in a way of
experiencing the other such that she is not subsumed under one’s own horizon but rather is able
to change that horizon, as we noted above. Thus, Gadamer presents the third way, the experience
of the Thou which treats “the Thou truly as a Thou – i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him
really say something to us.”63 This means that we are open to the other in the sense that the Thou
can interrupt my way of being in the world.64 Thus, Gadamer fits the language of I and Thou
neatly in his ontology of understanding: the Thou in dialogue with the I negates the preunderstandings of the I, yet not so as to leave the I fragmented in its identity, but that the I may
be enriched in its identity. Pre-understanding is converted into mature understanding through the
encounter with the Thou.
Nevertheless, Gadamer expresses his discomfort with I-Thou language in his writings
after Truth and Method. In his essay, “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person,” he
writes, “To say ‘the I’ and ‘the Thou’ seems to us, at least since Wittgenstein, no longer quite
allowable.”65 In “Man and Language,” Gadamer alludes to Wittgenstein’s argument against
private languages to articulate what is problematic with the positing of I and Thou: an “essential
feature of the being of language seems to me to be its I-lessness. Whoever speaks a language that
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no one else understands does not speak. To speak means to speak to someone.”66 What Gadamer
is getting at here is that there exists no I separated from a Thou in a dialogue, even in its initial
condition. Dialogue partners do not approach each other from a state of alienness, as
Schleiermacher’s model would have it, for example, but rather from one of commonality. So
Gadamer claims that “speaking does not belong in the sphere of the ‘I’ but in the sphere of the
‘We’”67 Gadamer argues that it is language which “unifies I and Thou;”68 that is, prior to a
decision of I and Thou to come to an understanding with each other, they are already unified in
language. As Gadamer puts it, “language is the real medium of human being, if we only see it in
the realm that it alone fills out, the realm of human being-together.”69 Thus, Gadamer’s claim is
that the language of I and Thou suggests an initial separation between the two which in fact is
always already overcome in language. In essence, then, the language of I and Thou tends to
repeat the mistake of idealism – the separation and alienation of the ego from what confronts it
as if it were foreign from the outset.
Gadamer extends this idea of the bond of language as the medium of sociality to say that
intersubjectivity is not an appropriate model for sociality because of its neglect of the centrality
of language.70 Because the notion of intersubjectivity presupposes the concept of two subjects
initially isolated from each other, Gadamer criticizes intersubjectivity by way of a criticism of
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the philosophy of subjectivity.71 Because on the idealist model, the subject autonomously
configures its objects, it is not conditioned by language or tradition. Hence, the concept of
intersubjectivity is simply the consequence of the attempt at sociality on the idealist model.
Gadamer here relies on Heidegger’s criticism of concepts of reflective self-consciousness as
abstractions of “factical life experience.” Humans are not primarily self-reflective
consciousnesses, but are rather practically and pre-reflectively enmeshed with the world in
multiple ways.72 For Gadamer, language is the fundamental mode of the human being’s
interaction with the world, and particularly, with other humans. Language is the atmosphere we
live in and therefore is bond between humans. Therefore, Gadamer writes, “Who thinks of
‘language’ already moves beyond subjectivity.”73
Having thus disposed of both the model of I-Thou relations and the model of
intersubjectivity as inappropriate for conceiving of genuine sociality, Gadamer suggests two
alternative models on which to build a theory of sociality, not surprisingly borrowed from
tradition: from the concept of person developed in the Christian theological tradition and from
the ancient Greek concept of friendship.74 Gadamer does not really develop the former notion
and for the most part leaves it as suggestive,75 but he does articulate his view of sociality as
friendship in multiple essays.
For Gadamer, the concept of friendship is an appropriate model of sociality because
instead of focusing on knowing subjects as in idealism or its descendants, it emphasizes
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reciprocity and the role of language and conversation in the development of relationships.76
Gadamer relies on a model of friendship that comes out of the writings of Plato and Aristotle
which sees the condition for true friendship with others as a recognition of one’s own limitations
and finitude.77 To seek and form friendships is to realize that one is not self-sufficient, that one’s
own horizon needs expansion, and that “what is lacking is precisely the increase that friendship
signifies.”78
Gadamer suggests two further criteria for friendship. First, he claims that friendship must
be reciprocal: “One recognizes himself in another…in the sense of the reciprocity in play
between friends, such that each sees a model in the other – that is, they understand one another
by reference to what they have in common and so succeed in reciprocal co-perception.”79 In
other words, each member of a friendship recognizes that the other has a horizon that both
overlaps and is distinct from one’s own horizon and recognizes the need to integrate that horizon
into one’s own standpoint “for the sake of his own self-fulfillment.”80 Friendship, by its very
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nature, cannot be one-sided, but rather exists on the basis of the mutual recognition of
foreignness in familiarity. The second criterion is that “the partners cannot remain concealed
from each other.”81 This follows from the supposition that true friendships flourish where each
person has something to learn from the other. The otherness of the other is not suppressed in
favor of shared interests, but can also “correct or strengthen” our views and intentions.82
Friendship is thus Gadamer’s conclusive model for genuine sociality, one which coheres
with his hermeneutic ontology of understanding. Just as understanding comes in degrees and
never arrives at completion, friendship comes in various kinds and is always an approximation of
the best friendship. More importantly, however, friendship embodies Gadamer’s ideal of
reciprocity in dialogue.
For Gadamer, the primacy of language in dialogue leads directly to the claim that
reciprocity is essential in the self-other relationship. This is because neither partner in dialogue
has a monopoly on openness or language; “the language in which something comes to speak is
not a possession at the disposal of one or the other of the interlocutors.”83 Rather, the truth of the
subject matter itself which comes to language is what leads the dialogue.84 Thus, while both
persons must be actively attuned to the subject matter, the primary agent in dialogue is not one or
the other of the persons, but rather the truth which comes to presence through what is spoken.
Hence, the language receives its primacy from its being the medium where the thing itself
presents itself. Achieving true understanding in dialogue with other persons occurs when the
interlocutors allow the truth of the subject matter to emerge through their conversation. This
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results in a situation in which both partners are bound together and changed by mutually
allowing themselves to be encountered by the subject matter.85 Thus, Gadamer concludes that
“when two people understand each other, this does not mean that one person ‘understands’ the
other.”86 Understanding could not occur if only one person was attuned to the subject matter, for
its truth only emerges from out of the linguistic exchange between persons. Therefore, on
Gadamer’s view, the self-other relationship, best embodied in friendship, is a phenomenon which
is accomplished only by a joint effort in approaching truth in the process of understanding.
Initiative and the Between
As noted above, Gadamer maintains that neither the self nor the other has absolute
priority with regard to initiating the social relationship. Rather, he holds that there is a reciprocity
which occurs between the two parties which happens in language, and neither party is the
initiator of this reciprocity. Gadamer writes that in a dialogue, “neither partner alone constitutes
the real determining factor; rather, it is the unified form of movement as a whole that unifies the
fluid activity of both. We can formulate this idea as a theoretical generalization by saying that
the individual self, including his activity and his understanding of himself, is taken up into a
higher determination that is the really decisive factor.”87 For Gadamer, the event of being occurs
in dialogue as a presentation which is enacted through linguistic interlocutors, but which neither
partner is the primary agent in bringing it to presence. It is neither the self nor the other, but
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rather something higher, the truth that emerges from out of the conversation between them that
constitutes genuine sociality.88
This model of sociality is part of his critique of the idealist conception of subjectivity:
people are not isolated subjects but are already drawn together in language. Gadamer departs
from the view that we are separated from language such that we can use it as an instrument at our
own whims. He asserts that “it is literally more correct to say that language speaks us, rather than
that we speak it.”89 Because the world we inhabit is a linguistic world, all of our reflective
endeavors are linguistically formed. When we appear to use language as a tool, willing to use it
in one way rather than in another, we engage in comparative evaluations, judging one use to be
better or more advantageous than another. But even these comparative judgments presuppose
language. Thus, before we come to any particular conversation, language has already shaped us
by virtue of our having been formed in a linguistic tradition. This is why Gadamer claims that
“the language in which something comes to speak is not a possession at the disposal of one or the
other of the interlocutors. Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates
a common language. Something is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the partners in
dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another.”90
Gadamer then adds to this by claiming a kind of agency which arises from neither
dialogue partner, but rather from the conversation itself:
We say that we “conduct” a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is,
the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine
conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally
more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become
involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its
own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way,
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but the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one
knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation. Understanding or its
failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a
good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a
spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth
within it – i.e., that it allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists.91
Gadamer is here articulating his own model of conversation in opposition to a model which sees
two subject poles communicating with their other as an object pole. On such a view, each side
may alter its position with respect the other, but need not do so for a genuine dialogue to occur.
Gadamer rejects this view by rejecting that the dialogue partners are separated from each other as
a subject from an object. Further, he rejects the autonomous power of either dialogue partner to
stand over and above the other. Rather, both speakers are immersed in language which is both
their common bond and the agent which directs their conversation. One may wonder here what
Gadamer can mean by attributing agency to language; at first glance it could seem like an
unwarranted hypostatization of an impersonal process. However, Gadamer explains his view
with two models which are meant to demonstrate this agency of language in conversation and its
priority.
The first model comes from the concept of play, as something which happens to persons
at play. Gadamer writes, “The players are not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches
presentation (Darstellung) through the players.”92 Although the players participate in the game,
they are bound by and caught up in the rules of the game such that their subjectivity as distinct
from play itself is of little or no importance to the enactment of the game. Their subjectivity is
only effective, with regard to the game, as governed by play. Thus, Gadamer affirms “the
primacy of play over the consciousness of the player.”93 In this way, Gadamer can talk about the
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agency of play without constructing play as an agent. It is not that play is a center of intentional
acts, but rather play is the medium through which intentionality is structured. Gadamer explains,
“The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking
the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence.”94 In relation to the situation of
dialogue, it is the context of language itself, of the language game, which governs the
consciousness of the interlocutors. The persons do not need to struggle to communicate to each
other as to some foreign agent because both persons are already participants in the play of
language. Gadamer thus emphasizes “the importance of defining play as a process that takes
place ‘in between.’”95 The initiative of the play of language on Gadamer’s view is what enacts
the social relation between persons. Any agency of the self or the other in this process must be
described as a participation, and not an initiative.
Gadamer’s second model which articulates the agency of language is explicitly
phenomenological, drawing from the language of Husserl and Heidegger. Gadamer describes
what he takes to be an important insight in Husserl’s theory of intentionality:
Husserl spoke of anonymous intentionalities, that is, conceptual intentions in
which something is intended and posited as ontically valid, of which no one is
conscious thematically as individually intended and performed, which nonetheless
are binding for everyone. Thus what we call the stream of consciousness is built
up in internal time consciousness. The horizon of the life-world too is such a
product of anonymous intentionalities.96
Gadamer is here picking up on a strand of Husserl’s thought which articulates a kind of
intentionality which does not proceed from an ego or subject, but rather presents itself
“anonymously” to an individual. By directing my focus on the picture across the room, I
simultaneously become aware of the wall as its background, the bookshelf underneath it, that
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there are books on the bookshelf, and so on. Gadamer explains, “This horizon of intentionalities,
the constantly cointended, is not itself an object of a subjective act of meaning.”97 A phenomenal
horizon, or context, surrounds each intentional act, is copresented with it, and situates and
therefore gives meaning to what is subjectively intended. For Gadamer, this means that
subjective intentions are always passively synthesized with or integrated into anonymous
intentions.
Gadamer suggests that “a clear line leads directly from the concepts of passive synthesis
and anonymous intentionality to the hermeneutical experience.”98 What Gadamer wants to take
from these concepts is the idea that our experience of reality always supersedes and conditions
our subjective intentionality. We never are in a position to absolutely constitute and therefore
control our reality as subjects master objects, but rather our intentional acts are a participation in
the continual presentation of the world in the horizon of intentionality. And for Gadamer, this
horizon is presented to us in language. In this way, Gadamer explains that the linguistic world
from which our own speaking arises precedes, conditions, and operates upon our own use of
language. Language is the agent and our speaking is the participation in language’s activity.
Gadamer also explores this idea from another phenomenological angle, this time with
reference to Heidegger’s retrieval of the scholastic division between the actus signatus, a
reflective act, and the actus exercitus, a direct act. The actus exercitus is a direct, nonobjectifying apprehension of reality which precedes and is distinct from the act of reflection on
what is captured in consciousness. Gadamer then identifies this distinction in consciousness with
Heidegger’s basic concept of being-in-the world.99 We first and foremost apprehend the world
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not through objective reflection but through this more direct actus exercitus. Following this idea,
Gadamer claims, “Language is language when it is a pure actus exercitus, that is, when it is
absorbed into making what is said visible, and has itself disappeared, as it were.”100 Here,
language functions in its normal and most basic state not merely when the speaking subject
disappears but when the words have ceased to stand as distinct from what they express. On this
view, it is the activity of the Sache, the thing itself which has priority, which emerges through the
means of language. Thus Gadamer appropriates the intentional concept of the actus exercitus for
his own project of demonstrating the priority of the Sache over the initiative of reflective
subjectivity. This analysis of the two modes of intentionality directly combats the idealist
reliance on the actus signatus as the regulatory mode in which subjects come to know
themselves and the world around them.
Gadamer’s examination of the models of consciousness leads him to reject the idealist,
subject-centered model in favor of the ontology of the self-presentation of the world to Dasein.
Because the human being’s interaction with the world is explained in terms of the metaphor of
play and through the phenomenological mechanisms of intentionality, it follows that sociality is
grounded through the activity of the subject matter between persons rather than from the
initiative of either person. As Gadamer describes the event of conversation, “it really is true to
say that this event is not our action upon the thing, but the act of the thing itself.”101 In the next
section, I situate Gadamer’s view within Theunissen’s typology of social ontologies, showing
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how Gadamer’s view uniquely distinguishes itself from both the transcendental and dialogical
models of sociality.
Gadamer and Dialogicalism
What I have been calling Gadamer’s dialogical model of sociality, which focuses on the
agency of what is between persons in dialogue, fits into Michael Theunissen’s model of
dialogical social ontology exemplified by Martin Buber.102 Theunissen sees the philosophy of
dialogue as an attempt to correct the reductive tendencies of both German idealism as well as the
transcendental approach as exemplified by Husserl. Theunissen takes Buber’s thought as
representative of, though not identical to, the counter-idealist movement of dialogical philosophy
that flourished in post-World War I German thought. On Theunissen’s account of Buber, “the
explication of dialogical life is supposed to lay the foundation of ontology.”103 Here we can note
that on Gadamer’s view, dialogical life is the most salient illustration of his ontology of
understanding, but that his ontology extends beyond the interpersonal dialogue to art, history,
and texts, marking a difference from Buber. Nevertheless, Buber, like Gadamer, proposes a
model of sociality which arises not from a subject relating to its other as object or even as
another subject, but rather one which arises from a more fundamental relation in between them.
Buber says that this “relation is reciprocity,”104 which indicates the reaction to singledirectional concepts of sociality as proposed by idealism. Buber’s project thus charts the way in
which persons encounter each other which serves to undermine idealism. Theunissen notes that
this relation between I and Thou “is now above all characterized by ‘immediacy’”105 as well as
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being “a relationship of mutuality.”106 The immediacy invoked here is primarily a rejection of the
mediation of the intentionality or constitution by a consciousness. In other words, the between
[das Zwischen] is the very presence of the relation which is said to be both logically prior to the
interlocutors and immediately present in the dialogical encounter.107 Further, each person is
mutually constituted in genuine existence from out of the meeting; it is not the case that the self
constitutes the Other through intentional consciousness, nor can it be properly said that the Thou
constitutes the I. Rather, it is the encounter itself, the between, which alone carries the agency of
constitution. That is, both self and other emerge in their presence to each other only through the
between. On this view “the meeting happens at the same time to I and Thou” which ultimately
posits “the origination of the partners out of the between.”108 As Theunissen describes Buber’s
thought, then, “genuine persons only exist in a genuine relation, in other words, that the relation,
as encounter, first brings forth those who meet each other as persons.”109 On Buber’s view, thus
represented, there are no persons prior to the meeting; the relation is the beginning of the person.
Theunissen will come to criticize Buber’s dialogicalism on just this point. He claims that
“the philosophy of dialogue, the phenomenon that dispenses with transcendental philosophy, can
itself only be discovered in its essentials on the basis of transcendental philosophy.”110 What he
means by this is that although Buber’s thought seeks to posit the between as the originator of
both I and Thou, it must implicitly presuppose two subjectively-constituting poles which the
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between then acts upon.111 Theunissen’s argument for this hinges on “perspectivity.” He says
that advocates of the philosophy of dialogue such as Buber “hardly succeed in describing
convincingly the genesis of perspectivity out of the non-perspectival reality of the between. Since
perspectivity is the essential component of the subjectively constituted world, this means that
they are not at all capable of validating their thesis.”112 A genuine dialogue would appear to be
nothing without the encounter between different perspectives. But if persons arise directly from
the meeting, there is no explanation for perspectivity; the between itself is not the sort of thing
that constitutes or generates perspectives. Perspectives arise from subjectivities which constitute
the world from distinct vantage points. Hence, subjective perspectives must properly exist before
a true dialogue can occur. Because Buber’s view does not account for the existence of
perspectivity prior to the between, Theunissen claims that the philosophy of dialogue which
Buber represents ultimately fails to provide a convincing model of sociality. That is, dialogical
philosophy must implicitly presuppose the transcendental foundations it purports to repudiate.
Theunissen concludes his study by proposing between the transcendental and dialogical
models of sociality a mediation which begins from the subjective constitution of the world and
therefore other persons, but then enters into genuine relations with the other through the event of
dialogue. Theunissen thinks that the philosophy of dialogue cannot account for the genesis of the
perspectives required for dialogue and hence must admit that subjects predate their relations with
others by means of intentional constitution. The proper place, then, of dialogue is not as the
origin but as the fulfillment of subjects – a conversion from subjects to selves or persons. The

Theunissen argues that dialogical thinkers should “fully recognize that the meeting presupposes that the ones
meeting each other exist upon a particular being level, and concede to the between solely the power to transform the
poles that impinge upon one another.” Ibid., 366.
112
Ibid., 367-368.
111

46

philosophy of dialogue, Theunissen reasons, is unsuccessful at providing a comprehensive model
of sociality, but its value comes in its emphasis on the human telos toward relationships.
As I have claimed that Gadamer’s thought fits into Theunissen’s category of a dialogical
social ontology, it would seem to follow that Gadamer also succumbs to the criticisms that
Theunissen levies against the philosophy of dialogue. However, I will now show how Gadamer’s
account diverges from Buber’s view such that it avoids Theunissen’s criticisms while remaining
robustly dialogical. To do this, I need to show that Gadamer’s ontological grounding of sociality
in between persons is not itself generative of persons such that subjective perspectives are left
unexplained. At the same time, however, I will show that the individuals who encounter each
other in dialogue are ontologically anchored in their linguistic and historical context such that
their subjectivity is not free to constitute the world around them.
It is first important to point out that although Gadamer draws on a notion of an “inbetween,” he does not claim, as Buber does, that personhood as such begins from the dialogue
between persons.113 For example, with regard to interpreting texts, Gadamer speaks of a
“tension…in the play between the traditionary text's strangeness and familiarity to us, between
being a historically intended, distanced object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus of
hermeneutics is this in-between.”114 What Gadamer has in mind here is hermeneutics as playing
the mediatorial function between past and present, between foreign and familiar. It is the fusion
of these two horizons, transforming the senses of both sameness and strangeness in the process,
that constitutes the “in-between” for Gadamer. Transposing this framework from the
interpretation of texts to the encounter between persons, we can say that this in-between for

113
114

See Mendes-Flohr, From Mysticism to Dialogue, 38.
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295.

47

Gadamer is the emergence of the truth of the Sache in the reciprocity of the partners in
dialogue.115
On this account, persons must exist with differing horizons, or perspectives, for the
understanding in between them to develop. Were there no differing horizons that different
persons bring to the dialogue, there could be no true dialogue, no progression or enhancement of
understanding. Therefore, while Gadamer rejects conceiving of persons as subjects which relate
to their others as objects in favor of the play of language encompassing both figures, he does not
thereby reject that perspective-laden persons exist prior to their meeting each other. Günter Figal
explains, “When Gadamer takes issue with the subjectivity of a game and its historical life, he
does not mean that there are no persons participating, but rather that the game and its historical
life do not find their basis in the fulfillment of a knowing and self-conscious life. The concept of
subjectivity indicates an understanding of life as a principle.”116 In other words, Gadamer’s
objection is to the idealist notion of subjectivity as a grounding principle through which the rest
of reality is filtered. Instead, it is language which serves as the medium and ground through
which the relation between partners in dialogue exists.
Although each person is always already “traditioned” in language and therefore not prior
to language, each person genuinely exists and possesses a linguistic world prior to coming to
each particular dialogue which enlarges that world. Instead of proceeding from non-linguistic
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subjective constitution and reaching fulfillment in empathy or communicative exchange,
Gadamer’s view proceeds from linguistic pre-understanding to fulfillment in dialogue. Because
Gadamer’s model views the social relation as embedded in linguisticality all the way down, this
also suggests that at no time is the social relation merely subjectively constituted.117 Thus,
Gadamer provides an alternative to models of sociality which argue that the social relation must
originate from the subjective constitution of the world prior to linguistic acquisition. This model
suggests that initiative in sociality, even at the limit case of infancy, begins neither from the I nor
the Thou, but from the dialogue which emerges from between them. At the same time, rather
than the dialogue between persons authoring the self and other in toto, Gadamer’s claim is that
the relation of sociality is not grounded in either person in the dialogue. While sociality itself is
grounded in the “between,” on Gadamer’s view, this is not the same as saying that the persons
themselves are grounded in the between.
While Gadamer clearly offers a form of dialogical sociality which departs from Buber’s
view, he nevertheless does fit Theunissen’s characterization of the dialogical repudiation of
transcendental sociality.118 However, because Gadamer does allow that persons exist prior to
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their engagement in the event of dialogue, the worry may arise that his account amounts to a
little more than a variation on Theunissen’s mediation between the transcendental and dialogical
categories and thus also must presuppose the transcendental grounding of sociality. That is,
because Gadamer’s view proceeds from individuals to the mutually-enriching dialogue between
them, it appears that it subordinates the principle of dialogue to playing an ornamental role to
sociality rather than being its origin and ground. It is true that, like Theunissen, Gadamer speaks
of dialogue as bringing persons into authenticity, that the “between” more fully develops persons
in the process of joining them together in the process of dialogue. However, Gadamer’s more
fundamental argument is one which rejects the idealist or transcendental premise that the subject
inaugurates the social relation.
To combat the “transcendental” characterization of Gadamer’s view, we can recall
Gadamer’s rejection of the idealist philosophy of subjectivity as promoting a mistaken model of
how the self relates to the world around it. He writes, “Long before we understand ourselves
through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the
family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The
self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life.”119
Gadamer’s contention here is that the activity of an individual’s reflection on the self qua subject
is derivative of the person’s social embeddedness in a community. He follows this up by
maintaining that the “prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the
historical reality of his being.”120 Gadamer’s point is to demonstrate the individual’s historical
situatedness in contrast to the idealist concept of the subject who constitutes the world around
her as if in a vacuum. The play of language and anonymous intentionality always outstrips the
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subject’s attempt to autonomously give meaning to objects, events, and others. That is, none of
us operates, let alone starts out, as a subject who intends in such ways.
In perhaps Gadamer’s strongest statement on the matter, he says, “the pure transcendental
subjectivity of the ego is not really given as such but always given in the idealization of
language; moreover, language is already present in any acquisition of experience, and in it the
individual ego comes to belong to a particular linguistic community.”121 Here Gadamer
maintains that the assertion of pure, transcendental subjectivity apart from its mediation in
language is belied by the historical and factical conditions which constitute selfhood. Hence,
Gadamer provides an alternative to the mediation between transcendentalism and dialogicalism
that Theunissen provides. Instead of presupposing a transcendental subject, Gadamer
presupposes and articulates a factical subject, one who moves from linguistic pre-understanding
to ever richer social relation through dialogue. Thus, Gadamer’s model serves as an alternative
model of sociality – not only an alternative to idealist and transcendental models but also an
alternative to the dialogical model represented by Buber.
The Contribution of Gadamer’s Account of Sociality
Let us recall that Gadamer’s account of sociality has its roots in his critique of idealism.
Gadamer argues that idealism places subjectivity at the foundation of all cognitive activity such
that it freely determines the world around it as object under the conditions of the knowing
subject. But for Gadamer, this account simply does not do justice to the way human
consciousness operates in concrete reality. Citing Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, Gadamer
claims that phenomenological research has shown the ways in which consciousness is
conditioned by given reality much more than is reality conditioned by consciousness. Hence,
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there is no such thing as an independent subject freely lording over being by means of its
intentionality. Further, experience teaches us, on Gadamer’s view, that our limitations are given
to us primarily in social life.
Therefore, while relying on Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity, Gadamer endeavors to
advance beyond his teacher’s criticisms by proposing a participatory ontology which accounts
for the hermeneutic character of all of being. Gadamer primarily wants to show how being is
universally linguistically mediated to human beings and in so doing, he offers a replacement for
idealist subject-object models of reality. Instead of subjects constituting objects, Gadamer’s
model presents dialogue as the leading example of how persons come to an understanding of the
world around them.
Not only does Gadamer illustrate his ontology through the example of conversation, but
he also articulates his account of social life by means of the event of understanding which
characterizes his ontology. This means that sociality is driven by the event of persons engaging
each other in the process of understanding each other through language. This dialogue between
persons serves as both the ground and agent of the sociality which draws persons together. What
is particularly unique about Gadamer’s account is the agency that he gives to the dialogue, which
is why he says that “the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one
knows in advance what will ‘come out’ of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an
event that happens to us.”122 Gadamer’s claim, then, is that the sociality is grounded in event of
understanding in dialogue, which exceeds and is external to the initiative of either the self or the
other who encounter each other.
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In order to see the originality of Gadamer’s account, recall Theunissen’s assessment of
the dialogical models of sociality which seek to overthrow the transcendental models. On
Theunissen’s evaluation, Buber, who serves as representative of the philosophy of dialogue,
must implicitly presuppose that which he explicitly rejects, namely, the transcendental grounding
of the individuals who encounter each other in dialogue. Hence, while Theunissen maintains that
the philosophy of dialogue brings important points to bear upon the question of a social
ontology, he concedes that any successful account of sociality must begin from the
transcendental model of subjects constituting the world around them. In contrast to this
assessment, as I have argued above, Gadamer fully rejects the idealist grounding of sociality in
transcendental subjectivity while offering a dialogical model which grounds sociality in the
dialogue between factical subjects. This model therefore avoids the defects which Theunissen
attributes to Buber. Seen from this vantage point, Gadamer represents an innovative position in
his account of dialogical sociality. It rejects the idealist grounding of the social relation in the
transcendental ego while at the same time rejecting the Buberian claim that persons themselves
must be grounded in the dialogue between them. Gadamer achieves this by providing a
hermeneutic ontology which undergirds the grounding of sociality in the dialogue between
persons; it is this ontology which Gadamer presents as a corrective to idealism.
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Chapter Two: Levinas and Sociality as Responsibility
The aim of this chapter is to lay out Levinas’s model of sociality as a direct and
distinctive response to what he understands as idealist concepts of sociality. Levinas inhabits a
unique position in the topography of responses to idealism which I chart in this project in that he
argues that sociality is grounded not in the subject, nor in the dialogue between subjects, nor in
the divine, but rather in the human other. To be specific, Levinas holds the social relation to be
constituted by the personal, ethical responsibility of the subject toward the person who faces her.
This stance opposes what Levinas takes to be the idealist absorption of the other into the same,
that is, into the subject. Hence, Levinas decisively rejects any claim that sociality can begin from
the intentionality of the subject. Further, responsibility for Levinas is prior to empirical dialogue
and conditions any further interactions between persons. Dialogue is thus only a derivative effect
of sociality on Levinas’s view. Levinas therefore advances what he takes to be a more radical
rejection of idealism than found in Gadamer in claiming that sociality is both enacted and
maintained wholly prior to dialogue between persons. The ground of sociality for Levinas is in
the other person’s self-revelation to the subject and the subject’s experience of responsibility as a
result of this encounter.
In what follows of this chapter, I will set out the elements of the face-to-face encounter
which for Levinas constitutes sociality. Levinas chiefly describes sociality as the encounter with
the face. This articulation will begin with an explanation of Levinas’s rejection of the ontology
which typifies idealism on his view and his defense of the separation of the subject and the other.
I will then lay out the various elements and metaphors Levinas uses to describe the enactment of
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sociality in the revelation of the face of the other. Levinas argues that the social relation,
grounded in the face of the other, precedes the initiative of the subject. This remarkable claim
constitutes a response to idealism that distinguishes itself from both the dialogical philosophy of
Buber as well as Gadamer’s dialogical model of sociality. On Levinas’s view, the positing of the
ground of sociality merely “in-between” persons is not sufficient to escape idealism’s selfcentered approach to social life.
Idealism, Ontology, and the Rejection of Ontology in Levinas
While Levinas famously repudiates the whole tradition of ontology in Western
philosophy, he has in mind a particular conception of ontology which he rejects. What Levinas
labels ontology is the identity of “what is” and what is thought, the identity of thinking and
being. The fundamental claim of ontology, in Levinas’s view, is that “what is” is intelligible,
graspable within the confines of one’s own thought, one’s own interior. As we shall see, in
denouncing this view of ontology, Levinas is rejecting what Franz Rosenzweig rejects in the idea
that there is a single comprehensible totality of all that is. What we find in Levinas, then, is not
so much the denial of an accounting for what is, but the denial that what is can be accounted for
in a single, comprehensive frame of vision. Indeed, Levinas does describe elements of reality and
their relations to one another, and these descriptions do in fact form the basis for his model of
sociality, much in the way that the avowed ontology of Gadamer provides the grounds on which
his models of sociality is constructed.
Levinas defines ontology as the unification of being and thinking as exemplified in a
lineage of Western philosophical systems which he identifies with idealism. In Totality and
Infinity, he writes, “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the
other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of
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being.”1 In other words, any entity putatively distinct from the subject becomes bound to the
subject. It becomes designated as a member of the class of beings or as located within the totality
of being itself. “Being” becomes the third term, shared by subject and object, which makes
things intelligible to us, but in so doing, ultimately flattens out any crucial difference between
entities. This means not only that there are no consequential variations between entities, but also
that no pivotal differences ultimately remain between the subject and the entities it comprehends.
Levinas is particularly concerned with the comprehension between self and other,
between me and the other person who comes to me from outside myself. In idealism, according
to Levinas, every object of knowledge submits to the subjective conditions for knowledge. On
Levinas’s view, the categories of the objects of possible cognition are not merely formal
constraints on how entities appear to the subject, but concretely affect the ways in which others
appear to me as well.2 What Levinas objects to here is the way in which the I reduces the
individuality of the other to the general characteristics shared by all persons. He writes, “The
relation with the other is here accomplished only through a third term which I find in myself.”3
The problem with this move is that it assumes that I contain in myself already all the necessary
conditions for existing beings. I am self-sufficient. Thus, when I consider the other from the
standpoint of being, she is grasped according to the categories of being and the possibility that
she can teach, surprise, or interrupt me is eliminated.
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This has deleterious effects, thinks Levinas: “To affirm the priority of Being over
existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with
someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which,
impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing),
subordinates justice to freedom.”4 Put another way, Levinas argues that ontology, in its
identification of persons as existents which fit into the scheme of being, not only reduces persons
to knowable objects, but also thereby puts persons into its own cognitive box. Persons, as
objects, are relegated to products of the meaning giving act of consciousness.5 Ontology, on
Levinas’s view, supports the priority of the thinking subject over the freedom of the other; the
subject is free to determine the other, but the other is not free to resist the categorization of the
subject.6 Thus, Levinas claims, “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power.”7
Levinas’s charge, then, is that ontology fails to respect the freedom of the other when it attempts
to apprehend what the other is in the impersonal prioritizing of Being over personhood.
While Hegel’s version of idealism for Levinas represents a kind of pinnacle of the folly
of ontology,8 Levinas sees in the articulations of phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger a
reversion to idealism and therefore to ontology.9 In the essay “Intentionality and Sensation,”
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Levinas writes, “Phenomenological idealism is strongly committed to this correlation between
the structures of meanings that are thought and the thoughts – noeses – that think them, and that
thus rationally follow from one another.”10 On Levinas’s view, this mode of phenomenology is
idealist and exemplifies ontology in its correlation between thinking and being: all others show
up as noema, intentional objects, which must correspond to the subject’s intentional acts.11 What
Levinas finds particularly objectionable here is the meaning-giving function [Sinngebung]
accorded to the I in Husserl’s thought. The I gives meaning to the object; the object does not get
to define itself. Hence, as in classical idealism, the other is reduced to the same.
Another way that Levinas characterizes philosophies of ontology is to say that they
feature participation in a totality, by both self and other. In such a system of thought, Levinas
says, “The individuals would appear as participants in the totality: the Other would amount to a
second copy of the I – both included in the same concept.”12 On Levinas’s account, participation
is little more than the domestication of the foreign into the familiar. This is a reiteration of the
claim that if self and other share a third term which unifies them, the alterity of the other is
denied. On a participatory ontology, nothing can remain truly other than me if we both
participate in the same totality of being. What is essential on this account is the shared nature of
the beings in question. When the other is understood to share in the essential qualities I possess, I
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understand the other as myself, as an alter-ego. And from Levinas’s perspective, this means that
no other can interrupt my own perspectives and outlook – my continuity of self-identity.13
Thus, Levinas rejects from the outset an ontology of the likes espoused by Gadamer
which advocates the participation of two parties in the same ontological bond of language. For
his part, Gadamer would deny that his hermeneutic ontology turns the other into a “second copy”
of the I. Because humans share some things in common, such as language and tradition, need not
lead to the claim that persons are reduced simply to their commonalities. Rather, these common
traits make possible the access to the other. Communication would be impossible apart from the
conditions which alike we share in. Without dialogue, we could not learn of the otherness which
exists from beyond our limited horizon. Yet from Levinas’s point of view, a sociality grounded
in the bond of language which exerts its agency over individuals does not escape the idealist
tendency of the ego to understand the other as alter-ego. While Gadamer gives lip service to
changing one’s own views before the other, the other is always understood in terms of the
language which is shared in common. For Levinas, the agency of the Sache which presents itself
in language is insufficient to combat the ego’s predisposition to reduce the other to the same.
Levinas’s solution to the problem of participation – the problem of creating the other in
my own image – draws from a key feature in Rosenzweig’s philosophical system: separation.14
Rosenzweig argues that the three fundamental elements of reality are God, the world, and the
human being. Other philosophical systems tend to reduce these elements to its own privileged
keystone. For example, idealism reduces God and the world to the cognition of the human being.
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Hence, Rosenzweig argues that the true philosophical system is one which preserves the
distinctiveness and separation of these three elements from each other.15 Following this idea,
Levinas argues that the I must remain separated from the other and from being itself in order to
retain both its genuine identity, what Levinas calls the ipseity of the ego, and the identity of the
other. Levinas writes, “For the idea of totality, in which ontological philosophy veritably
reunites—or comprehends—the multiple, must be substituted the idea of a separation resistant to
synthesis.”16 The concept of separation for Levinas means allowing the same and the other to
truly be different from each other, not comprehensible into a single totality.
The clearest manifestation of this separation, this non-collapsibility into totality, is
accomplished through the subject’s own inner life, or interiority. Levinas characterizes interiority
as enjoyment, which is the embrace of the nourishing contents of life.17 Indeed, Levinas claims
that “subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty of enjoyment.”18 Levinas thus
invokes a sense of the separation of the subject rooted in its inner conscious life in its enjoyment
of the basic constituents of life. We live from and through food, water, air, and shelter, but these
are not merely objects we consume, but contents which we embrace and which give us
fulfillment. Enjoyment is an affective relation to the world around me, which precedes both the
intentionality of representation as well as the alterity of the other. Here, Levinas offers
phenomenological evidence for the independence of our interior life which separates the subject
from the other person as well as from God.19 With similarity to Rosenzweig before him, Levinas
maintains the separation of the self from God and from the other human being in the world.
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While Rosenzweig has no qualms with using ontological language to describe the
elements of reality in their separation, as we will see in the following chapter, Levinas’s
designation of ontology as the correlation between thing and thought problematizes any
ascription of ontology to his project. In fact, one might think that Levinas rejects ontology tout
court. However, it is important to note what Levinas is not rejecting when he disavows ontology.
He is not rejecting Rosenzweig’s model of the three elements of God, world, and human, for as
we will see, these elements only truly unfold temporally. Nor is he rejecting out of hand the
describability of phenomena which appear to us. Rather, he rejects the human capacity to grasp
and encompass the totality of beings in a single panorama, a single field of vision.
Phenomenological description, properly circumscribed, is still in principle viable, thought it
cannot be a description which considers itself to be neutral, total, or final.
Levinas argues that the multiplicity of beings is fundamentally opposed to their being
reconciled into a homogeneity, into a concept of “Being itself.” But this opposition to totality
reveals an alternative understanding of those beings and invites further investigation into their
appearing. Levinas writes, “This impossibility of conciliation among beings, this radical
heterogeneity, in fact indicates a mode of being produced and an ontology that is not equivalent
to panoramic existence and its disclosure.”20 Here, Levinas actually uses the language of
ontology to advocate for what he calls a mode of being, albeit a non-totalizing one, which instead
of lining everything up in a panorama of being, alters its mode of access to beings. Levinas
asserts, “Being is exteriority…or, if one prefers, alterity.”21 In this way of describing the matter,
using the spatial metaphors of interiority and exteriority, Levinas claims that being is to found
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not as the collocation of the breadth of all beings, but in the veering of perspective into the depth
of one being’s relation of otherness to another being. That is, being is not found in viewing, say,
the two dimensions of a photograph of a grand panorama, but instead is found in entering into
the third dimension of depth which the photograph can never adequately represent.
Utilizing a different spatial metaphor, Levinas characterizes this depth as a “curvature of
space” which “inflects distance into elevation” because its movement consists in “the being
situated in a subjective field which deforms vision, but precisely thus allows exteriority to state
itself, entirely command and authority: entirely superiority” 22 Thus, Levinas articulates this nontotalizing form of ontology, this deformed yet true vision of being, as a relation of height that
comes to the subject from that which is exterior to it. Preferring the label “metaphysics” to
ontology, Levinas writes, “The aspiration to radical exteriority, thus called metaphysical…
constitutes truth.”23 For Levinas, metaphysics signifies the transcendence of the other to the
same, the exterior to the subject, in a way that denies the correlation between what is denoted by
the metaphysical and the subject which attempts to grasp it.24 In fact, Levinas argues that
“metaphysics precedes ontology,”25 by arguing that the relation to exteriority actually precedes
and conditions the correspondence between idea and reality effected by intentionality. 26
However, it is not just any exterior being which makes possible this opening up of the
dimension of height to the subject. Concretely, this must be accomplished by the dispossessing
of the intentional consciousness of its propensity to draw all being into itself, when “that which
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is aimed at unseats the intentionality which aims at it.”27 To be sure, Levinas remarks, the world
of objects, inhabitations, and implements is often quite foreign and other to me, but ultimately
the perceptual alterity of the world remains subject to my intentionality.28 Thus Levinas argues
that an It, an object in the world of appearances cannot break free from the grasp of the I. He
therefore claims, “A relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within
the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, as a face to face.”29 In
other words, the human being, and more specifically, the face of the human other, is the locus of
the relation of exteriority which for Levinas expresses the truth of what is, that is, that reality is
not seen other than in the human face before my eyes.
For Levinas, then, the primordial social relation of the face to face is constitutive of a
non-totalizing ontology, which he prefers to call metaphysics. While for Gadamer, sociality is
determined in large part by a more comprehensive ontological structure, for Levinas, sociality
just is true ontology, if we may put it that way.30 Or rather, the sociality found in the face to face
meeting between two human persons overturns all other totalizing ontologies. Instead of working
from broad structure to specific applications of that structure, Levinas begins from the concrete
situation of the confrontation of one face to another and spins out his entire project from the
implications of that encounter.31 In the following sections, then, I will unpack the elements of the
encounter with the face of the other which for Levinas constitutes sociality.
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The Encounter with the Other: Revelation and Face
The face to face encounter for Levinas constitutes the locus of sociality and the
production of true experience. Social life is generated out of this encounter, which both
presupposes and enacts the radical separation between beings which is necessary to prevent the
lapse into totality.32 While it might be thought that the encounter with the other binds the two
beings together into a circumscribable relationship, Levinas maintains that “the face to face is
not a modality of coexistence nor even of the knowledge (itself panoramic) one term can have of
another, but is the primordial production of being on which all the possible collocations of the
terms are founded.”33 So the face to face is the event which makes possible arranging beings in
description, but is not something which itself can be described in that way. Thus Levinas has the
unenviable task of attempting to articulate what cannot be captured in the third-person, from an
uninvolved point of view.
Nevertheless, Levinas proceeds to analyze the face-to-face encounter in multiple ways,
using diverse metaphors to articulate the various facets that the encounter brings to light.
Phenomenologically, the face presents the I with a “counter-intentionality,” one which inverts
the I’s consuming gaze and questions the legitimacy of the self. Levinas describes this inversion
of intentionality as revelation, the revelation of the other to the same. This revelation has a
unique content and mode of enactment. The revelation of the face, for Levinas, is enacted
through discourse or language. However, this is not an empirical language, but rather a pre-
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linguistic expressivism. The content of this discourse is the ethical command summed up in the
words, “Do not kill!”
To back up several steps, however, we need to clarify what exactly Levinas is talking
about when he invokes this encounter between one face and another. For although Levinas is
speaking about encountering the literal, corporeal face of another human being, he argues that
this mundane phenomenon in our field of vision gives way to something beyond the corporeally
tangible. Levinas writes, “The face, still a thing among things, breaks through the form that
nevertheless delimits it.”34 In other words, Levinas claims that the face is a “sensible datum,” but
that nevertheless “the face rends the sensible.”35 Levinas thus holds that the face is at once
concrete and abstract: it has concrete phenomenal appearance, but its meaning is not exhausted
in that concretion.36 Instead, that face manifests an abstraction from the phenomenon. For
Levinas, “the abstractness of the face is a visitation and a coming which disturbs immanence
without settling into the horizons of the World.”37 This means that the speaking or the revelation
which comes from the face is not to be identified with or found in the concrete features of the
face. Although the face never reveals apart from its phenomenality, its revelation is not to be
confused with the particular way a face looks at any given time. Levinas maintains that the “face
of the other – underlying all the particular forms of expression in which he or she…plays a role –
is no less pure expression.”38 That is, the face expresses beneath and apart from particular facial
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expressions. With Paul Ricoeur, we should say that the true character of the face is heard as a
voice rather than seen as a vision.39
Levinas’s core thesis in this quasi-phenomenological description of the face is that this
encounter with the other human being reveals that the intentionality proceeding from the subject
“does not define consciousness at its fundamental level.”40 The face of the other reveals a rift in
the heart of human consciousness. Levinas argues that there are in fact two modes of
consciousness: the intentional consciousness of representational knowledge and a nonintentional,
moral consciousness which precedes and is the condition for the former mode of
consciousness.41 This nonintentional consciousness is described by Levinas as a passivity which
aims at nothing, but rather functions as a receptacle for the disruption of the ego’s intentionality
by the other. Levinas asserts that human consciousness contains a distinction within itself, and
the nonintentional component subverts the intentional component when confronted by the other
and allows the other to constitute the self rather than the accomplishment of intentionality’s goal
to constitute the other.42 This rupture or discontinuity of the self by the other occurs specifically
in the experience of the face of the other, according to Levinas.43 The face serves to break up the
ego’s self-continuity in its revelatory capacity which is unique to the human face.
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It is important, at this point, to understand what Levinas has in mind when he uses the
term revelation. Revelation is said in many ways, and Levinas’s usage is distinctive, if not
idiosyncratic. It will first help to say what revelation is not in Levinas’s thought. Revelation is
not a transmission of knowledge in the ordinary, cognitive sense, nor is it the impartation of a
kind of truth that is graspable by the intellect, a correspondence of proposition to reality. Most
importantly, for Levinas’s purposes, revelation is not disclosure in the Heideggerian sense of the
term.44 On Levinas’s reading, Heidegger’s definition of truth as disclosure or unveiling repeats
the traditional mistake of ontology by allowing impersonal being to be the content as well as the
agent of revelation.45 For Levinas, Heideggerian disclosure is therefore ineluctably
representational, a grasping and thus controlling of the horizon of beings, albeit disguised as a
letting-be of those beings.46 Hence, revelation is not the transmission of a body of propositions
available to be known.
Following from this, Levinas argues that the revelation of the face is not to be understood
as a divine or religious revelation, strictly speaking. There are two reasons for this. First, Levinas
notes in his lecture course “God and Onto-theology” that revelation as textuality falls under the
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scope of the thematization and comprehension which is at best a part of ontological philosophy.47
While revelation can speak through a text, if it were to be identified with a text, then it would
collapse into a prefigured meaning. Revelation as text, then, is subsidiary to the model of
revelation expressed in the face.48 Second, the revelation expressed in the face of the other is not
itself the revelation of God, in the sense of being either a knowledge or a manifestation of God.
While Levinas does admit that “the dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face,”49
access to God is neither the direct result nor the primary purpose of the subject’s encounter with
the face of the other.50 As Levinas puts it, “Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman
relation represents not the superior form but the forever primitive form of religion.”51 Thus,
revelation as the locus of sociality for Levinas must remain grounded in the human plane.
The meaning of revelation, then, on Levinas’s account is expressive presence. Levinas
writes, “The proximity of the Other, the proximity of the neighbor, is in being an ineluctable
moment of the revelation of an absolute presence…which expresses itself.”52 Levinas contrasts
the presence of the face to the phenomenon which appears as present and are available for us to
view different vantage points without attending to or contending with our gaze.53 The human
face, however, is fundamentally different in that it has the capacity to attend its own appearance,
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to be fully present to its phenomenality in expression. As noted above, this does not mean the
taking on or production of a particular facial expression. Instead, Levinas maintains, the face as
such expresses.54 Seeking to convey the transparent nature of this expression, Levinas also
describes the appearance of the other’s face to the subject as an epiphany or as manifestation. It
is the direct and unmediated “frankness” of expression which underlies and conditions any
linguistic sign or semantic content.55 These variety of locutions for Levinas are meant to indicate
the sheer immediacy of the expressive presence of the face. The expression is not “taken as;”
rather, it communicates with immediacy.
Levinas describes the manifestation of being, in the face, in similar terms to Gadamer’s
articulation of being as its own temporal self-presentation. Levinas says, “The thing itself
expresses itself.”56 In both Gadamer and Levinas, what is presented in its temporal expression is
not different from its being. What is expressed in the face, for Levinas, is not a diminution of the
reality of the face; it is not a representation of a reality more real than mere appearance. Instead,
the expression and the expressed coincide. Further, Gadamer and Levinas appear to share the
focus on language as the bearer of this presentation of being. Levinas writes, “Being, the thing in
itself, is not, with respect to the phenomenon, the hidden. Its presence presents itself in its
word.”57 To put it more concisely, Levinas says that being (in the face) presents itself in
language. However, as I explain below, the significance of language as Levinas uses it, and the
expression in which the face speaks, differs markedly from Gadamer’s conception of language.
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On Levinas’s view, the human face expresses or speaks in a way that no other bearer of
signification can. While for Gadamer, texts, works of art, and history can each speak and present
being in the same way that persons can, Levinas argues that the expressive presence of the face is
a radically unique mode of expression. In making the distinction between the appearing of the
face in expression and the appearance of all other phenomena, that is, the distinction between
expressive appearing and absent appearing, Levinas argues that in the artistic or literary work,
the interlocutor “has not attended his own revelation.”58 That is, on Levinas’s view, though the
author of a text is labeled an interlocutor and there is a sense in which the text serves as a
revelation, the author lacks the crucial element of expressive presence which characterizes the
face to face encounter. So while a subject can form a dialogue with a text in some sense, it is an
encounter of a different order than when one person faces the corporeality of another person. The
encounter with the text remains at the level of encounters with any other phenomenon, while the
encounter with the face is uniquely personal in a way that no other encounter is.59 This forms a
sharp contrast, then, with Gadamer’s view that dialogue between persons is not fundamentally
different from a dialogue with a text.
Language and Command
Levinas’s unique articulation of the language expressed in the face and the command
which it declares distinguishes his position both from the dialogical model of Gadamer and from
the revelational models of Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer. In contrast to Gadamer’s model, for
example, the human face, the signifier par excellence, presents itself prior to any sign which

58

Ibid.
In the transition from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being, Levinas speaks less frequently of the
encounter with the face, and more often of the notion of “proximity,” or “the approach.” However, I take these
expressions to be roughly synonymous, fulfilling the same function of the revelation of responsibility. Proximity
serves as a more formalized concept which perhaps serves to forestall the objection that the encounter with the face
is laden with the bias of sight, which connotes the grasp of intellectual vision as well.
59

70

would itself point back to a signifier. Instead, the face presents itself directly, apart from the
recourse to linguistic markers. Levinas articulates this situation over the course of his writings in
numerous ways. Language, speaking, discourse, expression, signification, and saying each take
up what Levinas wants to say about the role of the face in the impartation of meaning to the
subject. So it is first important to note that Levinas uses each of these terms in the process of
getting across his account of the face to face encounter, and often uses them idiosyncratically.
Yet it is unsurprising that linguistic accommodation should need to be made for describing an
experience which can only be had in person, on Levinas’s view.
As the face of the other constitutes a revelation to the subject, that revelation is manifest
in terms of language. Levinas says that the face emerges as discourse, and that this discourse
“institutes the pure experience of the social relation.”60 Thus, sociality, for Levinas, comes into
being from the language manifest in the face of the other.
In order to classify what Levinas is doing here with regard to language, we can say that
he espouses a kind of expressivism which holds that the encounter with the face precedes
representational language but which nevertheless expresses or signifies itself in a pre-linguistic
language. Levinas consistently maintains that the face gives itself in expression, language, and
signification prior to the uttering of a particular empirical language.61 This is the case, Levinas
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argues, because language is in its essence meaning, Sinn, or significance.62 Meaning for Levinas
is expressed par excellence in the face; more than that, all meaning stems from the manifestation
of the face. Recall Gadamer holds that language as dialogue is the locus of our understanding of
being. In parallel fashion, Levinas holds that language as the expressive presence of the face is
the locus of meaning. All subsequent forms of language are derived from and gain their
significance from the givenness of signification in the face. Levinas writes, “Meaning is the face
of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the primordial face to face of
language.”63 Thus, for Levinas, language is not originarily or primarily the subject’s bestowal of
meaning on the world through the representation of objects or concepts; instead, it is a meaning
which comes to the subject from the outside, from exteriority. With reference to Husserl’s notion
of the sense-giving function of human intentionality, Levinas claims here that “signification
precedes Sinngebung,”64 that is, the meaning expressed in the signification of the face precedes
the giving of meaning as construed by the subject.
The upshot of this analysis is that language and the meaning which it expresses is not
primordially controlled or produced by the I. Levinas writes, “Language is not enacted within a
consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in
question.”65 The primary function of language is to put into question the I, or in the terms that we
put it earlier, to invert and shatter the intentional arrow of the subject. Note here the consonance
of what Levinas says with Gadamer’s view of language as conditioning consciousness rather
than being conditioned by it. However, Levinas maintains, in contrast to Gadamer, that the
See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 205: “The primordial essence of language is to be sought not in the corporeal
operation that discloses it to me and to others and, in the recourse to language, builds up a thought, but in the
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fundamental separation between persons, between I and other, is what makes possible language
and that language as relation does not negate or overcome this separation.66 Levinas thus rejects
the concept of participation, both in ontology and in sociality as well. Levinas writes,
The relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of
the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me. In other words, language is spoken
where community between the terms of the relationship is wanting, where the common
plane is wanting or is yet to be constituted. It takes place in this transcendence. Discourse
is thus the experience of something absolutely foreign.67
Instead of language being the common bond of tradition in which subjects are absorbed,
language in Levinas’s view originates and is expressed from the other to the subject. It is the face
itself which is the origin of language, apart from the linguistic capabilities of the other herself.68
Levinas maintains that a consideration of this encounter reveals one’s own responsibility
for the other; indeed, this is the very content of the saying or the expressive presence of the other.
The saying in the face expresses or signifies a command in and through its appearance as naked
and mortal. The content of the command of the other can be represented as “thou shalt not kill,”
a command that articulates “the risk of occupying…the place of an other and thus, on the
concrete level, of exiling him, of condemning him…of bringing him death.”69 In other words, the
face of the other expresses its extreme vulnerability and thus also my obligation to not violate the
other’s weakness.70 However, this exposure itself exposes the fact that I always already am in the
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business of trying to usurp its place in my effort to exist, in my conatus essendi.71 Thus, for
Levinas, the face, as the primordial relationship with the other, awakens the self to responsibility,
and it does this through the revelation in the primal language of the ethical command. Therefore,
on Levinas’s account, our experience of the other is shot through with this originary language of
command, which is the basis for all other language uses.
Initiative and Passivity
As we have seen, Levinas argues that sociality begins from the encounter with the face of
the other. He further makes explicit that this encounter precedes and is independent of the
subject’s intentional initiative. He writes, for example, “The notion of the face…brings us to a
notion of meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my
power.”72 To make it clear that sociality cannot begin from the initiative of a transcendental
subject, Levinas claims that far from the subject participating in the construction of the social
relation, this relation is engendered solely from the side of the other person with whom the
subject is face to face. This emphasis is maintained in order to combat the ontological “tradition
in which intelligibility derives from the assembling of terms united in a system…Here [in this
tradition] the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present.”73 In contrast, Levinas argues that for
true sociality to occur, the subject’s power must be subverted by the face of the other.
Levinas also distances himself from the dialogical model in which sociality originates
from the situation in between interlocutors, for he is clear that the persons who face each other
are not on a level playing field. Rather than the self and other participating in a common
See Levinas, “Diachrony and Representation,” 171: “the natural conatus essendi of a sovereign I is put into
question by the death or the mortality of the other, in the ethical vigilance through which the sovereignty of the I can
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language and tradition, Levinas asserts that the other can only command from a position of
height, from transcendence, from that which breaks with systems of immanence and totality. 74
Levinas states, “The facing position, opposition par excellence, can be only as a moral summons.
This movement proceeds from the other.”75 For Levinas, this moral summons is a putting into
question of the I which cannot come from the I itself. Instead, the ethical relationship, which
according to Levinas is the heart of sociality, begins solely from the initiative of the other.
Levinas articulates this event of the ego’s being put into question through a
phenomenological analysis of the subject’s passivity. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas writes,
“Responsibility for the other…is a passivity more passive than all passivity, an exposure to the
other without this exposure being assumed.”76 This responsibility for the other is made possible
through the subject’s nonintentional consciousness, which is both a pre-reflective awareness of
one’s own consciousness and an awareness of being acted upon by the other.77 Here, the passive
mode of consciousness precedes the subjective initiative of intentionality.78 Again, much of this
sounds generically like what Gadamer wants to say in terms of the subjective consciousness
being itself subject to its factical context. And Levinas himself does not disagree with the
analysis of facticity as such.79 Beyond this, however, he argues that the passivity of the subject
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exists “not only by virtue of its being-without-having-chosen-to be, or its fall into a jumble of
possibles already realized before all assumption, as in the Heideggerian Geworfenheit.”80 Recall
that Gadamer, too, has argued that simply experiencing thrownness or being limited does not
capture the human social condition. Gadamer emphasizes that we experience our limits chiefly
through the encounter with the other. And upon closer examination, we found that this limitation
on the self is primarily through the claim of the other. These are features which Gadamer and
Levinas share in common in their accounts of sociality.
The decisive way in which Levinas diverges from Gadamer here is found in the fact that
for Levinas, the claim or command of the other cannot be separated from the corporeality of the
face – the expressive presence of the face is the command. Hence, while both Gadamer and
Levinas advocate a kind of passivity of consciousness before the encounter with the other, the
passivity of consciousness in Levinas’s view is not a resignation to the rule of the surrounding
tradition or Sache. Recall that Gadamer claims that consciousness is conditioned by the language
and tradition in which it is embedded. Passivity for Gadamer is the recognition that I am much
more constituted by my environment than being the one who autonomously constitutes the world
around me. By contrast, the passivity of consciousness in Levinas’s account is a subjection to the
face of the particular other who faces me. On Gadamer’s view, I am passive before impersonal,
linguistic conditions, whereas for Levinas, I am passive before a person.
Levinas argues that tradition and language is not what originally renders consciousness
passive; only the face of the other can do this. This goes back to Levinas’s analysis of the
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presentational phenomenality of the face in contrast to all other entities. It is only the face which
can invert intentional consciousness. Ricoeur notes that for Levinas, “the ego before the
encounter with the other (it would be better to say, the ego before it is broken into by the other)
is a stubbornly closed, locked up, separate ego.”81 While Gadamer posits an intrinsic openness at
the heart of the self rooted in the breadth of linguistic tradition, Levinas contends that the subject
is a locked door which can only be opened up by the experience of responsibility for the Other.
Levinas insists that the initiative and predisposition to responsibility is importantly prior
to and independent of my will. Further, this responsibility to which the self is called is not, in
Levinas’s analysis a responsibility which is assumed after ethical deliberation on the part of a
subject. As Levinas puts it, “this is not about receiving an order by perceiving it first and obeying
it subsequently in a decision, an act of will. In this proximity of the face, the subservience of
obedience precedes the hearing of the order.”82 Levinas admits that it appears paradoxical to
claim that obedience to the call precedes the call. However, what he is pointing to is the
experience of reflective intentionality always arriving “too late” to responsibility. By the time
reflection has interpreted the call and subsumed it under the categories of knowledge, it is
already aware through the nonintentional consciousness that “the I is, by its very position,
responsibility through and through,”83 and that being responsible is a condition “antecedent to
my freedom.”84 For Levinas, then, the self does not come into relationship with the other through
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a moral decision to bind oneself to another, but rather one finds oneself already bound in
responsibility to the other.
From Two to Three, or Beyond the Face
While Levinas focuses on the person-to-person relationship – the face-to-face of two
individuals – he does extend this account into the broader human community. However, he does
not think of community as such as a culmination of sociality, but instead sees it as derivative and
dependent on the face to face relation.85 Levinas stipulates that the face to face encounter is not
exclusive to the two individuals in the encounter; it contains all of humanity in its gaze. Levinas
writes that the face “attests the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity, in the eyes
that look at me.”86 In distinction from what he perceives as Buber’s I-Thou enclosure, Levinas
wants to maintain that the relationship between the subject and the other is fundamentally open, a
window on humanity instead of a wall.87 In Levinas’s words, “The thou is posited in front of a
we.”88 Levinas does not deny that the relationship is between two individual persons but argues
that these two individuals cannot abstract themselves from the broader context of humanity.
Further, Levinas argues that the appearance of the face is not simply revelatory of the one, the
particular individual in front of me. Rather, “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the
Other…the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.”89 Here, the other’s particularity is
seen but is also seen through. The ethics manifest in the interpersonal encounter cannot be
reduced to considerations of the neighbor’s particularity. There is a sense for Levinas that the
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other functions as a representative for all of humanity. What matters in the encounter is not any
characteristics of physiology or identity adhering to the person. What matters is simply the
revelation of expressive presence found in the face, that the other person is a bearer of the
command which inverts my intentionality. As Jean-Luc Marion puts it, “The face opens to the
humanity of the other man, but not to the particular alterity of a particular Other.”90
The We of humanity adds nothing to the responsibility which the I finds herself subject to
in the initial encounter in Levinas’s thinking. It is not as if the recognition of human needs and
concerns outside of the one who confronts me builds a layer of obligation onto what I have
recognized in the face, for the destitution of the other qua humanity is present there in the face. I
find no level of fraternity in humanity in encountering more or different faces. Levinas writes, “It
is my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely foreign…that constitutes the
original fact of fraternity.”91 In other words, the responsibility found in the revelation of the face
is constitutive of human fraternity. There is no sense of fraternity independent of the relation
with the face. This means for Levinas that ethics is neither broadened nor deepened beyond the
encounter with the face.92
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity he writes that “politics is opposed to morality.”93
From this remark, we can note that ethics, on Levinas’s view, is narrowly defined as being
exclusively pre-reflective. Anything reflective, such as politics or justice, is not a broadening of
ethics, but something like a necessary betrayal of ethics – necessary because we cannot do other
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than reflect on justice beyond the face. At best, it is something derivative of ethics. Hence, the
concern for the wider human community and the justice which must be implemented in it, while
important, must first pass through the encounter with the face. The responsibility for the
neighbor which is constitutive for sociality on Levinas’s account has no other locus or fulfillment
than in the relation with the face.
However, Levinas admits that the face-to-face encounter is itself embedded in a wider
context of fraternity. He writes, “The relation with the face in fraternity, where in his turn the
Other appears in solidarity with all the others, constitutes the social order, the reference of every
dialogue to the third party by which the We…encompasses the face to face opposition.”94
Levinas signals here that the Other who faces me appears as being in relationship, not only with
me, but with all others as well. Part of my recognition of the destitution of humanity in the face
of the other is the recognition that this particular other stands in solidarity with all Others. Here, I
recognize that the face I encounter is not an aberration; it is not simply this one other who is in
need, but a kinship of poverty is brought to my attention through the face of the other. Further,
this context of fraternity in some sense constitutes my identity as I: “The human I is posited in
fraternity: that all men are brothers is not added to man as a moral conquest, but constitutes his
ipseity. Because my position as an I is effectuated already in fraternity the face can present itself
to me as a face.”95 In other words, I find myself already implicated in the fraternity of human
persons. Thus, the encounter with the face (1) points beyond the face to the third party, and
therefore all human others, and then (2) identifies myself as among the human community. For
were I not embedded in the fraternity, the face could not have aroused my responsibility for that
fraternity.
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For Levinas, this notion of fraternity suggests a level of human community which is prior
to the empirical unity of the genus of the human race. Levinas writes, “When taken to be like a
genus that unites like individuals the essence of society is lost sight of.”96 Instead, Levinas
suggests that society is better conceived of in terms of responsibility. Fraternity, being this
normative bond, operates prior to the categorization of beings in a system of being or to the
empirical recognition of biological sameness: “Here fraternity precedes the commonness of a
genus. My relationship with the other as neighbor gives meaning to my relations with all the
others.”97 For Levinas, fraternity is an ethical bond which implies that each other is itself
responsible for others. Here again, Levinas points out that the responsibility involved in
fraternity is not that of calculation and willful action. The basic unit of responsibility is in each
face-to-face encounter, and as such, precedes representation and intentionality.98 Nevertheless, I
recognize in the encounter with the face of the other that the “other stands in a relationship with
the third party, for whom I cannot entirely answer,”99 but for whom the other is nonetheless
responsible. Levinas identifies the third party as that recognition of the other who is my other’s
neighbor: “The third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a
neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow.”100 Because each is responsible for another, no
human being is left outside of the web of responsibility; each is a neighbor who is responsible
and for whom another is responsible.101
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Levinas admits, however, that the fraternity of neighborly responsibility, while not itself
a result of rational reflection, calls for representation, analysis, and philosophy. He writes, “It is
not that the entry of a third party would be an empirical fact, and that my responsibility for the
other finds itself constrained to a calculus by the ‘force of things.’ In the proximity of the other,
all the others than the other obsess me, and already this obsession cries out for justice, demands
measure and knowing, is consciousness.”102 Levinas argues in Otherwise than Being that justice
is the necessary reflective procedure which confronts the subject with the entry of the third party,
albeit posterior to the fraternity which is introduced with the third person as well. Justice is the
necessary ordering of society which is essentially political in nature.
Despite the fact that the operation of justice is a work of intentionality, Levinas now
claims that “justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness,
assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the
intellect.”103 Justice is the allotment of rights and duties, of judgments and consequences by the
State, the concern for which, Levinas says, “is the spirit in society.”104 While it is necessary for a
political society to order itself by means of the justice which ensures the equality of its citizens,
hence ordaining both duties and rights to individuals, Levinas maintains that “the equality of all
is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves
justice.”105 That is, justice is first founded on the divestment of the self before the face of the
other, as Levinas writes, “Justice is impossible without the one that renders it finding himself in
proximity.”106 Although justice moves beyond the immediacy of the face into the sphere of

102

Ibid., 158.
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 157,
104
Ibid., 160.
105
Ibid., 159.
106
Ibid. See also ibid.: “Justice, society, the State and its institutions, exchanges and work are comprehensible out of
proximity. This means that nothing is outside of the control of the responsibility of the one for the other.”
103

82

reflection and rational deliberation, its judgments are founded, Levinas says, on the original
encounter with the other. No justice would be possible without the responsibility engendered in
the revelation of the other. This means that although justice prescribes actions to individuals visà-vis their position amidst others in society, the normative force of these actions is always
grounded in the personal encounter with the face of the other.
We have here reached the full scope of Levinas’s model of sociality. Justice is the final,
empirical level of human community which exists at the level of representation and calculation.
This is necessary, but still draws its force from the primal encounter, from proximity. While the
justice of society and the fraternity of humanity represent human sociality at its breadth, the
grounding of sociality, its normative motivation in responsibility, still resides in the face-to-face
encounter. Sociality therefore rises or falls depending on whether the subject’s encounter with
the face appropriately initiates responsibility for the subject. And as we have seen, responsibility
can occur only in the overcoming of the impersonal totality of being by the personal singularity
of the face of the other. As Marion puts it, “ethics will become first philosophy instead of and in
place of ontology only if it definitively transgresses anonymity.”107
Levinas and Dialogical Sociality
Levinas’s ethical responsibility model of sociality in a number of places explicitly departs
from the paradigmatic dialogical models espoused but Buber and Gadamer. Levinas specifically
criticizes Buber’s formulation of I and Thou on two fronts. First, he worries that Buber’s concept
of I and Thou, while breaking with the subject-object structure of intentionality, is insufficiently
personal because of the breadth of its application. Levinas writes, “the I-Thou relation in Buber
retains a formal character: it can unite man to things as much as man to man.”108 Levinas
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commends Buber for recognizing the need to have a relation which is not determined by the
content of what is related to, thus having already objectified it, but instead retaining the
importance of the relation itself in its sheer formality.109 That is, Levinas approves of the attempt
to break with the idealist gaze of objectification in relating to the other. However, the issue that
Levinas sees with positing the I-Thou relation as completely devoid of content is that in Buber’s
account, one relates to impersonal things in the same way one relates to persons.110
For Levinas, this simply does not “correspond with the facts,”111 which leads to his
second point: the reciprocity between I and Thou in Buber’s view is not the fundamental relation
between persons.112 Instead, Levinas argues, in sociality the Other enters the relation from a
position of height: “the I is distinguished from the Thou not by the presence of specific
attributes, but by the dimension of height, thus implying a break with Buber’s formalism.”113 The
metaphor of height denotes the asymmetry of the relationship. I and Thou are distinguished in
the first instance because they encounter each other from the vantage point of disparate planes.
Levinas thus provides a solution to the problem of formalism on the one hand and
objectification on the other. The Other is not recognized by means of her particular attributes or
content, but she is distinguishable from things by coming in a non-reciprocal fashion, by
presenting herself in transcendence to the subject. Levinas maintains that height is necessary for
responsibility, as a relation higher and more fundamental than the spiritual friendship of equals,
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which Buber has in mind.114 Only in the break from immanence, from the idealist tendency to
draw entities into its own plane, is it possible for the command of the Other to be heard.
Ultimately, Levinas concludes, “In my own analyses, the approach to others is not originally in
my speaking out to the other, but in my responsibility for him or her. That is the original ethical
relation. That responsibility is elicited, brought about by the face of the other person, described
as a breaking of the plastic forms of the phenomenality of appearance…Here, then, contrary to
Buber’s I-Thou, there is no initial equality.”115 Levinas thus sharply distinguishes in own view
which proceeds from the revelatory initiative of the other from Buber’s view which sees
reciprocity as constitutive for sociality.
One clear way to illustrate the difference between a model of sociality constituted in
reciprocity and Levinas’s view of sociality as grounded in the expressive presence of the face is
by focusing on the situation of dialogue. It is this analysis which will bear out Levinas’s
fundamental disagreement with Gadamer regarding the social relation. Though Levinas does not
anywhere explicitly address Gadamer, what he does say about the place of dialogue in sociality
is illustrative. Levinas describes ordinary dialogue as “the empirical reality of inter-human
speaking,” a situation in which, “for each of the interlocutors, speaking would consist in entering
into the thought of the other, in fitting into it.”116 Levinas’s account of what dialogue is here
comes quite close to the way Gadamer sees the dialogical relationship of persons who come
together through the Sache. Levinas, however, contests that this position of dialogue is the
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genuine locus of sociality. He will admit that otherness is posited in dialogue, but he notes, with
Gadamer, that this otherness is only one stage in the conversation. Hence, Levinas questions the
primacy of dialogue thus construed:
One must ask if this very discourse [dialogue], despite its allegedly interior scissions,
does not already rest on a prior sociality with the other in which the interlocutors are
distinct. It is necessary to ask if this effective, forgotten sociality is not nonetheless
presupposed by the rupture, however provisional, between self and self, for the interior
dialogue still to deserve the name dialogue.117
Here Levinas suggests that the situation of either interior or empirical dialogue, in which the
partners are united in the subject matter, is derivative of the encounter with the face which
demonstrates the true otherness of the persons from one another.118
This means that Levinas would think that Gadamer has misdescribed the enactment of the
self-other relationship; on Levinas’s view, Gadamer’s hermeneutic ontology arrives “too late.”119
Both Levinas and Gadamer claim that the self is in formation (in some sense) prior to selfreflection. Self-reflective consciousness always comes too late, for both thinkers, and therefore
finds itself always already underway. However, each thinker interprets this “always alreadyness”
differently. For Gadamer, as we have seen, subjectivity is always already caught up in the
continuity of (1) the flow of time, (2) language, and therefore (3) tradition. The self is already a
bridge, before it knows itself as self. For Levinas, on the other hand, subjectivity always already
finds itself ruptured, accused, by its proximity to the other. It is always already a You,
responsible for the other. Here, discontinuity precedes the continuity of consciousness.
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Further, the “prior sociality” which Levinas describes rejects the reciprocity of the
dialogical encounter because Levinas argues that the revelation of the other demands an
unconditional responsibility which does not depend on whether or not the other thinks itself
responsible as well. While reciprocity is crucial on Gadamer’s account because it is the
mechanism by which understanding, and hence sociality, occurs between persons, on Levinas’s
view, sociality is not fundamentally grounded in understanding but in responsibility. Levinas
may well agree that understanding as Gadamer sets it out requires reciprocity, but for Levinas,
reciprocity itself presupposes unilateral responsibility.
From Levinas’s point of view, Gadamerian hermeneutics does however have a legitimate
place in understanding and relating to the world, but hermeneutics does not exhaust the ways in
which humans can interact with reality. In his important essay, “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas
writes, “In all its analyses of language contemporary philosophy insists, and indeed rightly, on its
hermeneutical structure and on the cultural effort of the incarnate being that expresses itself.”120
However, while accepting a hermeneutics of culture and language, Levinas argues that the other
person presents the self with a prevenient discontinuity that is not mediated by tradition and
language. He asks, “Has a third dimension not been forgotten; the direction toward the Other
(Autrui) who is not only the collaborator and the neighbor of our cultural work of expression or
the client of our artistic production, but the interlocutor, he to whom expression expresses…?”121
Levinas thus suggests that a hermeneutics of the other person is derivative of the primary
expressiveness of the face of the other.122
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Levinas, then, rejects the Gadamerian claim that hermeneutic ontology is the medium out
of which the relation to the other first unfolds. While not rejecting hermeneutics out of hand,
Levinas argues that hermeneutics is not what first gives the other to the self. He writes,
The understanding of the Other is thus a hermeneutics and an exegesis. The Other is
given in the concreteness of the totality in which he is immanent, and which…is
expressed and disclosed by our own cultural initiative, by corporeal, linguistic, or artistic
gestures. But the epiphany of the Other involves a signifyingness of its own, independent
of this meaning received from the world. The Other comes to us not only out of the
context but also without mediation; he signifies by himself.123
The revelation of the other, which contains its own, transcendent, order of meaning, actually
grounds hermeneutics on Levinas’s view. Levinas claims that the “mundane meaning” of
hermeneutics “is disturbed and jostled by another presence that is abstract (or, more exactly,
absolute) and not integrated into the world. This presence consists in coming toward us, in
making an entry.”124 Thus, although the other does come to the self in the full concreteness of the
historical world, it is not this situation which can ground the ethical relation.
Levinas suggests that the “anti-Platonism” of contemporary philosophy mistakenly places
truth as having its being in history. Instead, Levinas argues that to glimpse “the revelation of the
Other (which is at the same time the birth of morality) in the gaze of a human being looking at
another human precisely as abstract human disengaged from all culture, in the nakedness of his
face, is to return to Platonism in a new way.”125 Levinas thinks that the immanence of history
and culture are not sufficient to provide the kind of transcendence necessary for responsibility.
This critique of the anti-Platonism of history is well suited to target Gadamer’s articulation of the
truth of being as not transcendent of its temporal presentation in history.126 For Gadamer, no
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truth-in-itself exists apart from its temporal presentation. But for Levinas, this lack of
transcendence means precisely a loss of moral orientation. The transcendence which is missing
in historical being is provided by the transcendence of the face of the other and its truth which
confronts the self. Thus, on Levinas’s view, it is the revelation of the other alone which can
ground sociality.
Levinas and Transcendental Sociality
While Levinas clearly rejects the idealist model of sociality as he characterizes it, there is
a question as to the degree to which Levinas articulates a transcendental concept of subjectivity.
From Gadamer’s point of view, many of Levinas’s worries would be overcome if he departed
from the concept of subjectivity altogether, opting instead for a model of selfhood which is not
weighed down with a lineage of the subject which grounds reality in its own certainty. Yet
Levinas argues that the project of overcoming subjectivity, as in Heidegger’s prioritization of the
Being of beings and in Gadamer’s prioritization of the language as the articulation of being
which binds us together, inevitably covers over the irreducible differences between persons,
reducing otherness into sameness. Hence, subjects must have a radical degree of alienness from
the persons which confront them. For this reason, Levinas emphasizes the separation of the
subject from God and her fellow human being. This positions Levinas, like idealist and
transcendental concepts of subjectivity, as having a subject which encounters that which is
separate from and foreign to it. This otherness is different in kind and therefore transcends
likeness. This transcendence is attributed to the subject in idealist thinking, while Levinas
attributes transcendence to the other which encounters the subject. Thus, Levinas inverts the
transcendental model of subjectivity, ascribing the agency of transcendence to the other who
faces the subject.
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While it may seem evident, therefore, that Levinas departs from Theunissen’s categories
of transcendental and dialogical models of sociality, David Klemm has argued to the contrary. In
his analysis of Levinas’s thought with respect to Theunissen’s typology, David Klemm asserts
that despite Levinas’s attempts to repudiate the transcendental model of sociality, he implicitly
requires the transcendental subjectivity he avows to do away with. In other words, Klemm levies
Theunissen’s critique of Buber against Levinas: that he must implicitly presuppose the
transcendental subject which he claims to reject. Klemm claims that Levinas must presuppose an
I which both recognizes itself and freely chooses to respect the other. He writes, “I must possess
an immediate awareness of the unity of my own being in order to respond to the Other; I must
freely decide to respect the being of the Other as presented. Both of these moments are implied
in Levinas against his intentions and are not made explicit.”127 Klemm notes that while Levinas
denies that the subject is free to welcome the other, his account of the face to face encounter
requires this freedom and openness. And this is because Klemm reads the subject’s encounter
with the face as a hermeneutic encounter. Klemm reads Levinas as proceeding from a verbal
encounter in language to the responsibility engendered by this event of communication.128 On
Klemm’s interpretation, the human face as a bearer of meaning is the signifier which points to a
signified and hence is interpreted by the subject.129 Klemm writes, “When Levinas understands
this presentation as a face, he does not transcend the ‘circle of understanding’ but rather
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reinstantiates it.”130 That is, Klemm reads Levinas as implicitly presuming that presentation of
the face bears a hermeneutic “as-structure,” that the face is something that is interpreted and
therefore approached through the understanding.131 This results in a transcendental conception of
subjectivity because the subject must ultimately constitute the meaning of the face.
While Klemm is within his rights to argue that sociality in general requires hermeneutics,
he is incorrect in claiming that Levinas’s own account presupposes it. As we saw above, Levinas
claims that the face signifies prior to signs, prior to empirical language. The meaning imparted
by the face conditions any further use of language between persons rather than that meaning
being mediated through verbal exchange. Klemm thus misunderstands the radical passivity of the
subject and the prevolitional nature of the encounter which Levinas articulates.132 While
retaining the concept of subjectivity, which Gadamer prefers to do away with, Levinas abandons
the primacy of the intentional consciousness, maintaining instead that nonintentional
consciousness is constitutive of subjectivity. The subject on Levinas’s account is not an
epistemically transcendent entity; instead the subject is an ethical respondent through hearing the
call of the other and being drawn by the other into responsibility. In this way, Levinas preserves
the alienness (as a moral alienness) of subjectivity in the encounter while presenting the
relational bond between them as having its origin in the revelation of the face of the other.
The Contribution of Levinas’s Model of Sociality
Levinas’s articulation of social life begins with his critique of idealism, both classical
German idealism as well as what he labels phenomenological idealism. The core problem with
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idealism, according to Levinas, is that entities are correlated with thought such that the inherent
difference in beings is reduced to the sameness of the totality which can be thought in intentional
consciousness. This totalizing power of the idealist ego eliminates the possibility that other
persons can reorient the grasp of the I. Consciousness ineluctably absorbs otherness into its own
categories. Levinas’s critique is that this model cannot do justice to ethical and social reality. If
the idealist model is true, persons cannot truly enter the moral and social life. No one genuinely
realizes responsibility for the person which faces them. In contrast to this, Levinas’s analysis
accounts for ethical responsibility by radically revisioning the social relation.
Levinas’s critique of idealism agrees with Gadamer that idealism has misidentified the
way in which the subject’s consciousness comes into relations with other persons. Both Levinas
and Gadamer reject the notion that consciousness freely lords over the objects and persons it
reflects upon. Each figure argues that consciousness is much more passive than idealism
supposes. Rather than conditioning all of reality, consciousness is much more conditioned by
what it encounters. However, while Gadamer argues that idealism is overcome by grounding
sociality in the linguistic context that surrounds both self and other, Levinas rejects the claim that
this dialogical grounding of sociality is sufficient to overcome the lure of idealism.
Instead, Levinas maintains that only through breaking with a participationist ontology can
the other be truly experienced in her alterity, which is the condition for responsibility, the
foundation of social life. Sociality cannot be articulated through an ontology which purports to
describe the relations between persons from a third-person point of view. Rather, it can only be
found in the experience of the expressive presence of the other who faces me. Levinas says that
in this alterity we find “a mode of being produced and an ontology that is not equivalent to
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panoramic existence and its disclosure.”133 The encounter with the Other in her otherness
produces a mode of being which is not totalizable. Here, sociality is metaphysics. Taking license
from the ontological language he uses on occasion, and with the necessary caveats, we can say
that Levinas’s non-totalizing ontology of alterity is nothing other than the social relation.
Escaping idealism means for Levinas grounding sociality in an ontology of alterity.
That Levinas occupies a unique position in the topography of models of sociality has
never seriously been in dispute. What has been more difficult to pin down is how to fairly and
adequately articulate such an (admittedly) idiosyncratic view vis-à-vis its alternatives.134
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However, as we have situated Levinas’s model of sociality in the context of the critique of
idealism, it appears as a natural plot in the logical space of positions to take in opposition to
subject-centered models of sociality. While idealist and transcendental models ground sociality
in the subject, and dialogical models ground sociality in the space in between self and other,
Levinas’s ethical responsibility model grounds sociality in the other human being who faces the
subject.
The contrast with Gadamer is again instructive. Like Levinas, Gadamer rejects that
sociality is grounded in the cognitive grasp of the ego. Gadamer’s claim is that sociality is
grounded in language outside of the self. But the self participates in sociality through the process
of understanding – the progressive integration of the foreign with the familiar. The content and
the goal of sociality, from Gadamer’s perspective, is understanding, a kind of knowing which
expands and evolves through sociality. From Levinas’s point of view, this concern for
understanding is a hold-over from idealism; it is still the project of grounding sociality in
epistemology rather than in ethics. While Gadamer argues that idealism has misunderstood the
way in which consciousness comes to understand others, Levinas argues that the whole project
of trying to approach others through the understanding is misguided. Instead, we are related to
others first and foremost in an ethical way – we find ourselves laden with responsibility for the
other person who faces us before we find ourselves trying to understand the other person. The
content and the goal of sociality, for Levinas, is the responsibility evoked by the command in the
face of the other. Levinas argues for this contention with the analysis that the I, when faced with
the other, bears an irreducible experience of responsibility. This analysis therefore constitutes the
means by which Levinas positions his view of sociality as ethical responsibility as that which
alone can stand as the true alternative to idealism.
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Chapter Three: Rosenzweig and Revelational Sociality
Having presented the dialogical and ethical responsibility models of sociality as
exemplified in Gadamer and Levinas, I turn now to introduce the third key model of sociality in
my topography of the responses to idealism: the revelational model of sociality. I present this
view as articulated by Franz Rosenzweig before proceeding in the next chapter to explain its
expression in Bonhoeffer. Like Gadamer and Levinas, Rosenzweig’s model of sociality results
from his negative assessment of idealism. Unlike these thinkers, however, Rosenzweig’s key
indictment of idealism is that it renounces the concept of revelation. Rosenzweig argues that
idealism reduces reality to the subject’s cognition, causing the subject’s world, including its
conception of sociality, to collapse in on itself. Only by incorporating the experience of divine
revelation can the subject form genuine relationships with others. Like both Gadamer and
Levinas, Rosenzweig rejects what he takes to be the idealist claim that the transcendent subject is
the ground for sociality. However, in contrast to finding the ground in the dialogue between
persons or in the revelation of the human other, Rosenzweig argues that the transcendence of
divine revelation is needed in order to elude the snare of idealism. Rosenzweig’s model of
genuine sociality, inaugurated by revelation, unfolds in temporal stages: sociality is grounded in
and unlocked by divine revelation, which is enacted through the human-divine dialogue, and
culminates in the collective invocation of God by the human community beyond dialogue.
In order to see, however, the ways in which Rosenzweig departs from the other models of
sociality I have discussed, I will lay out the structure and development of Rosenzweig’s view. I
begin by explaining his key criticisms of idealism and show how these lead to his articulation of
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an alternative ontology. The sociality that Rosenzweig proceeds to promote arises from this
ontology, but is also a crucial piece of its enactment. By unpacking Rosenzweig’s account, I
show that the idealist rejection of the concept of revelation is his core diagnosis, and that
returning revelation to the forefront of an articulation of reality is crucial to obtaining a proper
account. As the chapter develops, I show more specifically that Rosenzweig’s view diverges
from dialogical models of sociality such as Gadamer’s as well as Levinas’s ethical responsibility
model by requiring a conception of God who personally engages with human beings.
The Critique of Idealism in Rosenzweig
Rosenzweig’s critique of German idealism in The Star of Redemption advances from two
basic claims: that idealism endeavors to operate from reason’s own capacities alone and that
God’s creation of the world is not available as an assumption for reason, strictly speaking.
Because a proof for the act of creation cannot be given by reason, a substitute concept must be
derived which explains the existence of the world. Rosenzweig says that this concept, “with
which [idealism] seeks to circumvent as well as replace the idea of creation, is the concept of
generation.”1 This effectively replaces the concept of God as creator with that of God as
generator. However, in order for reason to find a rational unity, the content generated, i.e., the
world, must be proportional in some way to the generator. Hence, God must be recognizable to
cognition. But this means that once God is identified by cognition, both God and world alike are
cognized content. As a result, God does not explain the world, but lies side-by-side with the
world in cognition.
On Rosenzweig’s analysis, then, cognition becomes the origin of all things in the idealist
account because it is the source which underlies God and the world. Rosenzweig writes that only

1

Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 135.

96

the self as “purely subjective and as this pure subject can assume the role of the origin of
cognition vis-à-vis everything objective: the ‘I’ of Idealism.”2 Now, reason again demands that
the plurality of things which the subject cognizes be brought into a comprehensible unity. Hence,
the things which the subject cognizes must bear a likeness to their origin, the subject. At the
same time, the subject must avoid a complete identification with the objects it comprehends, in
which case it would fail to offer a distinction from them which would be able to explain them.
According to Rosenzweig, idealism solves this problem through positing that the subject
generates entities both as mental concepts and as objects, as non-I. Hence, they are both like the
subject qua concept and unlike the subject qua object of cognition.
Because the subject is like its object only in concept, the subject is concretely isolated
from its objects. This results, for Rosenzweig, in the “absolute occlusion of the self”3 which is
the consequence of its transcendence from the world of cognition. The solitary idealist self must
therefore turn to a means of concretely relating itself to the non-I through a system of ethics.
However, this ethics can proceed in no other way than through rationality, according to idealism,
in the self’s submission to a universal.4 Concrete action must be governed by universal reason.
Hence, says Rosenzweig, while generation moves from the universal to the particular, ethics
closes the circle of reason by way of return, moving from the particular to the universal.
The universal law must be identified either with the subject’s own cognition or with
divine cognition. If it is identified with the subject’s cognition, then the subject’s efforts to relate
to what is outside itself results in relating only to itself. Things fare no better, however, if the
universal law is identified with God. For Rosenzweig, idealism defines God ultimately not as an
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I or a He, but as an It, as absolute spirit. Rosenzweig then claims that in idealism, spirit is but
another name for what the self is; hence, “reason has triumphed, the end merges again with the
beginning, the highest object of thought is thought itself; nothing is inaccessible to reason.”5 The
completion of the rational circle of thought is the pride and joy of idealism, but this comes at a
cost: “God and man are reduced to the marginal concept: subject of cognition; world and man on
the other hand to the marginal concept of a mere object of this subject.”6 Because idealism seeks
to operate and find its completion through reason alone, it finally succeeds by identifying the
human being as subject, reducing God to that self-same subject, and identifying the world and
other human beings as objects of this subjective cognition. Rosenzweig concludes that idealism
collapses in on itself. The richness of reality has been truncated, failing to do justice to the
experience of God and the world as separate and unquantifiable domains.7
The implication of this criticism of idealism for its model of sociality is that other
persons, as members of the world of subjective cognition, are truncated by and absorbed into the
rational subject. Others are rightly related to when they are properly ordered within a universal
system of rationality. Sociality is enacted when other persons are recognized as representatives
of universal reason and the subject fulfills its obligation to treat other persons as such. For
Rosenzweig, such a view fails to account for the living event of real human relationships which
are bound to each other in love and spontaneous action. Idealism only knows of relationships
which are necessary, universal, and obligatory. A consequence of Rosenzweig’s analysis, then, is
that idealism’s account of sociality is decisively lacking, and the root of this lack can be traced
back to idealism’s reductive account of the subject as ontologically comprehensive.
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Because Rosenzweig sees idealism as the culmination of the whole philosophical project
“from Iona to Jena,”8 that is, from Parmenides to Hegel, he implicates all of philosophy in his
critique. In particular, Rosenzweig argues that because idealism thought it could account for
reality by simply replacing the concept of creation, it neglected (or defanged) the concept of
revelation. Idealism thought that revelation, because of its appeal to something beyond reason,
should be left on the sidelines in the construction of a system of philosophy. Rosenzweig argues
that revelation in fact provides the crucial elements of language, temporality, and love, each of
which is needed to account for genuine sociality. First, however, I turn to the way in which
Rosenzweig offers his pluriform ontology as an alternative to idealism’s account of ontology.
Rosenzweig’s Ontology
Rosenzweig’s model of sociality arises out of his articulation of ontology in The Star,
much as Gadamer’s view arises from the ontology developed in Truth and Method. However,
instead of a participatory model of ontology in which being exists as its historical manifestations,
Rosenzweig’s view of reality begins as a dismantling of the notion of being in general, which he
designates as the “All,” which he claims that German idealism has attempted to capture.
Rosenzweig believes that the prime mistake of idealism was to begin from a unity, the concept of
the All, which all beings participate in, and instead argues that God, the world, and human beings
each exemplify a reality, an All, that denies that the other elements have an ontological share in
it. Hence, we could say that Rosenzweig begins with three ontologies, three different
articulations of the ways in which things can be, instead of one ontology.9
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In line with this idea, Part One of Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption sets out each of
the three elements of the “All,” God, the world, and the human, as having its existence solely in
itself, not being derivable from any of the other elements.10 On Rosenzweig’s view, each
irreducible element appears initially in a position of autonomy, self-sufficient, and resistant to
being put in relationship with another element. He writes, “The three elements may appear to lie
side by side in calm fixity, each with a one-and-all feeling about its own existence that is blind to
whatever is outside. In this respect they are all three mutually equivalent…Not merely the world
but man and God too are configurations enclosed within themselves and inspired with their own
spirit.”11 Thus, God, the world, and the human being are elements which initially appear as selfsufficient, none of which experiences a need for an element outside of itself to constitute itself.
Rosenzweig’s argument against idealism on this score claims that idealism ultimately
reduces God and the world to the self-consciousness of the human being.12 In part, Rosenzweig
assents to idealism’s own view of itself, affirming that the self in its initial position remains
“without a view beyond its walls…fixing its own interior with a defiant gaze, incapable of
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forerunner of the “new philosophy.” The new philosophy maintains that philosophy must now travel through the
individual human, as an element alienated from world and God. Rosenzweig’s project is to distinguish between the
human, the world, and God, and analyze them according to their own natures without reducing them to their others.
Rosenzweig writes, “They are the Noughts to which the critique of Kant, the dialectician, reduced the objects of
rational theology, cosmology, and psychology, the three ‘rational sciences’ of his time. We mean to restore them,
not as objects of rational sciences but, quite the contrary, as ‘irrational’ objects.” Ibid., 19. Thus, Rosenzweig has in
mind the inverse of Kant’s project. While Kant starts from rational sciences and ultimately ends up in
unknowability, Rosenzweig starts from the Noughts, unknowabilities, and hopes to end up with a positive system.
10
Strictly speaking, Rosenzweig claims that the All of idealism is here shattered into three Alls.
11
Ibid., 84.
12
Benjamin Pollock suggests that Rosenzweig argues against Fichte and Hegel in Part One and against Schelling in
Part Two. See Benjamin Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5, 9, who argues that “Rosenzweig understood this [as a] task…of grasping,
articulating, and indeed realizing truth as the identity and difference of ‘All’ that is. A ‘system of philosophy,’ as
Rosenzweig understood it, seeks to understand all beings both in their plurality as diverse, different beings, and at
the same time insofar as they share in a single, common unity…According to Rosenzweig, the German Idealist
systems fail to grasp the inherent difference of individual beings – their particularity and finitude – because they
assume the unity and, indeed, the divinity of ‘the All’ as primordial or original. Rosenzweig, to the contrary,
conceives of this ultimate unity of all that is as the redemptive goal toward which all beings strive.”
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sighting anything alien except there in its own sphere and therefore only as its own property,
hoarding all ethical norms within its own ethos so that the self was and remained lord of its
ethos.”13 Rosenzweig severely qualifies idealism’s claim by arguing that although the human
being asserts itself as the lord of being, in reality both God and the world remain entities whose
existence remains fully independent of the human and which stand against the human.14
Rosenzweig describes this “lordly” human being as metaethical, that is, evaluatively
separate from God and the world. On this account, the human being is characterized by a kind of
self-effectuated transcendence through the juxtaposition of the oppositional characteristics of self
and personality. Self is inwardness and isolation while personality is bound up with society and
its roles. At some point in a person’s life, which has been hitherto immersed in “personality,” it
becomes a self: becoming a distinctive individual in isolation from its society, it lives only from
its own solitude.15 Rather than fusing together, self and personality alternate: what starts out as a
socialized personality becomes a self, which in turn has the capacity to enter into cultural life,
thereby temporarily renouncing itself qua self. Despite the fact that the human being can enter
into social life in some respect, the enclosed and isolated nature of the self becomes the prime
characteristic of the human being. In Part Two of the Star, Rosenzweig will show how this
introverted human self becomes transformed, once and for all, into a “soul.”
The Initiative of Revelation
In order for the elements to enter into a genuine relationship with one another,
Rosenzweig argues that a gratuitous initiative is needed which can unlock the enclosedness of
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Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 82.
See Nathan Rotenstreich, “Rosenzweig’s Notion of Metaethics,” in The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, ed. Paul
Mendes-Flohr (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988), 82: “Rosenzweig’s description of the
position of man, which he called metaethical, is meant to cut the basic tie between the human individual and the
human whole or mankind.”
15
Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 71. One could draw a parallel here to Heidegger’s concept of becoming an
authentic self from its existence as a “they-self.” See Heidegger, Being and Time, 167.
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the elements upon themselves.16 Neither the human self nor the world possesses the requisite
initiative to truly engage the other elements.17 This is important to note, in that the self, on
Rosenzweig’s view, is not characterized by openness as it is for Gadamer. Rosenzweig’s
positioning of the elements in his description of reality disallows a sociality stemming from
openness. Rather, in order to rightly relate to others, for genuine sociality to come into shape, the
individual must be disrupted from out of her self-enclosure, and Rosenzweig is emphatic that the
self does not possess an ability to propel itself into sociality. On Rosenzweig’s view, then, God is
the only element which contains in itself the resources to accomplish genuine relationality. From
the perspective of the first part of The Star, however, “how this is to happen, how one is to free
the tongue and unlock the eye of the self, that is quite beyond the imagination of the self as we
know it hitherto.”18 That is, although Rosenzweig will claim that it is God’s initiative which sets
in motion the relationship between the elements, it is so far unclear how or why this can happen,
given Rosenzweig’s claim that even God appears enclosed within himself.19
The second part of The Star begins to answer the questions left open in the first part,
namely, the manner in which the elements of reality are to come into relationship with one
another. Rosenzweig articulated the being of God in Part One as vitality, which is the admixture
of divine essence and divine freedom.20 Rosenzweig argues against views of “divine caprice”

See Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig, 175: “The elements must turn outside themselves, as it were, because they do not
have the tools, each within itself, to secure themselves over against their nothings any further than they have through
the factual ‘Yes’ ‘And’ ‘No.’ For each element to be what it is – and not to fall back into nothing – we discover, it
must enter into relation with its others.”
17
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption., 61: The world “is entitled to remain blind and deaf as long as God does
not strive and man does not speak.” See also, ibid., 78: “the self lacks all bridges and connections; it is turned in
upon itself exclusively.”
18
Ibid., 80.
19
See Rotenstreich, “Rosenzweig’s Notion of Metaethics,” 87, who notes that Rosenzweig’s “whole anthropological
approach is characterized by an attempt to make self-enclosure so radical that only revelation and divine miracles
can open the ‘doors’ or ‘windows.’”
20
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 49. For Rosenzweig, God in his vitality is composed of essence and
freedom: one part a static necessity of being and one part the dynamic caprice of action. Joining together act and
being, Rosenzweig’s God is both constant and charismatic, both continuity and capable of discontinuity. For the
16
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which argue that God creates in absolute freedom, but he also rejects the view that God creates
out of necessity simpliciter. Rosenzweig thinks rather that God’s creative activity is grounded in
the necessity of his essence, but that this essence is a dynamic, vital essence rather than a static
essence. Thus, God has no need to enter into relations with the world qua the concealed
dimension of his nature, but does need to create qua the manifest dimension of his nature.21 In
this way, Rosenzweig is able to maintain that God can be both essentially enclosed within
himself and an element which in his structure relates to the other elements, first through creation,
then through revelation.22
A layer of complexity is added when discussing the sociality of divine-human relations in
addition to interhuman relations. Gadamer’s ontology does not have a specified place for God,
and therefore his model of sociality does not explicitly address the divine.23 Although Levinas
discusses the dimension of the divine, he is clear that any proposed relationship to God should
not alter one’s relationship with another human being. The subject’s relation to God is ancillary
to the question of ethics, on Levinas’s account. Rosenzweig, by contrast, expects that the human
being should relate both to God and to other human beings, and that the relation to God
conditions genuine relations with others. Thus, what constitutes “genuine” sociality will look
different on an expanded ontological outlook than on a more purely “immanent” ontology, that
is, an ontology which remains on the human plane. The question and complexity of the human-

background to this set of claims, see Friedrich Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason M. Wirth (Albany, NY:
SUNY University Press, 2000), 3-49. See in particular, ibid., 5: “Even though the God who is necessary is the God
who is free, both are still one and the same. What is a being from nature and what is as such through freedom are
completely different. If God were already everything from necessity, then God would be nothing through freedom.
And yet God is, according to general consensus, the most voluntaristic being…Even this ‘nature’ of God is living,
nay, it is the highest vitality, and it is not to be expressed so bluntly. Only by progressing from the simple to the
complex, through gradual creation, could we hope to reach the full concept of this vitality.”
21
Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 114-116.
22
Explaining this distinction in another way, Rotenstreich writes that “the revelation of God is a special act and is
not a continuity of the essence of God.” Rotenstreich, “Rosenzweig’s Notion of Metaethics,” 72.
23
Gadamer does, however, at times situate his thought in relation to theology.
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divine relationship will remain with us through the rest of the project, yet for Rosenzweig, as
well as for Levinas and Bonhoeffer, the self’s relationship with God does not replace its
relationship with other human beings. Rather, sociality is granted a richer vitality, and, for
Rosenzweig, human sociality becomes authentic only in the context of the relationship with God.
For Rosenzweig, the initiative of God in the act of revelation is what sets the three
elements into relation with each other, breaking the occlusion of the self necessitated by the
systems of idealism.24 Revelation is delivered first and foremost in the modality of love, in
contrast to the modality of cognition. God reveals himself not as a content to be grasped but as a
person to be loved. This fact has several consequences. The person to whom God reveals himself
experiences love in the genuine sense for the first time. This love opens up the individual,
granting her temporality, speech, and concrete action toward others. The human being who
receives revelation thereby receives these features for the first time. Rosenzweig claims that
genuine sociality cannot come about apart from love, temporality, and language, and therefore
that this sociality does not come about apart from revelation. In what follows, I describe God’s
initiative of revelation as unlocking the capacity to love others, highlighting how these features
constitute a break with idealism, in Rosenzweig’s view.
Rosenzweig defines revelation in a broad sense and in a narrow sense,25 roughly
corresponding to the distinction between general and special revelation.26 Rosenzweig’s broad

Pollock writes, “Revelation, in the broad sense, names for Rosenzweig the opening up of God, world, and human
being to each other in relation.” Pollock, Franz Rosenzweig, 185. In my view, this articulation of revelation as an
activity of each of the elements mischaracterizes the way in which revelation proceeds from the initiative of God
alone. Pollock continues on to say, “To realize the very self that it is, the notion of revelation thus suggests, each
element must seek out the completion of its own self in its relation with its others” Ibid., 186. Although it is correct
to say, on Rosenzweig’s view, that each on the elements needs to be placed in relation with its others, it is much less
clear that either the self or the world can be said to “seek out” relationality.
25
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 161, where he speaks of a “second” and “narrower” revelation.
26
See Donald K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, 1996), 240, which defines general revelation as “God’s self-disclosure and self-communication in the
universe and the created world,” and special revelation as “God’s particular self-revelation at specific times and
24
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definition of revelation is God’s reaching out both to the world and to humans through his
word.27 Thus, according to this first sense of revelation, God’s act of creation is also a revealing
of his word to the world. The narrow, or second form of revelation, is God’s specific selfpresentation to the human self in speech, in the particular moment. According to Rosenzweig,
this narrower revelation illuminates the revelation of creation, making creation known as God’s
action for the world. Thus, the two revelations bear a unique relationship to one another with
respect to chronology and epistemology: the general revelation appears in the world prior to the
particular revelation, but is only known as such posterior to the second revelation. Put otherwise,
while God first creates the world and speaks his word to this creation, he only subsequently gives
it true speech through humanity in revelation, and it is thus only through this revelation that the
world can be recognized as creation at all. Hence, God’s special revelation to human beings has
epistemological priority, although not chronological priority.28
Rosenzweig claims that revelation, in its narrow and proper sense, is self-revelation.
Thus, God’s speaking in and to creation is not itself a revelation of love. Rosenzweig writes in
his analysis of Genesis 1 that “God speaks…but so far he does not speak himself, not yet as
self.”29 Rosenzweig is convinced that it is a mistake to wholly identify revelation with God’s
activity in creation, for then God’s “factuality,” the experience humans have of him, could fade

places and to particular people.” Rosenzweig is less confident that God’s activity in creation is truly a selfrevelation.
27
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 111: “the divine word…is revelation only because it is at the same time
the word of creation.”
28
Historical revelation bears witness to creation, to the providence of God in the world, and “possesses its own
space and time.” Rosenzweig says it is grounded in the historical event of the revelation of the divine name. This
historical revelation is of the narrower, self-presentational type, but as an historical event, it is experienceable only
second-hand. Hence, while it is important for the foundation of the historical community and its witness to
revelation, it cannot itself be the ground for temporality, language, or love, as it is not directly experienceable as
such. See ibid., 187-188.
29
Ibid., 154. God, too, bears a kind of relational deficiency prior to revelation, on Rosenzweig’s view. He writes that
God “is an I which…contains the Thou immediately, an I which discourses only with itself and can discourse only
with itself. It is, thus, an impersonal I, an I that still remains within itself, which does not step outside of itself in the
Thou, does not reveal itself but, like the metaphysical God of the protocosmos, is alive only within itself.” Ibid.
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into obscurity by being reduced to a statically available idea, a single occurrence, or a historical
process.30 Hence, God’s self-revelation must be of such a character as to be able to be
experienced ever-anew, and it must be a revelation of God’s own self. This is why the historical
revelation of the divine name to Moses, while indeed being a self-revelation and sufficient to
ground the religious community, is insufficient to ground the inversion of the occluded self into
the relational self. What makes this possible is that divine revelation presently speaks to the
human self in the mode of love.
Revelation as Love
For Rosenzweig, the intentionality of love is the act which fulfills the requirements of the
personal character of self-revelation. The love of the lover is a giving of oneself to the beloved in
the self-sacrifice of revealing oneself.31 For Rosenzweig, love is an act, an event, rather than an
attribute.32 Hence he concludes that “God’s love is ever wholly of the moment and to the point at
which it is directed.”33 If love were an attribute, it would be eternal, necessary, and hence bound
up with the universal rationality espoused in idealism. Rosenzweig thus rejects any abstracted
notion of the “love of God” which floats in eternity apart from a concrete beloved. Instead,
divine self-revelation is principally expressed in the momentary and self-giving act of love.
On Rosenzweig’s account, the force of the love of God on the human being punctures the
isolated and inwardly-focused self, transforming it into a soul. Rosenzweig writes that it is only
“in the love of God that the flower of the soul begins to grow out of the rock of the self.

See ibid., 160. See also Rosenzweig’s analysis of what he calls “atheistic theology,” that is, concepts of revelation
which tend to flatten out the transcendence of God to human thought or activity, thus paving the way for modern,
Feuerbachian atheism, in his essay “Atheistic Theology,” in Philosophical and Theological Writings, trans. and ed.
Paul W. Franks and Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 17-19.
31
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 162: “It is love which meets all the demands here made on the concept
of the revealer…Only the love of a lover is such a continually renewed self-sacrifice; it is only he who gives himself
away in love.”
32
See ibid., 164: “love is not an attribute, but an event.”
33
Ibid.
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Previously man had been a senseless and speechless introvert; only now is he – beloved soul.”34
Rosenzweig defines the soul in contrast to his earlier articulation of the self: a soul is that which
is able to enter into genuine relationships with what is outside of itself, while the self remains
occluded in its own seclusion.35 Rosenzweig maintains that the self cannot of its own resources
transform its introversion into sociality; “a shock was necessary before the self could become
beloved soul.”36 What occurs in revelation is a rupturing of the self and a constitution of a soul,
the creation of receptivity in what had previously been self-enclosed.
Because love confronts the individual without the individual being able to absorb the love
into its own rational territory, it disarms the self’s defenses. The individual finds herself
responding in contentment and humility.37 Because the self was not an inert object, but rather a
force, it contained the potential for outwardly-directed activity. The magnetism of defiance
which turned the self in on itself, once unlocked by revelation, serves to draw the transformed
soul to God in faithful trust.
Revelation as Temporality
As noted above, Rosenzweig holds that the revelation of divine love is a moment-bymoment, contingent event which eludes the grasp of the universal reason extolled by idealism.
This quality of love is significant for Rosenzweig’s alternative to idealism because it enables a
dimension of temporality which is unavailable to idealism and which is necessary for true
sociality. Specifically, Rosenzweig argues that the experience of the open-endedness of the
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Ibid., 169.
Ibid. 82: “Soul would mean stepping out of the introverted confinement.”
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Ibid., 179.
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Rosenzweig says that this response may occur because the soul had already “wanted” love. Rosenzweig
speculates that perhaps this desire was buried in the self only to become realized in the experience of being loved.
However, because love is concentrated only on the present moment, on Rosenzweig’s view, the question of why or
how the soul was able to respond to this love fades in view of the experience of the love itself. Rosenzweig does,
nevertheless, characterize the transformation of the self as a conversion of defiance into humility and faithfulness.
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present moment is necessary for genuine relationships to occur.38 But this open-ended quality of
the present moment is not available for idealism because idealism dictates (1) that the objects of
reason be circumscribed and therefore past in order that reason be complete and (2) that sociality
is rooted in universal reason and hence is separated from temporality. Because of the demand of
idealism to locate relations with others in reason, sociality is inevitably locked in the past, unable
to account for the openness of the experience of the present. Rosenzweig maintains, then, that
revelation alone provides the experience of temporality which is lacking in idealist thought.
Rosenzweig argues that idealist attempts to understand the world project it in thought as a
completed object, something which can be grasped precisely because it is past. He writes, “all
concepts which comprehend reality generally seek to assume the form of the past tense. To be
recognized, the world is projected every time into the past.”39 For Rosenzweig, something that is
past is in itself barred from true relationality, for to be in relation means to be incomplete,
unfinished, while the world as an object of knowledge would be figured as completed.
The key to opening up the world as creation, as God’s first relation with the other
elements, therefore lies in opening the elements up to each other in temporality. But genuine
temporality is not available to idealist philosophy in itself, which either tries to understand reality
in thought alone, separated from temporality, or from the point of view which considers things
only in their past. Rosenzweig argues that the elements can only be understood from the category
of experience, which starts from living rather than mere thinking. Thus, Rosenzweig claims that

See Franz Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” in Philosophical and Theological Writings, 125-126, where he
posits that genuine sociality needs time to unfold in the back and forth of conversation: “Speaking is time-bound,
time-nourished; it neither can nor will abandon this, its nourishing environment; it does not know in advance where
it will arrive; it lets its cues be given by others. It lives in general from the life of the other, where the audience of
the narration or the respondent in the dialogue or the cospeaker in a chorus; whereas thinking is always solitary,
even if it is happening among several ‘symphilosophizing’ partners.” Rosenzweig maintains that while the “old
thinking,” best exemplified in idealism, operates in isolation and without regard for experiencing time, the new
thinking is predicated upon “needing the other and, what amounts to the same, on taking time seriously.” Ibid. 127.
39
Ibid., 132.
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the theological category of particular revelation, God’s second relation to what is outside of
himself, provides the experience requisite to understand the elements in relation to one another,
or what amounts to the same thing, revelation offers to human beings genuine temporality.40
True experience and true temporality, then, for Rosenzweig coincide, and it is only from this
standpoint that philosophy, which adopts theology’s category of revelation, can truly come to an
understanding of the elements of the All.41 Thus Rosenzweig proposes an “absolute
empiricism”42 as the methodology best appropriate to articulating reality. This “empiricism” is a
philosophy of experience which takes revelation as its presupposition.43
Hence, Rosenzweig claims that it is only revelation which can break the idealist
transfixion on the past and bring it to true experience in and of the present.44 And it is the mode
of revelation as love, in its character as being located solely in the present moment, which makes
possible experience and genuine temporality. Rosenzweig writes that only in the momentary
expression of revelation “will the thing emerge from its subjective past into its vital present.”45
Human beings can only experience the present as truly and temporally open from the revelation

Elsewhere, he writes, “What God has done, what He is doing and what He will do; what has happened to the
world, what will happen to it, what happens to man, what he will do – all this cannot be disconnected from
temporality.” Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” 124.
41
See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 106.
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Rosenzweig, “The New Thinking,” 138.
43
See Paul Mendes-Flohr, “Franz Rosenzweig’s Concept of Philosophical Faith,” in Leo Baeck Institutional
Yearbook, 34 (1989), 366: “Broadly defined, revelation thus becomes the overarching fact of experience.” Here I
argue against Peter Gordon, who maintains that “like Heidegger, Rosenzweig subscribes to the ontologicalhermeneutical thesis that it is temporal, human existence itself that first constitutes the ground of meaning.” Peter Eli
Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2003), 183. While Gordon rightly emphasizes the basic temporal constitution of meaning, insofar
as he omits that that it is revelation which makes possible this experience of meaning, he appears to fall subject to
Rosenzweig’s critique of Goethe’s purely immanent temporality which lacks “the eternal for support.” Rosenzweig,
The Star of Redemption, 288. While Gordon rightly emphasizes Rosenzweig’s dictum that “eternity cannot go
beyond time” (ibid.), it is revelation which comes to the human being apart from its own resources that properly
grants the human being its true temporality which is the experience of relationship.
44
See ibid., 157: “For the soul, revelation means the experience of a present.”
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of God’s love, on Rosenzweig’s view. It is this very experience of the present which enables the
human to become “unfinished” and to begin to form relations with what is external to it.
Revelation and Dialogue
Rosenzweig claims that the medium of God’s self-revelation to human beings is
linguistic.46 This claim is significant for two reasons. First, with respect to his argument against
idealism, language in the mode of speech is a personal medium, rather than the impersonal media
of logic and of art which idealism extolls. In particular, God relates to humans in a dialogical
rather than monological mode, requiring the interaction between the divine and human persons.
Revelation takes place through the medium of dialogue. Second, it is this personal mode of
revelation which enables human speech to attain genuine sociality with other persons. I will treat
both of these claims in turn.
One of the most distinctive and vibrant parts of The Star of Redemption is the description
of the dialogue which Rosenzweig envisions as occurring between God and the soul. This
dialogue functions as the medium of divine love to the human being in which the linguistic
response of the soul plays a vital role. On Rosenzweig’s account, the dialogue between God and
the soul unfalteringly unfolds as a back and forth movement: the locating call of God and the
soul’s readiness to hear, followed by the imperative call of God to the human being, which
engenders the response (and responsiveness) of the soul in the love of God, to which God replies
and the soul in turn responds in prayer. These are the words: “Where art thou?” – “Here I am.” –
“Love me!” – “I have sinned,” – nevertheless, “I am thine.” – “I have called thee by name: thou
art mine.” – “my God, my God.”47 The content of the revelation expressed in this dialogue is the
command to love God (as well as the concomitant command to love the neighbor). However, this
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See ibid., 110, where Rosenzweig describes language as the “organon of revelation.”
See ibid., 175-184.
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dialogue also exhibits what Rosenzweig takes to be essential in personal relationships. Selfrevelation, expressed in language, requires the vulnerability involved in the declaration of love.
Further, the dialogue between God and the soul unfolds as the expression of mutual love: as
lover, God commands the soul to love, and the soul acquiesces to this command.48
Rosenzweig now claims that the divine act of revelation engenders the use of language in
a new and genuine sense. He writes, “language, for all it is all there, all created from the
beginning, nevertheless awakes to real vitality only in revelation.”49 That is, although
Rosenzweig grants that human beings are fundamentally linguistic beings, that language is a
feature of one’s personality as a person embedded in society, human speech only becomes true
speech in the encounter with revelation.
Recall that Rosenzweig endeavors in Part One to maintain the separation of the human
self from its others. He writes that “the criterion of the self” is that “it keeps silent.”50 For
Rosenzweig, the tragic hero of Greek drama illustrates the language of the self: a monologue
which really amounts to silence and withdrawal into the self. Rosenzweig maintains that “the self
does not express itself, it is buried within itself. As soon as it enters into conversation, however,
it ceases to be self. It is self only as long as it is alone.”51 Here, Rosenzweig admits, through the
example of the tragic hero on the stage, that the human being can enter into a dialogue with other
persons, and this prior to any divine act of revelation.
However, he argues that this interhuman “dialogue does not create any relation between
two wills because each of these wills can only will its isolation.”52 In other words, will is an

Rosenzweig says that the beloved’s love first exists as “an awe compounded of humility and pride, together with a
feeling of dependence and of being securely sheltered,” but is first expressed as shame. See ibid., 168 and 179.
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operation of the self, which is lost when entering into a dialogue. The self, the only thing that can
exercise a person’s will, does not show up in a conversation, as Rosenzweig continually
emphasizes: “the self lacks all bridges and connections; it is turned in upon itself exclusively…It
remains self only in its complete speechlessness and unrelatedness.”53 Here we can see a
particular deficiency of the person prior to her experience of revelation, who Rosenzweig will
call the “pagan.” The pagan can relate to others through language, in dialogue, but once she does
so, she loses her individuality and her capacity to will.54 Thus, persons cannot relate to each
other on a volitional level. This suggests that persons can neither really will to agree nor to
disagree with each other in conversation; they often are simply talking past one another.55 While
persons are able to communicate with one another in dialogue prior to divine revelation, they are
not able to present themselves as a whole. By contrast, divine revelation enables the human
being to truly speak for the first time, that is, to truly engage in self-revelation toward others.
Despite the fact that the human being is opened up to sociality for the first time in divine
revelation and the dialogue contained therein, the soul is not fulfilled in this encounter with
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Ibid., 78-79.
In explaining Rosenzweig’s contrast between the pagan and the “fanatic,” who wants to forcibly drag revelation
and the kingdom of God in a particular direction, Leora Batnitzky writes, “the pagan remains open to revelation, to
becoming a witness, while the fanatic does not. Even though the pagan is self-absorbed, the pagan recognizes her
finitude” Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation: The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig Reconsidered
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 48. She further claims that the pagan is “is capable of proper
performance in relation to God and other people, while the fanatic is not.” Ibid., 58. Batnitzky here is too optimistic
with regard to the pagan’s capacities. Instead, the pagan in herself, is not open to revelation, nor is she capable of
proper relation to God and others, on Rosenzweig’s view. The thrust of Batnitzky’s claim is that the fanatic is
violently coercive in a way that the pagan is not, and thus the pagan occupies a kind of superior ground in this
regard. I agree with this qualified claim. But I do not think that the pagan can be said to “open” to the divine of her
own resources.
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Rosenzweig does think that the secluded selfhood of the self is comprehensible and communicable, not through
word but through art. He writes, “Prior to any real human speech, art creates, as the speech of the unspeakable, a
first, speechless, mutual comprehension.” Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 81. Although persons cannot
verbalize their selfhood to others in the context of conversation, the self can be expressed through the work of art.
This means that selfhood cannot be directly expressed from one person to another, but rather it needs the impersonal
dimension of art in order to act as medium for the understanding of another’s self. See also ibid., 147: “Not the word
but art is the true language for the world prior to the miracle of revelation…the reality of art, as work of art, is not
speech but something itself spoken vis a vis the lifestream reality of real language. Were it still speech here too, then
it would be a language beside speech, and while there may be many languages, there is but one speech.”
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divine love. Rather, she finds herself longing for relations which are wholly worldly, and indeed,
being propelled into human community by divine revelation itself. Rosenzweig writes, “the soul
aspires beyond this [divine] love to the realm of brotherliness, the bond of a supernatural
community, wholly personal in its experience yet wholly worldly in its existence.”56 Thus I take
up in the next sections Rosenzweig’s account of the genuine human community, in which human
sociality finds its fulfillment, as the alternative to the idealist system of ethics.
The Love of Neighbor
The human being can come into authentic relationships with others once she has gained
the ability to love, for love is the genuine mode of self-revelation and therefore the genuine mode
of sociality, on Rosenzweig’s view.57 Rosenzweig argues that the love of God does not bind the
soul in private, mystical dialogue; rather, it prepares the soul for love in human community. The
soul is ultimately not fulfilled in the exclusivity of the human-divine encounter. After being
opened up to what is outside itself, the soul finds a longing for brotherliness, for relations with
that which belongs to the same plane of existence and can relate to the soul in solidarity. By
definition, then, God cannot fulfill this longing. The soul must abandon the immediate dialogue
with God and speak to others in what now has become her own voice. And her voice speaks to
others in just the way she has found herself spoken to: through the self-revelation of love.58
Indeed, Rosenzweig claims that God’s command to the human being to love God himself
at the same time contains the command to love others as well.59 Rosenzweig asserts, “The love
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for man, in being commanded by God, is directly derived from the love for God. The love for
God is to express itself in love for one’s neighbor. It is for this reason that love of neighbor can
and must be commanded.”60 Thus the imperative declaration for the love of God requires love
for the soul’s neighbor. Rosenzweig notes the peculiarity of this demand, that love is
commanded, and this command is considered to be a paradigmatic expression of love.
Nevertheless, he maintains that this command is the truly immediate expression of love and that
“the declaration of love is in reality always too late.”61 What we might think of as the proper
expression of love, “I love you,” Rosenzweig claims is in fact derivative, the after effect of the
more primordial expression found in the command to the beloved to love the lover. On
Rosenzweig’s view, the declaration of love in the formalized “I love you” is considered, and
therefore posterior to the actual moment of love. The mature soul learns that to love God in
return is also to implant itself in the world, carrying about the love of God to its neighbor.
Rosenzweig argues further that the love of neighbor is made possible only through the
love of God made manifest in the revelational encounter with God. He writes, “Only the soul
beloved of God can receive the commandment to love its neighbor and fulfill it. Ere man can
turn himself over to God’s will, God must first have turned to man.”62 This is a corollary of
Rosenzweig’s claim that the self, prior to revelation, is self-enclosed, incapable of true love.
Here also we see Rosenzweig’s commitment to the necessity of the initiative of God for the
human being to have the ability to respond to God’s commands. Only because God has revealed
his love to the soul can the soul then reflect and embody that love to its neighbors.63 Further,
Rosenzweig maintains that the love of the soul toward others, as love, is enacted in the same
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temporal modality as God’s love. Genuine human love, too, is always concentrated in the
moment, unconcerned in itself with the time which surrounds it.64
For Rosenzweig, the way in which the soul’s love mirrors the divine act of love is a
crucial feature of the soul’s action in the world, and he contrasts this view with what he takes to
be Islam’s conception of human action as a reflection of divine revelation. Islam becomes for
Rosenzweig a kind of religious stand-in for idealism, particularly the universal and necessary
account of ethics in idealism. On Rosenzweig’s account of Islam, revelation is an attribute of
God and thus necessary and universal, once and for all, as opposed to the contingent and
particular revelation Rosenzweig has described thus far.65 From the point of view of
Rosenzweig’s Star, for Islam, love is only a statically-proceeding mercy, and hence it is only a
one-way affair.66 God does not reveal himself, but a content. Rosenzweig argues that Islam’s
submission is not a quiet stance of the soul, but a string of acts of obligation.67 Love is not
received passively, but through constant action. Here, God is passive, and the human is active, in
contrast to Rosenzweig’s account of the initiative of God acting upon the inert self.68
Rosenzweig then argues that Islam’s view of human responsibility reflects its view of
divine revelatory action, just as the view of human responsibility that comes out of Judaism and
Christianity mirrors its conception of God’s activity. Thus, Rosenzweig claims that in Islam, the
individual is bound permanently to a subservience to the static law, while on his own view, true
love of neighbor is entirely spontaneous and free, because it is love.69 In this way, Rosenzweig

See ibid., 215: “Love of neighbor always…must be an act of love wholly lost in the (present) moment.”
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asserts that the Muslim responds to God in the world not through love but through obligation. In
Islam, adherence to the law means giving authority to the past, while in Judaism, following the
command to love means privileging the present. Here, Rosenzweig suggests that Muslim ethics
finds its secular counterpart in Kantian ethics, where the emphasis falls on following the
universal law as opposed to individuality and relationship.70
Rosenzweig thus maintains that in Islam, revelation is given statically and universally,
and therefore the only response is to act toward others in the same way. Because a law is given
as a universal content, and not as living dialogue, the human being engages in social relations not
through living dialogue, not through the particularity of love, but through obligation to the law.
True sociality fails here because there is no precedent for individual and privileged relationship
with another particular being. The act of love given in the moment is crucial for Rosenzweig’s
ideas because it establishes relationality in time, because it signifies a relationship with a person
rather than with a law, and because it makes possible the love for neighbor as an end in itself,
rather than one’s action toward the neighbor being a means to fulfilling the law. By targeting
Islam as consisting in obligation to the universal law, Rosenzweig is able to identify a common
weakness in what he takes to be his main philosophical and religious competitors.71
Love of Neighbor as Ethics
In setting a universalized model of ethics as a contrast to his own view, Rosenzweig
situates his account in the sphere of ethical theory. That is, Rosenzweig provides his view of the

See ibid., 217: “This straightforward, obedient piety is based on a free self-denial ever laboriously regained. And
it finds an exact counterpart, strangely enough, in the secular piety of more recent times which freely conforms to
universal law. The ethics of Kant and his followers, for instance…”
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love of neighbor as an alternative to competing views of what it means to live and act rightly in
the world, both religious and philosophical. Rosenzweig can therefore be described as
recommending a kind of ethics, in the sense of prescribing for the human being a normative
orientation in the world. We must understand this “ethics” in a very particular way, however,
because there have been numerous proposals as to whether or not Rosenzweig should be said to
promote an ethics in The Star of Redemption.72 To show the sense in which Rosenzweig’s model
of the love of neighbor counts as an ethics, we should turn to the place in the Star where he most
clearly presents his alternative to what he labels as the idealist model of ethics.
Rosenzweig distinguishes love of neighbor, which he says is both commanded by God
and rooted in freedom, from Kantian ethics, which is absolutely and only rooted in freedom. On
Rosenzweig’s view, the Kantian requirement for autonomy leads to a purely formal and therefore
barren prescription for action in the world, as he writes, “the natural consequence of this
requirement is that the laws which are to determine this act lose all content, for any and every
content would exercise a power disturbing the autonomy…The moral law is necessarily purely
formal and therefore not only ambiguous, but open to an unlimited number of interpretations.”73
In other words, because nothing can impinge on the freedom of the will, in order to be
autonomous, no prescription external to the will – “Do this!” – can be universally concretized.

The debate as to how “Levinasian” Rosenzweig is features prominently here. See for example, Robert Gibbs, who
says that Rosenzweig advocates for “an ethics that orients intersubjective space without recourse to foundations.”
Robert Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 21. Then
see Peter Gordon, who writes that a key purpose of his study is “to combat the misunderstanding of Rosenzweig as
primarily an ethicist or theorist of alterity.” Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger, 11. Gordon here states that he is
responding to the work of Gibbs and Richard A. Cohen. After this, see Samuel Moyn’s (in my view judicious)
remark in his Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005), 154: “Once the quite categorical distinction between God’s love for man and man’s love for
one another in Rosenzweig’s thought is restored, the suggestion that there is not a theory of ethical intersubjectivity
in The Star of Redemption, as in Peter Eli Gordon’s important recent study, will seem just as overstated as the
contemporary belief among Levinasian commentators that the book is obviously about human ethics.” However,
while Moyn appears to restrict the realm of ethics to the human-divine encounter, I argue that there is a form of
ethics to be found in the Star in the human realm.
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Despite Kant’s would-be protests to the contrary, Rosenzweig thinks that adherence to
the moral law must always be an abstract affair – “Everything, after all, can be moral, but
nothing is moral with certainty.”74 That is, the moral law can always only be applied in particular
cases which are never identical to each other, and this results in the uncertainty of moral action.
Because the concrete circumstances are different, the required action may be different as well.
“By contrast,” Rosenzweig says, “the commandment to love one’s neighbor is clear and
unambiguous in content.”75 On Rosenzweig’s view, then, love of neighbor is a concrete directive
which applies determinately in every situation in which another shows up in the soul’s world.
And for Rosenzweig, this clarity of action is provided by the love of God: the love of neighbor
“is distinguished from all ethical acts by the presupposition of being loved by God.”76 Thus, the
content of the love of neighbor is directly filled in through the love of God, on Rosenzweig’s
account. Here, where Kant cannot provide moral certainty, Rosenzweig claims that the love of
neighbor commanded by God provides the certainty needed for moral action.
At the same time, however, Rosenzweig emphasizes that the love to be poured out toward
the neighbor has nothing to do with that neighbor’s particularity. Rosenzweig writes that “the
neighbor is only a representative. He is not loved for his own sake, nor for his beautiful eyes, but
only because he just happens to be standing there, because he happens to be nighest to me.”77 In
other words, although the command to love the neighbor is particular, the object of that
command is itself formal, a mere representative: “whoever be momentarily my neighbor
represents all the world for me in full validity.”78 It might seem odd here that Rosenzweig
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decries Kant’s ethics for being purely formal while his own view posits neighbor in formal terms
as well. However, the formality on Rosenzweig’s view exists only outside of the concrete
circumstance in which the neighbor is encountered. The neighbor’s function as representative
serves to ensure the particularity of the act in the concrete situation. The neighbor is to be loved
not for any feature that appears to me, but merely because she is the nearest part of the world
which can be transformed by my love. It is here, then, that Rosenzweig sees the strength of his
approach in contrast to other prescriptive worldviews: it provides both the correct internal
motivation and the correct outward action. That is, Rosenzweig’s model provides a certainty for
normative action regardless of circumstance, and it grants the conditions under which the proper
comportment (love rather than duty) toward its object can be fulfilled.
Although one may object to Rosenzweig here that the love of neighbor is itself an
abstract command that can be applied in many different ways depending on the context,
Rosenzweig would respond to this by arguing that love is never a command in the abstract. It is
always and only a concrete command which is given in the moment. I cannot know ahead of
time what actions love will prescribe. Hence, Rosenzweig sees his own view as providing proper
internal and external moral behavior which he sees other views as lacking. While the sole
motivation for action is love, the action has its end in the performance of world redemption. The
event of redemption begins with the soul’s love of neighbor and has as its end the conversion of
the entire world into praise and thanksgiving of the goodness of God.79
A Community for Redemption
Rosenzweig argues that sociality reaches its culmination not in the I-Thou dialogue
between God and the soul nor even in the love of one’s neighbor, but in the temporal integration

See ibid., 228: “The soul’s action, wholly turned toward the neighbor of the moment in deed and consciousness,
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of the elements in redemption by means of the collective invocation and giving of thanks to
God.80 For Rosenzweig, this conception of the redemption of the world solves the problem left
open by idealism, that the human being reduces God and the world into herself, into her own
subjectivity. Instead of truncating the elements or keeping the elements isolated from each other,
Rosenzweig presents the mechanisms by which God, the world, and the human enter into
genuine relationships with one another as the activity of redemption. Hence, the way in which
redemption is enacted in temporal life is the key, for Rosenzweig, to transcending idealism’s
neglect of temporality with regard to sociality.
While in revelation God speaks in the imperative and dialogical form, the soul itself
brings about the redemption of the world through the cohortative mode of speech whereby soul
While Rosenzweig argues that the love of God is mirrored in the soul’s love of her fellow neighbor, this does not
also mean that the whole I-Thou dialogue between God and the self-turned-soul also takes place on the human to
human plane. Rosenzweig says much less about interhuman dialogue in the Star, and it is left to the reader to stitch
together what he does say into a coherent whole. He does position the human soul in relation to its neighbor in terms
of I and Thou, writing that the task of redemption given to the I is to “say Thou to the He,” that is, to love the other
human not merely as an object, but as a person in direct address. Ibid., 274. See also ibid., 240: “Out of the endless
chaos of the world, one nighest thing, his neighbor, is placed before his soul, and concerning this one and well-nigh
only concerning this one he is told: he is like you…he is not to remain a He for you, and thus a mere It for your You.
Rather he is like You, like your You, a You like You, an I – a soul.”
The speech that occurs between persons does not, however, effectuate the dialogue of lover and beloved
sketched out between God and the soul. Rosenzweig writes, “The love of the human, the earthly lover…was a direct
likeness of divine love. But what we have found here resembles divine love only in being tied to the moment, in
being ever newly present.” Ibid., 212. While the soul who has received the love of God in revelation is described by
Rosenzweig as also, at least in some sense, having the power to transform a self into a soul. See ibid., 235: “where
someone or something has become neighbor to a soul, there a piece of world has become something which it was
not previously: soul.” The means by which the soul does this is not through dialogue but through duet. Thus, here I
concur with Samuel Moyn, who reads the interhuman relations in the Star as starkly different from the dialogue with
God, against Leora Batnitzky, among others, who reads the dialogical structure between God and the human being
as constitutive for interhuman sociality as well. See Moyn, Origins of the Other, 154: “Whereas God and man were
assigned to the totally distinct roles of lover and beloved, between man and man, each one loving the other like
himself, there is a certain equality and perhaps even symmetry…Rosenzweig certainly did have a theory of ethical
self-questioning and judgment in relation to “the other,” but he applied it only to the relation of the self to the
divine.” For Batnitzky’s view, see her “Dialogue as Judgment, Not Mutual Affirmation: A New Look at Franz
Rosenzweig’s Dialogical Philosophy,” in The Journal of Religion, 79 (1999): 534, where she argues that on
Rosenzweig’s view, “just as mutual confirmation is not possible for, nor the aim of, Jewish-Christian dialogue, so
too mutual understanding is neither possible nor desirable between individual people…In their particularity,
individuals meet each other in the harsh and harrowing assessment of one point of view over and against the other.
Change comes not from mutual confirmation, but from self-judgment that is inherently one-sided. Self-judgment is
not a relation of mutuality but one that bears full responsibility for transforming oneself. Self-judgment requires
everything from the self and nothing from the other, except that the other remain other.” In the background to this
disagreement is the debate in the literature on Rosenzweig’s relationship to Levinas.
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and neighbor together enjoin each other to invoke the goodness of God. The cohortative mode of
language is a first-personal plea or exhortation; it often takes the form in English, “Let us…”.
Rosenzweig characterizes this collective speech as a prayer, chant, or song which expresses
praise and thanksgiving to God through the universally true sentence: “he is good.”81 That is, by
collectively proclaiming the words, “he is good,” the community is also thereby expressing the
exhortation, “Let us give thanks and praise to God.”
This cohortative mode of speech is significant, on Rosenzweig’s view, because it
progressively draws all of creation into its vocalization, thereby bringing creation into
relationship with both God and the human being. Thus, redemption is accomplished, according
to Rosenzweig, by the process of the soul’s continually enlarging the chorus by leading the world
to join in the expression of thanksgiving.82 Rosenzweig claims that the soul’s outpouring of love
toward its neighbor results in the neighbor’s opening of her own mouth, and the voice that
ensues joins the soul’s own voice in praise of the creator.83 Hence, Rosenzweig sees the soul’s
mission in the world as expanding beyond a dialogical sociality, integrating social life into the
ever-expanding community of creation.
Rosenzweig then argues that this cohortative grammatical mood makes possible what had
not been available for the soul to perform on its own: thanksgiving to God.84 Because the soul
and neighbor give voice to praise and thanksgiving to God, they perform the grammatical and
vocal act of giving, that is, they perform in the dative. Here, Rosenzweig is concerned to give an
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account of what unifies the members who join together in the chorus. He asks, “What unites the
one voice of him who exhorts with all the world? He is different from all the world; they are two
different subjects, two different nominatives. And what he has and sees is also different from
what all the world has and sees, two different objects, two different accusatives.”85 On
Rosenzweig’s view, the soul and the world occupy divergent perspectives, and it is the same
with the soul and the neighbor, for the neighbor is a member of the world as well. Using
phenomenological language, we can say that each I intends from a different point of view and
therefore intends its object differently. As a result, there is a sense in which each I intends
different objects, objects which are constituted differently. In response to this problem,
Rosenzweig writes, “Only he [God] whom he [the soul] thanks is the same whom all the world
thanks; he is not object for him and thus tied to him; he is something ‘beyond’ him and beyond
anything that could become object for him.”86
Rosenzweig here presents two features of the situation of thanksgiving which provide a
solution to the disparate intentionality of soul and world. First, Rosenzweig argues, as he has
previously in his polemic against Islam, that God is not an object which can be bound to the
human being’s gaze. God is an element separate from the world and the human being and
therefore eludes the grasp of objectification by that mere fact. Second, there is a sense in which
God can be reached in human intentionality, and reached as the same despite being intended by
different persons. For Rosenzweig, this is the attribution of goodness to God in the giving of
thanks to God. Rosenzweig explains, “The voices of the hearts separated in this world find each
other in the dative which is beyond all. The dative is what binds, what comprises. He who is
given something, such as, here, thanks, does not thereby become the property of that which he is
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given. He remains beyond the giver, and because he remains beyond the individual giver he can
be the point at which all givers can unite.”87 Because no giver of thanks binds, or can bind, God
solely to itself in the act of giving thanks, this allows room for a multiplicity of voices to give the
same attribution to the same God without God being exhausted by or captured in the giving.
Further, Rosenzweig has it that this collective act joins the various members of the chorus
together in their shared intentionality. No longer are the I’s separated in their perspective and
intention, but are now bound together in a community of joint intention; no longer is the soul
found in the relationship of I-Thou, but now it is shaped in the relation of We-Thou.
Rosenzweig designates this community of redemption as the kingdom of God. He writes,
“The kingdom of God is actually nothing other than the reciprocal union of the soul with all the
world. This union of the soul with all the world occurs in thanksgiving, and the kingdom of God
comes in this union and every conceivable prayer is fulfilled.”88 The community of the kingdom
of God is characterized by its liturgical activity. Chant, chorus, and prayer each function not only
to invoke God, but above all to accomplish the redemption of the world. However, the kingdom
is not yet accomplished; it will be the fruit of redemption, but it begins, has its seeds in the vocal
congregation. Thus, the task of this community is an ongoing, eschatological task: its purpose is
to bring eternity into time. In fact, as we saw earlier in noting the importance of revelation for
temporality, here, genuine sociality in the community is inconceivable apart from its temporal
constitution. Rosenzweig argues that the kingdom of God, as an ultimately eschatological entity,
serves to bring all of creation in to itself in a temporal process.
The mechanism by which the prayer of the community brings eternity into time,
according to Rosenzweig, is liturgy. Rosenzweig sets the prayer of the community in the context

87
88

Ibid., 233.
Ibid.

123

of the liturgical year in the life of the community. Liturgy brings eternity into temporality
through ordering the discontinuous present, or “nows,” of revelation into the cyclical year of
festivals and liturgical life.89 Not only is the human being liberated from transitoriness, but world
is as well. Rosenzweig suggests that liturgical life represents the future of the “hypercosmos,”
the state of the cosmos in its true eternity, and as representatives of the redeemed world, “the
structures of liturgy…anticipate. They take something future, and turn it into a Today…They are
the silent anticipation of a world gleaming in the silence of the future.”90 Thus the world appears
here to be brought into redemption in a unique way. Liturgy mirrors in anticipation the character
of the redeemed hypercosmos, enacting in present life what is truly future. But through this very
act, the cosmos itself experiences its fulfilled state while still on its own temporal path, as it
were. A large portion of the third part of The Star is dedicated to describing the liturgical life of
both Judaism and Christianity, arguing that the empirical practices of these communities, each in
their own way, function to draw God, the world, and the human into relation with one another by
weaving eternity into the fabric of time.91 The temporality of liturgical life serves as a concrete,
lived integration of the elements, as opposed to the abstract integration of the elements attempted
by idealism in thought alone.
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The community which is oriented in liturgical life is therefore Rosenzweig’s completed
model of genuine sociality.92 The ritualized performances of prayer, gesture, and song constitute
the manner by which human beings constitute genuine temporality for their own community and
for the inclusion of the whole world into that community. Rosenzweig argues that this temporal
orientation offers a way for the elements of reality to come into genuine relations with each other
which idealism cannot provide. The heart of this temporal enactment of reality is found in the
social life of the community. Thus for Rosenzweig, while divine revelation grounds human
sociality, it is that human sociality in the religious community which in turn brings all of reality
into a kind of sociality of the elements.
Rosenzweig and Levinas
The question of the extent of Rosenzweig’s influence on Levinas has occupied much of
the secondary literature on the two thinkers. Here, I am not so much interested in the lines of
convergence as in the points at which Levinas departs from Rosenzweig. For if there is
significant ambiguity concerning what concepts or motives Levinas may have drawn from

A question which may arise here is that of Rosenzweig’s controversial notion of the Jewish blood-community. In
the discussion of the exclusive privileges of the Jewish community, Rosenzweig writes, “While every other
community that lays claim to eternity must take measures to pass the torch of the present on to the future, the bloodcommunity does not have to resort to such measures. It does not have to hire the services of the spirit; the natural
propagation of the body guarantees it eternity.” Ibid., 299. On Rosenzweig’s view, Jewish blood ensures its
community’s claim for future redemption. While other communities are not thereby excluded from participation in
eternity, they lack this decisive benefit.
Kepnes gives the assessment that Rosenzweig’s discussion here may “sound strange for its ethnocentrism
and its touches of Jewish racial superiority. Certainly, this could be seen as a result of the intense focus on ‘race’ as
a category of both science and culture at the turn of the twentieth century and an obsession of many German
intellectuals of this same period. Yet, I think that Rosenzweig, himself, provides a more fruitful context to
understand Jewish blood than that provided by the pseudoscientific concept of race. This context is the structural
form of the miracle, of prediction and fulfillment that we see Rosenzweig using throughout the Star. Here, the
notion of Jewish blood signals the concrete sociological fulfillment of the promise of redemption. The notion of
Jewish blood signals an anti‐Hegelian and empirical move to the concrete, to a supra‐rational principle or a given
substance.” Kepnes, Jewish Liturgical Reasoning, 104-105. The idea in this explanation is that the reference to
Jewish blood fulfills the same function as prophecy and miracle as an element within creation which testifies to
divine action or to fulfillment. While Jewish blood attests to its bearer’s future redemption, it is not itself the
mechanism of that redemption. Kepnes explains, “it is liturgy, and not Jewish blood, through which the Jewish
people's sense of their election, ethical ideals, and eternality unfolds.” Ibid., 105. Liturgy is the common mechanism
of redemption through which both the Jewish and Christian communities enact eternity in temporality.
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Rosenzweig, it is much more clear where their respective models of sociality formally diverge.
First, I must backtrack, giving Levinas’s account of the relationship between God and sociality,
before proceeding to show the sharp contrast between the two thinkers.
Although Levinas invokes the terminology of God across his corpus, he takes care in his
philosophical writings to delineate how we are permitted to use the concept of God in
philosophical discourse. Insisting upon a philosophical (and phenomenological) starting point,93
Levinas is wary of the use of the concept of God in philosophy, which, following Heidegger, he
designates as onto-theology. Levinas stipulates, “Onto-theo-logy consists in thinking of God as a
being [étant] and in thinking being [être] on the basis of this superior or supreme being.”94
Identifying God with Being or as the highest being for Levinas makes God complicit in or
absorbs God into the totalizing violence of being, reducing otherness into comprehension.
Placing God at the top of the chain of being, on Levinas’s view, far from personalizing reality,
instead subordinates any personhood associated with the concept of God to God’s impersonal
function as the keystone of being. In onto-theology, God becomes an anonymous figure, devoid
of personhood, which exists solely to secure the architecture of impersonal being.
Levinas nevertheless strives to think of God in a manner other than as an onto-theological
construct; he “seeks to think God as a beyond-being.”95 Levinas goes on to say in his lecture
course on “God and Onto-theology” that the “non-onto-theo-logical approach to the idea of God
goes by way of the analysis of the interhuman relationships that do not enter into the framework
of intentionality.”96 Already in Totality and Infinity, Levinas emphatically refuses a conception
See Levinas, “Transcendence and Height,” 30: “ultimately my point of departure is absolutely nontheological. I
insist upon this. It is not theology that I am doing, but philosophy.”
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of or relationship with God apart from the human relationship. He claims, “There can be no
‘knowledge’ of God separated from the relationship with men.”97 In order for God not to be cast
into ontological terms, the subject can only relate to him through the experience of the face of the
other. The God who is seen in being, who is accessed directly but impersonally, is a God who
circumvents the plight of the needy in favor of cementing a philosophical architectonic. The
point is that a God conceived apart from the face to face encounter with humans is an impersonal
God, one who is available for reflection but is abstracted from the needs of the human other.98
“Everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation,” Levinas asserts, “represents not
the superior form but the forever primitive form of religion.”99 The way to block the concept of
God from becoming a pawn of ontology and a possession of the ego is to locate God in the
encounter with the human face – the sole place wherein subjective intentionality is displaced.
However, Levinas does say that while the human other neither serves to bring God and
the subject together nor is to be conflated with the divine, the face of the other serves as the locus
where God can be revealed.100 The trace of God in the face is not presented as a proof or of
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God’s existence to the atheist or the skeptic, for this trace does not definitively lead to any object
or person. To claim that God is found in the face is not a knowledge provided by epistemological
procedure; the claim of God’s presence is not measurable by intentional consciousness. It may
well be that God is present, speaking in the human face, unbeknownst to the subject or to the
human other herself. God need not be identified as such to present his commands.
In the final analysis, Levinas thinks of God, from a philosophical point of view, as a
possibility which can never be unswervingly affirmed – or rejected. Levinas maintains that God
must be continually obscured by a question mark, by the “blinking light” of revelation.101 That is,
the revelation of God is not a light which we can capture and examine; it must always burst in
and out of our phenomenal plane. Levinas writes,
God is not simply the ‘first other (autrui),’ the other (autrui) par excellence, or the
‘absolutely other (autrui),’ but other than the other (autre qu’autrui), other otherwise,
other with an alterity prior to the alterity of the other (autrui), prior to the to the ethical
bond with the other (autrui) and different from every neighbor, transcendent to the point
of absence, to the point of a possible confusion with the stirring of the there is [il y a].102
God’s transcendence transcends the transcendence of the human other to the extent that it may be
indistinguishable from what Levinas terms the there is, which is, as one commentator puts it, “a
dark and chaotic indeterminacy that precedes all creativity and goodness.”103 In other words,
God cannot finally be ascertained as something to be individuated from anonymous, impersonal
chaos. For Levinas, the point is not to search for the identity of God, but instead to attend to the
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neighbor in front of one’s own face. Hence, God cannot stand as motivation for ethics or for the
love of one’s neighbor. The neighbor must signify and command in and of herself.
Note here the stark difference from Rosenzweig that Levinas expresses. Levinas asserts
that the genuine human to human relationship is the condition for a relation to God, while
Rosenzweig holds that the relationship to God is a condition for genuine human relationships.
For Rosenzweig, the love of neighbor is directly derived from the love of God, while for
Levinas, there can be no love of God prior to the encounter with the face of the other.
In one of his few essays on Rosenzweig, Levinas summarizes what he considers to be
two specifically Jewish elements in Rosenzweig’s thought: “[1] Love is manifested as
commandment; the imperative par excellence, it commands what nothing in the world could
command, love. [2] Man is the mediator of redemption, the indispensable relay of the movement
that began in God.”104 These two traits of Jewish thought, as Levinas sees them, are elements
that Levinas himself works to affirm in his own writings.105 However, his gloss on Rosenzweig’s
account of love, command, and divine purposes borne by human agency may serve to obscure
the significant differences operative in each figure’s view. While they share the rejection of an
exclusive divine-human mysticism, Levinas rejects the priority of the revelation of God which
Rosenzweig maintains. Further, on Rosenzweig’s view, the revelation of divine love is
synonymous with personal self-revelation, with the will to be fully open and transparent to the
other. God’s self-revelation to the human makes possible the love of neighbor. In contrast to this,
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Levinas claims that the face of the other of itself commands the love of neighbor. While the face
is self-revelatory, this invokes no response of self-revelation in the other, for Levinas. He writes,
“responsibility for others could never mean altruistic will, instinct of ‘natural benevolence,’ or
love.”106 The point is that the response of the subject to the other is not formed in any intention
or reflection; instead, the subject is bound in responsibility prior to having been able to choose
this response. Therefore, when Levinas uses the language of the love of neighbor, this love is
interpreted in his account as the pre-volitional affection of responsibility into which the subject is
drawn. While Rosenzweig’s view of love is the enabling of the will, Levinas’s view of love is as
an operation antecedent to the will.107
The second component of Jewish thought which Levinas articulates bears out another
difference, which has to do with the way that each thinker sees the human person as a
representative of God. For Rosenzweig, the soul responds to revelation through bringing the
neighbor and the world into the redemptive community of thanksgiving. For Levinas, on the
other hand, the subject responds to revelation through responsibility for the Other. And while
both Levinas and Rosenzweig articulate a concept of the authentic human community, for
Levinas, this is ultimately reducible to the face to face encounter. For Rosenzweig, on the other
hand, the community worshiping before God constitutes a higher level of sociality than the
human to human encounter. These differences ultimately boil down to the fact that two
fundamentally different conceptions of sociality are at play. Rosenzweig sees sociality as
culminating in the communal praise of God, while Levinas sees sociality as fulfilled in one
human being being responsible for the particular human being with which he is faced. For
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Levinas, this is a consequence of his commitment to the claim that “everything that cannot be
reduced to an interhuman relation represents not the superior form but the forever primitive form
of religion.”108 Thus, on Levinas’s view, a model of sociality which enjoins the subject to turn
away from her neighbor, even if it be for the purpose of turning toward God, is defective.109
Rosenzweig and Dialogical Sociality
Theunissen’s The Other identifies Rosenzweig as one of the chief representatives of the
philosophy of dialogue, locating him in the same field of sociality as Buber, among others.110
Theunissen identifies the philosophy of dialogue with the principle that “the Other is originally
only to be encountered in the Thou, as the ‘second person’ of the personal pronoun.”111 This
adequately captures Rosenzweig’s characterization of the human being’s encounter with God,
and it is not a false characterization of Rosenzweig’s view of how genuine human to human
relationships begin. As we saw above, Rosenzweig thinks that genuine human relations begin
through the soul’s love of neighbor, which commands that the soul treat its human other as a
Thou. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify Rosenzweig’s position in contrast to theories of
sociality which concentrate solely on the dialogical encounter. Although Rosenzweig uses
dialogical language, he does not argue that sociality is grounded in the meeting between persons,
nor does he argue that persons themselves are grounded in this way. That is, while Theunissen is
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right to see Rosenzweig as contesting idealism’s claim that transcendental subjectivity can
account for genuine sociality, Rosenzweig does not follow Buber in claiming that the dialogue
between I and Thou is the source of sociality. Instead, Rosenzweig argues that sociality and
personhood are grounded in divine self-revelation.
However, a question may arise for the distinction I claim between dialogue and revelation
in Rosenzweig’s account. As noted above, revelation is given through the medium of dialogue.
Hence, it appears as though to say that sociality is grounded in revelation is on Rosenzweig’s
account the same as saying sociality is grounded in dialogue, because revelation comes in the
form of dialogue, on this view. The most direct response to this charge is to say that it is simply
not true that dialogue and revelation are identical to each other; on Rosenzweig’s account,
dialogue is dependent on the initiative of divine revelation. On the account of the dialogical
models of sociality of Buber and Gadamer, the dialogue bears its own initiative, that is, itself is
an agent. On Rosenzweig’s account, by contrast, the agent is the divine person who through
speech grounds the person’s ability to come into genuine relations with others. Thus, the
question is not so much whether sociality is formed in the back and forth movement of dialogue,
but whether dialogue can be said to be the ground or the cause of the social relation. And on
Rosenzweig’s view, dialogue is the instrument of revelation rather than itself being the ground.
While Rosenzweig clearly distinguishes himself from models of sociality grounded in
dialogue, it remains to be determined how Rosenzweig’s view avoids the transcendental
grounding of sociality, that is, how Rosenzweig eludes Theunissen’s criticisms of Buber. Recall
Theunissen claims that Buber must implicitly presuppose transcendental subjects which come
together in the meeting between them in dialogue. In contrast to Buber, who claims that persons
originate from the meeting itself, Rosenzweig maintains that subjects exist in their separation and
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individuality prior to sociality. As noted above, his analysis of the metaethical human being
articulates the human self as lord of his own being, as a subject who endeavors to reduce all of
reality to his own sphere. Yet Rosenzweig argues that this effort is unsuccessful, resulting in a
truncated and isolated human subject. That is, while this subject attempts to transcend God and
the world by drawing them into itself, God and the world remain equally resistant to reduction.
Further, Rosenzweig does not argue that sociality can be built upon the solitary layer
subjectivity. Instead, he argues that sociality only comes through the abandonment of this
allegedly self-sufficient subjectivity. The introverted self must be transformed into the social
soul outside of itself. Hence, Rosenzweig’s rejection of idealism and proposed alternative
occupies a distinct plot of logical space. Although he admits that human beings can be described
as separated, constituting subjects, these must be converted into souls in order to achieve genuine
sociality. Hence, his view diverges from a position which would claim that persons begin as
transcendental subjects and then incrementally build up to sociality through language use. On
Rosenzweig’s account, the attempted transcendentality of the subject must be wholly abandoned
in order to enter into true social life. Next, I turn to a closer investigation of how Rosenzweig’s
model of sociality differs from Gadamer’s dialogical model.
Rosenzweig and Gadamer
Both Rosenzweig and Gadamer place importance on temporal continuity and
discontinuity in achieving genuine sociality, highlight the importance of language for sociality,
and cast aside an oversimplified I-Thou model of social relations in favor of a more
comprehensive view. Yet in each of these three cases, the similarities begin to vanish once
viewed in more detail. Further, while Rosenzweig and Gadamer both criticize idealism for
grounding sociality in subjectivity, both their diagnoses and the cures they offer diverge
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significantly: Gadamer thinks that the false objectification of others in idealism is overcome
through the process of understanding others in dialogue, while Rosenzweig claims that the
seclusion of the self is overcome only in the admittance of revelation.
Dealing with the first and second alleged similarities together, I should note that although
Rosenzweig never addresses the question whether humans can be said to have a kind of language
from infancy or if language is a contingent layer added onto the human subject, Rosenzweig does
maintain that humans have and operate in language in their natural state, the state of creation.
Rosenzweig does appear to connect one’s personality, or one’s connectedness to others, to birth,
and hence prior to the emergence of the isolation of the self, but he does not explicitly identify
language with personality.112 Through one’s personality, however, there is a constant connection
to other humans in the atmosphere of society, which becomes disrupted by the birth of the self
and its withdrawal into itself, into its own atmosphere. This discontinuity is one which pulls the
individual out of its primal relatedness to others rather than serving to promote relatedness. Yet
Rosenzweig does posit the event of revelation as a singular momentous discontinuity which
engenders genuine sociality. This event serves to not only disrupt the self’s introversion, but to
weave the human being back into genuine relations with God, other humans, the past, and the
future. Thus, Rosenzweig articulates revelation as the discontinuity which makes possible both
temporal and existential continuity.
In the first chapter, I noted that Gadamer’s model of sociality hinges on the continuity of
preunderstandings which get disrupted by experiences of otherness and finally become integrated
into more comprehensive understandings. On Gadamer’s view, this process is a continual one,
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whereby ruptures occur on multiple occasions and in multiple ways.113 While it may be the case
that this revelation occurs more than once in a person’s life, it serves as a unique conversion of
selfhood into soulhood. This serves as a contrast to Gadamer’s view of discontinuity as
progressive and infinitely repeatable.
The third feature, the apparent similarity of subordinating the I-Thou relation to a broader
network of relations, is only a superficial comparison as well. While Gadamer ends up rejecting
the pairing of I and Thou for its implicit separation of two subjects prior to their connection in
language, Rosenzweig sees things differently. First, he does not reject I-Thou language; he
simply thinks there is more to sociality than just I and Thou. Second, Rosenzweig encourages the
notion that apart from revelation, self and other are in fact separated from each other. The I is
closed off and isolated from God prior to its awakening by his word of revelation. While there is
indeed a sense with which Rosenzweig affirms the relatedness of persons through society, the
context in which the I-Thou dialogue comes into play is not in the original relatedness of persons
in society, but rather the function by which that dialogue bridges the separatedness between
persons, human or divine. This difference in the view of a person’s initial situation leads to the
difference in the ways that Gadamer and Rosenzweig criticize idealism.
Both Rosenzweig and Gadamer reject the claims of idealism that sociality can
legitimately be grounded in transcendental subjectivity. However, the way that each goes about
solving this issue is different. While Rosenzweig has it that persons begin from a position of
separation, Gadamer rejects this claim. Gadamer argues that persons are fully immersed in their
facticity, in language, such that their conditionedness precludes their freedom and autonomy as
subjects. Rosenzweig, on the other hand, gives an account of both the facticity and the autonomy
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of the human subject. He argues the individual contains both freedom and facticity, that both
poles exist within the person, the one not to be lifted above the other. Rosenzweig’s claim, then,
is not that idealism has completely misdescribed the human subject, but rather than it has only
partially described the person. This fact means, for Rosenzweig, that it has failed to account for
the way in which persons genuinely relate to one another. By contrast, Gadamer thinks that
idealism from the beginning misunderstands and misdescribes human consciousness.
Finally, the contrast between Rosenzweig and Gadamer can be demonstrated in the
solution to the problem of where idealism goes wrong with regard to sociality. Gadamer’s
conclusive model of sociality is friendship, wherein the ideal of dialogue finds its full fruit in the
mutuality of the friend relationship. Rosenzweig, by contrast, concludes that human sociality is
fulfilled not in dialogue, but in shared intentionality toward a third, namely, God. While on
Gadamer’s view it is the reciprocity of dialogue that binds friends together, on Rosenzweig’s
view, it is the giving of thanks to God in liturgical activity that binds persons together in the
community. This has the consequence that for Gadamer, most anyone at any stage can share in
the sociality of friendship, while for Rosenzweig, it appears it is only those in the religious
congregation who can partake in the fulfillment of genuine community.
This contrast can also be seen in the notion of initiative which each thinker employs.
While for Gadamer, neither party can be truly said to take the initiative in inaugurating any
social relation, for Rosenzweig, true sociality begins from the initiative of God. Further, the
person who has been awakened by the initiative of God in turn initiates a relationship with her
neighbor through love. However, Rosenzweig does describe the community of the kingdom of
God as “the reciprocal union of the soul with all the world,”114 and he writes that in the
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anticipation of redemption, “man and world act and react upon each other in indissoluble
reciprocity.”115 Thus here in the activity of redemption embodied in the community of the
kingdom, Rosenzweig does describe a kind of back-and-forth movement in which neither party
appears to have priority. Although he says that redemption is “not directly God’s work or
deed,”116 but instead that it is the soul who accomplishes redemption, Rosenzweig argues that the
soul needs God in order to perform this activity. Rosenzweig writes that the soul and the world
are themselves unable to deliver themselves from this reciprocal deliverance, for in
delivering themselves, they only deliver themselves more and more firmly into and onto
each other. They cannot deliver themselves by themselves from each other; they can only
be delivered together with each other – delivered by a third one, delivering one on the
other, one by means of the other. Besides man and world, there is but One who is third;
only One can become their deliverer.117
In other words, while the human being and the world, joined together in the community of the
kingdom of God, reciprocally share in the direct activity of redemption through prayer and chant,
it is God who makes this activity truly redemptive. Of their own accord, the soul and world
cannot deliver themselves, but when God is the initiator and goal of this activity, then it becomes
redemptive, on Rosenzweig’s view.
Rosenzweig’s model of sociality therefore presents a view in which genuine sociality
must be grounded in and initiated by a single party, but the fulfillment of the social relation is
carried out in mutuality. On the level of the human-divine encounter, the Other, God, initiates the
relationship in revelation, but then this relationship is enacted in the back-and-forth movement of
dialogue. On the level of the human community, it is the I, the soul, who initiates the relationship
with the Other, the neighbor, in love, but then this relationship is enacted in the mutual union of
shared vocalization toward God. Thus, in Rosenzweig we see a complex combination of the
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notions of initiative and mutuality, dialogue and revelation, which make up the social relation.
Nevertheless, Rosenzweig’s account clearly claims revelation as the ground for genuine,
redemptive sociality. I claim, therefore, that Rosenzweig’s model of sociality is best described as
offering an alternative to idealism’s grounding of social life in the subject by arguing that true
sociality requires divine revelation.
The Contribution of Rosenzweig’s Account of Sociality
In conclusion of this chapter, recall that Rosenzweig’s model of sociality flows out of his
critique of idealism. This critique says that idealism reduces God and the world to the human
subject and the objects of its cognition. Further, it reduces the temporality of life to what is
completed and past, and can assume nothing new or incomplete. From the way in which
Rosenzweig articulates his response to idealism, we can see how social life in idealism would be
considered to be defective. Persons cannot relate to each other in a genuine way, in idealism,
because it cannot account for temporality and love, which are necessary to explain the richness
of social life. Rosenzweig’s argument is that idealism thought it could do without the concept of
divine revelation, but by leaving out revelation, it has left out precisely what is necessary for
social life, namely, love, temporality, and speech.
As Rosenzweig unfolds his account of genuine sociality, we see how he distinguishes it
from what he understands the idealist (Kantian) account of ethics and social life. The proper
relationship to others is described not as duty but as the love of one’s neighbor. This love is
derived from and commanded by the love of God. Further, this love is not simply a way to treat
others but is an invitation, an incorporation of the other person into the mutual recognition of the
goodness of God. The souls who are related to each other through love in the community of
thanksgiving are now bound together in their shared invocation of God. This collective
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invocation of God by the community serves in fact to bring the entire world into right
relationship with God. This is the process of redemption, according to Rosenzweig: the temporal
ordering of reality through the liturgical actions and expanding scope of the religious
community. The action of redemption, accomplished by the community, orients social life
toward God and toward the future fulfillment of all things in God, which is the proper
relationship between God, the world, and humanity.
Rosenzweig’s model of sociality occupies a unique position on the map of responses to
idealism. Instead of replacing idealism’s grounding of sociality in the transcendental subject with
a grounding of sociality in dialogue, Rosenzweig argues that sociality, in a genuine sense, can
only be grounded in divine revelation. While revelation is the source of this sociality,
Rosenzweig claims that sociality is only truly fulfilled in the redemptive community, the
kingdom of God. Hence, it looks as though Rosenzweig’s account is theological rather than
philosophical insofar as it presumes, and indeed demands, the presence of divine revelation.
Rosenzweig would reject this simple dichotomy. Philosophy requires revelation in order to speak
rightly of reality, on his view, and it does not thereby stop being philosophy. Hence,
Rosenzweig’s account, as he sees it, offers a grounding of sociality in divine revelation, which
requires a distinctive ontology. This ontology takes its cue from the historical failure of
philosophy, culminating in idealism, to account for the elements of God, world, and the human
in their richness and vitality. Rosenzweig offers an account of these three elements which, while
recognizing their distinctiveness, brings them into temporal relationship with each other by
means of the human community which is grounded in the initiative of divine revelation.
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Chapter Four: Bonhoeffer and Revelational Sociality
The aim of this chapter is to articulate both Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s critique of idealist
models of sociality and the alternative model of sociality he offers, which is embedded in a
theological ontology. More specifically, Bonhoeffer grounds his model of sociality in the
initiative of divine revelation in Christ in the church community. Bonhoeffer thus provides an
innovative ontology of persons which serves to correct the failings of idealist accounts of human
beings and communities. Bonhoeffer’s theory of sociality echoes a number of concerns we have
seen in previous chapters. He finds fault with idealism for promoting a subject-object ontology
which holds the subject as independent of the objects which it can only come into relationship
with via epistemological means. Like the thinkers I have previously examined, Bonhoeffer finds
the concreteness of I-You language as a helpful antidote to the abstraction inherent in idealistic
philosophical systems. However, Bonhoeffer maintains that an adequate account of sociality
which escapes idealism must venture beyond the language of dialogue and invoke divine agency
for its success.
Similar to Rosenzweig and Levinas (and in contrast to Gadamer), Bonhoeffer emphasizes
the fundamental closedness of persons prior to revelation. On Bonhoeffer’s view, however, the
self is not simply closed off from others, but actively subverts the social relation with others in
its sinful state. Any account of sociality which does not account for the sinful self runs the risk of
idealist abstraction, on Bonhoeffer’s view. In what follows of this chapter, I will chart
Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of idealism as they arise in each of his two dissertations, Sanctorum
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Communio and Act and Being, as well as how he constructs his alternative model of sociality.1
Along the way, I will have the opportunity to note the consonance of Bonhoeffer’s views
with Gadamer and Levinas, as well as the important ways in which their accounts of sociality
remain mired in idealism on Bonhoeffer’s view. Gadamer and Levinas represent successful
versions of sociality in the primal state and the fall into sin, respectively, from Bonhoeffer’s
point of view. What they neglect is the divine initiative which places human beings into truth. I
then argue that Bonhoeffer’s ontology of persons, and specifically the person of Christ, grounds
all other concepts of being, as well as the way in which human beings can enter into genuine
sociality, on Bonhoeffer’s view. This ontology for Bonhoeffer supplants the idealist ontology
which underlies its failed account of sociality. I will finally show that neither Bonhoeffer nor
Rosenzweig falls prey to the other’s critiques of idealism despite the difference in ontology
which each offers in response to idealism. This is because both of them appeal to divine
revelation as the ground of their model of sociality, a ground which each sees as requisite for the
break from idealism as well for the generation of the true unity of community.
The Critique of Idealism and Model of Sociality in Sanctorum Communio
Bonhoeffer’s account of sociality in Sanctorum Communio is complex and has been
misunderstood not only because of its complexity but also because Bonhoeffer’s presentation of
how various the elements of sociality ought to be related to one another is not clearly laid out.
Bonhoeffer’s ultimate aim is to give an account of the sociality of the church, both in its
empirical structures and in its underlying ontological framework. To do this, Bonhoeffer first
articulates the Christian concept of person in contrast to other philosophical models of

1

The scope of my investigation of Bonhoeffer is limited to these two early works. While Bonhoeffer does continue
to articulate his model of sociality in subsequent writings, inter alia, in Creation and Fall, Life Together, and Ethics,
his critique of idealism culminates with Act and Being. Hence, while a reexamination of Bonhoeffer’s conception of
sociality throughout his corpus would doubtless be fruitful, it is beyond the scope of my current investigation.
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personhood, and in particular, in contrast to idealism. Bonhoeffer presents the concept of a
social-basic relation [soziale Grundbeziehungsbegriff] as the underlying ontological relation
between persons apart from which persons cannot be adequately defined.2 The Christian concept
of person, which Bonhoeffer says is interdependent with concepts of God and community, is
meant to articulate the underlying situation of humanity which presupposes both the primal state
and the fall into sin, but which anticipates the redefinition of sociality in the church. The primal
state, which can only be known from revelation in Christ, forms the founding strata of person
and sociality whose social-basic relations become overlaid and therefore transmuted in sin. Upon
entry into the church community, the social-basic relations become overlaid and transmuted once
again – not as a mere return to the primal state, i.e. not as a repeal of the strata of sin, for sin,
Bonhoeffer maintains, remains even in the church.
Throughout his project, Bonhoeffer articulates five interrelated criticisms of the idealist
model of sociality, which I summarize here before presenting in detail. First, he argues that
idealism begins by assuming the wrong starting point, thinking that subjects are from the outset
unrelated to other persons. Second, he claims that idealism overlooks the significance of the role
of sin in sociality. Third, he argues that this mistaken starting point leads idealism to ask the
wrong questions, pursuing sociality through epistemology rather than through ethics. Fourth, the
epistemological approach of idealism leads it to conceive of persons as abstract and timeless
rather than concretely affected by time and history. Finally, idealism’s inadequate conception of
persons results in a model of sociality which relates persons through the abstract unity of rational
spirit. This abstract unity fails to do justice to true plurality and community. Bonhoeffer’s model

2

Bonhoeffer argues that concepts of person and community are interdependent such that neither can be understood
apart from the other. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, trans. Reinhard Kraus and Nancy Lukens, ed.
Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998), 34.
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of sociality, then, is a solution to the failures of idealism which he lays out in both of his
dissertations.3 In the following, I reconstruct Bonhoeffer’s multi-layered account of sociality in
Sanctorum Communio before showing how it evolves into the sociality of Act and Being.
Before tackling this account, however, I should say a word about Bonhoeffer’s
methodology. Bonhoeffer’s account of sociality relies on a number of theological
presuppositions which are framed in the Lutheran tradition out of which Bonhoeffer was
working. These presuppositions include the claim that the teaching of Holy Scriptures and “what
is common” to the Christian church constitute truth and therefore are authoritative in the
understanding of persons, God, and community.4 Bonhoeffer’s explicit theological grounding of
his account provides a different backdrop for the kinds of ontological claims than the other
figures I have examined. While Rosenzweig assumes certain theological claims and is certainly
indebted to a theological and scriptural tradition, he also presents his arguments in traditional
philosophical categories. By contrast, Bonhoeffer is not interested in presenting his claims in
philosophical form. Instead, his method consists of using philosophical ideas for theological
purposes.5 Hence he presumes the Christian narrative of the creation of the world and of persons
by God, the subsequent fall of persons into sin, which breeches the communion persons had with
both God and other persons. Therefore, reconciliation is needed and provided through the life,

Note that while Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of idealism are dependent at least in part on Wilhelm Windelband and
Emmanuel Hirsch, he orients those criticisms as contrasts to his original model of sociality. See ibid., 40 n. [17].
4
See for example the Lutheran Augsburg Confession (1530), which seeks to affirm in its teaching “the pure Word
of God and Christian truth. Since this teaching is grounded clearly on the Holy Scriptures and is not contrary or
opposed to that of the universal Christian church, or even of the Roman church (insofar as the latter’s teaching is
reflected in the writings of the Fathers), we think that our opponents cannot disagree with us in the articles set forth
above.” Creeds of the Christian Churches, ed. John H. Leith (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 78.
5
See Christiane Tietz, “Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church,” in Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer
and Contemporary Scholarship, ed. Adam C. Clark and Michael Mawson (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications,
2013), 33: “In his analysis of the church, it is theology and not sociology that is given priority. Although sociology
can assist with this analysis, this is only after theological premises have been accepted.”
3
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death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Christ’s activity in the power of the Holy Spirit
inaugurates the church, which itself participates in this redemptive activity.
This basic understanding of creation, fall, and reconciliation shapes the way in which
Bonhoeffer construes sociality as advancing in distinct phases through the stages of humanity’s
existence. Further, divine redemptive activity in Christ through the Holy Spirit governs
Bonhoeffer’s conception of how genuine sociality should emerge in the world. Finally, his
criticisms of idealism focus on the ways in which idealism fails to account for the theological
premises assumed in this picture of salvation history.
Sociality in the Primal State
According to Bonhoeffer, the primal state, which is defined as the state of persons prior
to the fall of humanity into sin, is only conceivable through revelation in Christ. Under the
assumption that Christ saves humanity from broken communion with God, Bonhoeffer maintains
that unbroken communion with God can be postulated only in reference to Christ. Because
human beings are called to in revelation, we can presuppose that persons are “active centers of
intellect and will.”6 That is, they have the active capacity to receive a call and respond to that
call. The next thing inferred from revelation is that human beings were created to be in unbroken
relationship with both God and human beings, but that sin has effectively broken both
community with God and social community between people.
From these presuppositions, Bonhoeffer argues that the human being is essentially a
confluence of thinking, willing, and feeling, each of which depends for its exercise on external
personal interaction. Bonhoeffer says that “we can conceive of these acts only as based upon
human sociality.”7 Understanding, expression, and language, too, are possible only in the context

6
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Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 62.
Ibid.
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of sociality. Bonhoeffer argues that “only in reciprocal interaction with other minds is selfconscious thinking and willing possible and meaningful.”8 This leads to Bonhoeffer’s
appropriation of the dialogical concepts of Ich und Du, positing an I-You relationship that is
simultaneous and reciprocal: “the consciousness of being an I and the consciousness that there is
a You arise together and from their interaction.”9 Bonhoeffer’s reasons for thinking this are
found chiefly in his analysis of the social nature of thought and of the will. He relies on Hamann
and others to say that it is “language that renders thought possible.”10 But language is a social
phenomenon. Thus, thinking presupposes sociality. Next, Bonhoeffer argues that willing is only
exercised and hence real in the resistance against another will. He writes, “Will as an isolated
phenomenon is absurd.”11 Therefore, willing, too, presupposes other persons.12
The significance of this account of sociality in the primal state for Bonhoeffer’s critique
of idealism is to be found in the essential interrelatedness of persons from the start. Bonhoeffer
suggests that idealism’s first error is in its assumption of the self and its other as subject and
object, categories of a different kind, and therefore in need of reconciliation.13 Bonhoeffer writes,
the only question asked by idealist philosophy about I and You…is formulated wrongly.
It starts from the assumption that I and You can be conceived quite unrelated to one
another, and then it inquires about their point of unity, which obviously must exist. The
question of the alien psyche, the question how one finds one’s way to the other, is not
sufficiently informed by the fact of the unity of all activity of spirit. This question always

8

Ibid., 68-69.
Ibid., 70.
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Ibid., 69.
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Ibid., 72.
12
Bonhoeffer claims that the I and You are essentially interrelated and co-arising from the broader community of
which they are both a part. See ibid., 71: “Since I know myself as ‘I’, I lift myself as an individual above a
vegetative condition of spirit in the community. At the same time, however, in this very act the essence of the ‘You’
jumps up to meet me, as the other spirit that is conscious of itself.” In other words, I and You simultaneously meet
each other, arising from the context, or the “between” of the community. Bonhoeffer uses the Hegelian phrase,
objective spirit, to label this broader social order, yet he will later emphatically distinguish what he has in mind by
this idea from Hegel’s use of it.
13
As noted in the introduction, the criticisms of idealism offered by Bonhoeffer, among others, may not be the most
accurate or charitable readings of idealism.
9
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assumes an individual conceived as fundamentally isolated, who subsequently seeks
contact somehow with others.14
What Bonhoeffer calls the epistemological paradigm with which idealism operates is not
equipped to ask the right question about the fundamental relationships between persons because
it fails to see that the intellect and will distinctive of persons necessarily imply sociality, that they
presuppose existence in community. Hence, Bonhoeffer concludes, “human spirit in its entirety
is woven into sociality and rests on the basic-relation of I and You.”15 This basic-relation can be
articulated as the idea that I and You are co-arising and co-dependent. The I exists only through
the You, and the You can only exist in its relation to an I. Thus, self-consciousness or selfhood is
shot through with sociality.
Bonhoeffer’s account of social existence in the primal state very much exemplifies the
dialogical model of sociality and its critique of idealism, especially as articulated by Gadamer. I
and You are not separated as subject from object, but are rather both inheritors and participants
in a broader or prior social structure, which gives them both language and understanding. Both
Bonhoeffer and Gadamer thus criticize idealism as trying to solve the problem of sociality
through a misunderstanding of the prior connectedness of persons. Further, Bonhoeffer’s account
here holds that neither the I nor the You ground the social relation, but instead sociality is
grounded in the community between them of which they are both members.16
What is decisive here, however, is that Bonhoeffer’s endorsement of a dialogical model
of sociality holds only in the primal state, prior to the advent of sin.17 This point reveals
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Ibid., 76.
Ibid., 73.
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See ibid., 70: “It is our view that there would be no self-consciousness without community – or better, that selfconsciousness arises concurrently with the consciousness of existing in community.” See also from SC-A, ibid., n.
[29]: “human beings cannot be thinking-beings without participating in this objective spirit, that is, that they would
obviously lack a decisive ingredient of human spirit.”
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Bonhoeffer writes that the concepts of person and community in the primal state must serve merely as formal
presuppositions which gain their content only from revelation. He warns that this discussion “cannot be a matter of
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Bonhoeffer’s second criticism of idealism, and for that matter, all contemporary social
philosophy and sociology, which declares that it does not take seriously the reality of sin and the
impact of sin on social-basic relations. Bonhoeffer writes, “we differ fundamentally from
idealism, for which origin and telos stand in real, unbroken connection, the synthesis of which is
expressed in the concept of ‘essence’. There, sin and salvation are realities that do not alter the
original essence of things. For us, though, the doctrine of the primal state is significant precisely
because it enables us to grasp concretely the reality of sin, which infinitely alters the essence of
things.”18 In other words, insofar as the realities of sin and salvation are taken up at all, idealism
takes them as accidents of history which do not affect the substance of persons and community.
Bonhoeffer argues to the contrary that sin fundamentally changes the basic-relations of one
person to another.
In the course of his account of sociality in the primal state, Bonhoeffer uses the insights
of both philosophers of community and sociologists, but he does so with the mostly implicit
qualification that the concepts and resources he takes from them are really only applicable in the
primal state.19 However, while these sociologists think they are describing social reality as it
exists now, for Bonhoeffer, this just ignores the reality of sin. Thus, they are actually quite close
to giving an accurate account of the formal structures of human sociality pre-fall, in
Bonhoeffer’s view, and are useful to that extent. Hence, Bonhoeffer is able to affirm their
analyses, but through setting their descriptions in a different context, one that is only available to

developing speculative theories about the possibility of social being in the primal state not affected by evil will.
Instead, methodologically, all statements are possible only on the basis of our understanding of the church, i.e., from
the revelation we have heard.” Ibid., 65. The question of the primal state is not one of archeology but of eschatology,
that is, of “hope projected backward.” Ibid., 61. It is revelation which shows us what we can hope for in redemption
by showing us the formal sketches of what that redemption presupposes.
18
Ibid., 62.
19
For example, Bonhoeffer can quote Othmar Spann saying, “this is the essence of spirit, to be oneself through
being in the other,” as a summary of his own conclusions for the primal state. Ibid., 73, quoting Othmar Spann,
Gesellschaftslehre, 103ff.
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revelation. Bonhoeffer argues that what the disciplines of social philosophy and sociology have
missed is that with sin, the “spirit-form” of human beings takes a different shape.20 That is, the
basic-relations and structures of human being and community are altered at their fundamental
level by the onset of sin into the world. Thus, the descriptions given in the primal state never
apply to the world of the present day (except in eschatological prolepsis).
In the same way, Bonhoeffer would claim that although Gadamer has certainly made an
advance over idealist philosophy in rejecting its subject-object ontology and epistemology, he
has not taken seriously the effects of sin on persons in relation. For what Gadamer thinks applies
in current social relations is applicable in the primal state alone. There is a genuine place for
dialogical sociality in which I and You exist in seamless reciprocity, in which the between of the
broader community provides the initiative and ground for relationality. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer
would argue that Gadamer has not fully broken with idealism in that, like idealism, Gadamer
holds that sociality remains uninterrupted from arche to telos. Gadamer’s view that sociality is
always on the way to ever richer and more refined understanding in language is rooted in an
ontology that is unaffected by the concept of sin, and its weakness is found in its inability to
account for the ways in which persons manipulate, betray, and belittle others in language. Rather
than being mere incidental variations on understanding in community, Bonhoeffer argues that sin
changes the manner in which persons relate to each other in a basic way.
Sociality After the Fall
In Chapter Four of Sanctorum Communio, “Sin and Broken Community,” Bonhoeffer
explains the way that sin affects basic relations. He writes, “Whereas the previous spirit-form
grew out of love, the fall replaced love with selfishness. This gave rise to the break in immediate
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community with God, and likewise in human community. With this change of direction the
whole spiritual orientation of humanity was altered.”21 Bonhoeffer analyzes this shift in terms of
will, maintaining that in the state of innocence, “will is by its nature oriented toward other
wills.”22 Bonhoeffer claims, “Whereas in the primal state the relation among human beings is one
of giving, in the sinful state it is purely demanding.”23 Bonhoeffer’s idea here is that the wills of
persons in the primal state are oriented by love of others, which again is a theological
presupposition made possible only through revelation in Christ, while after the fall this love of
others turns inward, what Bonhoeffer, following Luther, will later call the “heart turned in on
itself.”24 This articulation of the change in social-basic relations in the state of sin serves as a
post hoc set up of the I-You relationship Bonhoeffer argues for in his chapter on the “Christian
Concept of Person.”
To advance the distinctiveness of what Bonhoeffer sees as the Christian concept of
person, he outlines in Chapter Two a quick typology of philosophical approaches to the concept
of person. Bonhoeffer breaks the history of philosophy down into two basic positions: social
atomism on the one hand and idealism on the other. The former position advocated by the
Epicureans and the Enlightenment maintains that persons are enclosed individuals who only
externally relate to one another. On the other hand, idealism, as Bonhoeffer sees it,
“fundamentally denies the person by subsuming the person under the universal.”25 Hence, in
addition to the usual list of German idealists, Aristotle and the Stoics fall into this category,
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according to Bonhoeffer. This way of framing the issue allows Bonhoeffer to position the
Christian concept of person as the mean between two extremes, that which both respects the
individuality of the person while also positing her intrinsic connectedness to other persons.
Bonhoeffer’s third key criticism of idealism follows this typology by maintaining that in
idealism, following Descartes and Kant, the metaphysical concept of person is transformed into
an epistemological concept. In the wake of Kant, idealism “resolves the opposition of subject and
object in the unity of mind, in intellectual intuition.”26 As a consequence, Bonhoeffer claims, the
personal and ethical concepts of I and You are reduced to the epistemological categories of
subject and object. Further, subjectivity, in the hands of the idealists, is equated with Geist,
which relates to other persons on the level of spirit. Because this concept of spirit is constituted
by what is rational, and because for idealism, “the I is person insofar as it is spirit,”27 persons can
only relate to one another in the realm of abstract rationality. On Bonhoeffer’s view, this
construal of the self-other relationship utterly misses the concrete reality of sociality.28
Against this, Bonhoeffer argues that the Christian concept of person must “overcome the
idealist concept and replace it with one which preserves the individual, concrete character of the
person as absolute and intended by God.”29 On Bonhoeffer’s view, because idealism attempts to
develop the self-other relationship from epistemology, that is, from the perspective of
comprehending and knowing the other person, it is bound to fail. Rather, I enter the social sphere
“only when my intellect is confronted by some fundamental barrier,”30 and “idealism’s ‘object’
is ultimately no barrier.”31 Bonhoeffer is concerned to preserve otherness through the concept of
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a barrier, or a limit, to one’s own self-consciousness. Thus, Bonhoeffer claims that the otherness,
and therefore the true relationship with the Other, cannot be found in epistemology but rather
only in an ethical experience. Bonhoeffer maintains that “only the experience of the barrier as
real is a specifically ethical experience.”32
At this stage, the fourth criticism of idealism appears. Bonhoeffer holds that for idealism,
ethics follows from rationality, and therefore can be known timelessly, or apart from the concrete
moment of confrontation. Bonhoeffer instead thinks that ethics is only founded in what he calls
“concrete time,”33 that is, in the moment of address. In this “moment,” the whole person is
addressed, not merely her reason, meaning that the will and emotions are included here too.34 In
idealism, the other presented in the moment of address is not a temporal or real barrier because
ethics can be known apart from any encounter, and thus is really a subsumption of the other into
what the I knows.
Bonhoeffer argues that the ethical person “as conscious being is created in the moment of
being moved – in the situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation by an
overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the concrete situation.”35 This way of
framing personhood reiterates Bonhoeffer’s argument against idealism, according to which
persons are conceived primarily as rational beings who enter the ethical realm solely by virtue of
the universal reason which they bear. But for Bonhoeffer this results in a divided person, treating
the person as abstract reason in separation from the whole person “in concrete, living
individuality.”36 Thus, Bonhoeffer’s criticism maintains that in conceiving of spirit as timeless
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rationality, idealism offers an abstract and fragmentary anthropology, divorcing the intellect
from the situation of concrete encounters.
As a corrective, Bonhoeffer employs the categories of I and You, here arguing that they
provide what is missing in idealist thinking, namely, the expression of a concrete personhood
which confronts the self in time, space, and history. Bonhoeffer importantly distinguishes this
account of the I-You relationship from the account he gives in the primal state. As noted above,
the social-basic relation has changed from being rooted in love for the other to being rooted in
selfishness. Now because of sin, the will of the other person confronts the I as a demand.
Selfhood is now no longer defined by its confluence with the You, but rather by its confrontation
with the You. The You here is defined by Bonhoeffer as “the other who places me before an
ethical decision.”37 The You as demand functions to engender the I as responsible. Thus,
personhood and responsibility are intertwined on Bonhoeffer’s view such that the real person is
the ethical person – the one who has been concretely addressed by a You in the entirety of her
being in the moment.38
While Bonhoeffer argues that the You can be both God and another human being, he
claims that genuine, that is, ethical, personhood arises only in relationship to the divine You.39
Bonhoeffer claims,
The person-creating efficacy of the You is independent of the personhood of the You. We
now add that it is also independent of the will of the human You. One human being
cannot of its own accord make another into an I, an ethical person conscious of
responsibility. God or the Holy Spirit joins the concrete You; only through God’s active
working does the other become a You to me from whom my I arises.40
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Thus, Bonhoeffer’s claim has it that only God as You can truly encounter the self and create a
responsible self, but that God’s You performs this action through the human You. This claim is
rooted in analysis of the will which is oriented toward selfishness. Bonhoeffer thinks that the
human You on its own is not sufficient to be the barrier necessary to confront the self, that is to
break through the inwardly directed will of the self. In large part, Bonhoeffer’s strong and
traditionally Lutheran doctrine of sin prevents his allowing for persons in themselves to reverse
the orientations of the will in another human being.
Commentators have latched onto this description of the I-You relationship as the clearest
and most concentrated expression of Bonhoeffer’s account of anthropology and the sociality in
which persons are embedded. A line of criticism of Bonhoeffer’s account taken up by Charles
Marsh and Wayne Whitson Floyd Jr. has emerged at this stage, which is due to not carefully
distinguishing the different layers of Bonhoeffer’s exposition and taking this description of the IYou relation as constitutive for his entire project. This criticism maintains that Bonhoeffer
imprudently adopts the categories of the philosophy of dialogue and thereby ultimately fails to
sufficiently depart from the transcendental-idealist tradition.41
A second criticism, which falls out of the same kind of misreading argues that Bonhoeffer’s anthropology in
Sanctorum Communio as exemplified in the I-You relationship of chapter two is fragmentary, actualistic, and
therefore cannot account for the continuity of existence. This criticism stems from Bonhoeffer’s insistence here that
the concrete moment of the individual’s encounter with the You serves as a refutation of idealism’s timeless account
of ethical rationality and decision-making. Bonhoeffer’s thinking is that the concrete, lived moment of reality in
which the individual is faced with an ethical dilemma exposes the abstraction of idealism, which is unable to
account for this kind of situation. In contrast to idealism’s belief that a person’s existence is most paradigmatically
manifest in timeless rationality, Bonhoeffer argues that “the individual becomes a person ever and again through the
other, in the ‘moment.’” Ibid., 55-56. That is, “the person ever and again arises and passes away in time. The person
does not exist timelessly; a person is not static, but dynamic. The person exists always and only in ethical
responsibility; the person is re-created again and again in the perpetual flux of life.” Ibid., 48.
On the basis of these statements, Marsh, Clifford Green, and Michael DeJonge have declared Bonhoeffer’s
anthropology to be actualistic at this point, meaning that the person is constituted only through acts of encounter
with the Other. Green writes, “In Sanctorum Communio, the main emphasis in the central concept of person is
actualistic…[which] involves an extreme fragmentation of personal life: it cannot, as such, give an adequate
alternative account of the continuity of human life…This is a sharp, unresolved issue in Sanctorum Communio
which is explicitly taken up in Act and Being.” Clifford Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (revised edition)
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 70-71. Charles Marsh objects that on the anthropology of Sanctorum
Communio, “If social relations are ‘ever falling apart,’ and if they are shaped by the act-oriented claims of the other,
41
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Marsh and Floyd see in Bonhoeffer’s use of the language of I and You the influence of
Buber’s philosophy of dialogue, the position that sociality is grounded in the dialogue between
persons. Theunissen’s analysis of the philosophy of dialogue is key to both Floyd’s and Marsh’s
criticism of Sanctorum Communio. Marsh maintains that Bonhoeffer appropriates the categories
of the philosophy of dialogue while Floyd suggests that Bonhoeffer tends, at least in portions of
the text, to adopt it wholesale.42 Having foisted the dialogical banner upon Bonhoeffer’s account,
Floyd and Marsh both proceed to read Theunissen’s criticisms of Buber’s philosophy back into
Bonhoeffer’s account of the I-You relationship articulated in “The Christian Concept of
Person.”43 What goes unnoticed in these criticisms is the fact that Bonhoeffer’s use of the
categories of I and You in Chapter Two is quite different from the philosophy of dialogue
charted in Theunissen’s analysis. Although it is clear that Bonhoeffer is familiar with a number
of the thinkers in the movement of the philosophy of dialogue, he never interacts with nor even
appears to have read the dialogical thought of Buber.44

it would seem to be the case that community, and also subjectivity itself, splinters into particularized acts of
encounter,” a notion which Marsh suggests “backslides to the equivocal terms of Barth’s crisis theology” Charles
Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 72,
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The person of Sanctorum Communio, conceived in terms of act, gives way to the person of Act and Being,
conceived as the unity of act and being,” Michael DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth,
and Protestant Theology (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 74.
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Nevertheless, considered in its form, Buber’s scheme looks similar to Bonhoeffer’s
account of the I-You relation in that, for both, human beings are not in themselves the ground of
sociality: the human You can no more autonomously engender sociality than can the I of itself
relate appropriately to the You. Rather, something other than the persons themselves must
intervene in order to bring about genuine persons. Marsh takes note of this similarity and claims
that the “dialogical categories” Bonhoeffer adopts “restrict” his theological categories. Marsh has
it that Bonhoeffer’s “shortcoming” in Sanctorum Communio is that “the christological terms he
uses are in large part informed by the language of dialogue.”45 Marsh suggests that Bonhoeffer’s
I-You language amounts to an adoption of the Buberian category of the between as the locus of
the encounter between persons. On Marsh’s reading of Bonhoeffer, the genuine person “proceeds
out of the christological between…Christ is the divine subjective ground of the I and other;
Christ as between is the source of community.”46 Marsh thinks this is a problem because the
encounter with the divine in the other person flickers in and out of experience, fragmenting what
should be a continuity in the community of persons.47
Despite the formal similarity between Bonhoeffer and Buber on this score, Marsh
misreads Bonhoeffer as offering Christ as an in-between. The decisive difference Bonhoeffer has
with Buber here is that for Bonhoeffer, the something that makes possible and intervenes into the
human-human relationship is itself a You, a person, while for Buber, it is an impersonal relation
or situation: the between. Although Buber’s notion of the between makes possible intimacy and
personal relationships between humans, this relation itself is no third person, but is rather an
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event. This is clear in the fact that Buber posits the relation as making possible persons, and his
model of sociality does not clearly demarcate God as having a separate kind of encounter as a
Thou with the I.48
On Bonhoeffer’s account, sociality, in either of its vertical (divine-human) or horizontal
(human-human) iterations is not grounded in reciprocity or in the meeting between persons.
Instead, the divine person is alone able to situate the human being into truth that makes possible
genuine sociality. Accordingly, Bonhoeffer would criticize Buber’s view as leaving no room for
revelation, as the person of Christ, to put into effect genuine human relationships because it
allows persons to be placed into genuine relation with each other apart from revelation. In other
words, Marsh, as well as Floyd, wind up criticizing Bonhoeffer for advocating for a form of
dialogicalism that Bonhoeffer rejects. Of course, as noted above, Bonhoeffer does maintain a
model of sociality akin to dialogical models in the primal state, but this social-basic relation is
superseded by the entry of sin into the social plane, making necessary the initiative of the divine
other to ground sociality.49 Crucial to these criticisms, then, is the assumption that Bonhoeffer’s
concept of person entailed by the I-You social-basic relations of demand, is the defining concept
of person for the model of sociality articulated in Sanctorum Communio.
Sociality in the Church
While Bonhoeffer’s account of the Christian concept of person in the second chapter is
generalized, giving the underlying, descriptive conditions of personhood of both those in
redeemed or unredeemed existence, it does not take into account how person and community in
A second objection may be offered here, that although does not arise directly from Buber’s use of the between,
may well arise in relation to Marsh’s employment of Christ as between. Bonhoeffer rejects the view that the self’s
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Christ, in the sanctorum communio, are overlaid with a new social-basic relation, the third form
of the social-basic relation offered in the text. Just as person and sociality are fundamentally
changed with the entry into sin, so person and sociality are fundamentally changed with the entry
into the church. The primal state provides the formal, structural features of human existence in
community, while the fall into sin provides an actualizing content to sociality, the governing
principle by which persons relate to one another. Entry into the church does not remove this
principle, sin, or the ways in which, when operative, it guides sociality. Instead, sociality in the
church is governed by a new principle which makes possible a new orientation of the will.
Bonhoeffer outlines the new social basic relations in the community of the church when
he claims that “the Christian person achieves his or her essential nature only when God does not
encounter the person as You, but ‘enters into’ the person as I.”50 In other words, Bonhoeffer
claims that personhood is not fulfilled or complete in the I-You relation characterized by the
punctiliar demand of the You. Instead, the person is only truly realized in true community, and
this comes only in a distinct form of encounter with God. No longer is the relation to God and
the other person the opaque encounter of a barrier, but the relation becomes a true self-revelation;
God is known as an I, as a self, through the revelation of God’s love. Bonhoeffer explains:
The cord between God and human beings that was cut by the first Adam is tied anew by
God, by revealing God’s own love in Christ, by no longer approaching us in demand and
summons, purely as You, but instead by giving God’s own self as an I, opening God’s
own heart. The church is founded on the revelation of God’s heart. But since destroying
the primal community with God also destroyed human community, so likewise when
God restores community between human beings and God’s own self, community among
us also is restored once again.51
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In restored community, that is, the church, the social-basic relation of one person to another is
changed from demand into love. Thus, the person who exists in the church exists through a new
sense of personhood, the essential nature Bonhoeffer spoke of above.
This nature is constituted through the encounter with the love of God, this love forming
the new social-basic relation. Bonhoeffer writes, “The person living in the community of the IYou relationship [in the church] is given the assurance of being loved, and through faith in Christ
receives the power of love also…For that person the other member of the church-community is
essentially no longer claim but gift, revelation of God’s love and heart. Thus the You is to the I
no longer law but gospel, and hence an object of love.”52 This change can be described in terms
of the reorienting of the will from inwardly-focused selfishness back outward, toward the other
in love. The person now receives the power to love, this having been lacking in the previous
social-basic relation constituted by the demand of the You. This relation is similar to the socialbasic relation of the primal state in that the will is oriented toward the other in love. However,
the difference between the two is that while the relation in the primal state was a merely formal
construction of persons in relation, the social-basic relation of love in the church is the concrete
overcoming in history of the selfish relation of sin.
This power to love is grounded in what Bonhoeffer calls the “vicarious representative
action” [Stellvertretung] of Christ, the standing in for humanity before God, paradigmatically
found on the cross. Bonhoeffer writes that vicarious representative action “is not an ethical
possibility or standard, but solely the reality of the divine love for the church-community; it is
not an ethical, but a theological concept. Through the Christian principle of vicarious
representative action the new humanity is made whole and sustained. This principle gives
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Christian basic-relations their substantive uniqueness.”53 Vicarious representative action can be
described as the specific form of self-giving love which not only makes possible the reorienting
of wills in community, but serves as the basis for human love for others. Not only does this
concept serve as the “the life-principle of the new humanity,” but it is also the case that “my
service to the other person springs from the life-principle of vicarious representative action.”54
The love for humanity demonstrated by Christ is implanted in the persons of the church
community, who model this love to those around them. Hence Bonhoeffer describes life in the
church-community as “the beginning of the new life…where the You reveals itself to the I as
another I, as heart, as love, as Christ.”55
As a consequence of the articulation of this model of sociality found in the church
community, a two-stage movement emerges with respect to how the divine and human other
encounter the person living historical reality. First, the divine You encounters or can encounter
the I in the human You as demand apart from the church. Second, this encounter is changed into
the relationship with both the human and divine You as self-giving love, in Christ.56 Because on
Bonhoeffer’s account, a change in the content of the social-basic relation entails a change in the
concept of person involved in the relation, the concept of person operative in the I-You relation
of demand is a different concept of person operative in the I-You relation of love.
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In order to critique and supplant the idealist model, Bonhoeffer’s argument now shifts
from the examination of persons and their social-basic relations to an examination of the nature
the communities in which they are embedded and which give shape to those social basic
relations. Bonhoeffer argues that community is the ultimate locus of sociality, and that the true
community, the church, is constituted through both divine and human I-You relations. In order to
explain Bonhoeffer’s articulation of the church community as an alternative to the idealist model,
I will need to unpack two important concepts he uses to explain communities: collective
personhood and objective spirit.
Bonhoeffer argues that communities bear the character of what he calls “collective
persons,” a concept he picks up largely from Max Scheler.57 Bonhoeffer finds this concept useful
because it allows for the positing of social being which does not at the same time dissolve or
diminish the individuals within that community. In keeping with his emphasis on sociality only
being adequately addressed in ethical categories, Bonhoeffer asks what it would mean to think of
collective persons as the bearers of ethical responsibility. Because collective persons are, after
all, persons, they participate in I-You relations: collective persons are I’s that can be addressed
by either a collective or an individual You, and they are You’s which can address individual or
collective I’s. Further, and most importantly for Bonhoeffer’s immediate purposes, collective
persons are I’s that can be addressed by the divine You. As the receiver of an address, a
collective person itself possesses a will which encounters another will in the address.
The broadest such collective person is sinful humanity as a whole, which Bonhoeffer
designates as the collective person of Adam.58 Bonhoeffer locates the unity of the collective
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person in the encounter between wills found in the address by the divine You.59 The significance
of Bonhoeffer’s proposal is to be found in the fact that the unity of community is found not in the
likeness of rational spirit, but in the fact of being addressed by the will of God. Bonhoeffer says
that the collective person of Adam “can only be superseded by the collective person ‘Christ
existing as church-community’.”60
Bonhoeffer claims that the church is the collective person which is created from out of
Christ’s redemptive act; further, Bonhoeffer argues that Christ exists as this collective person.
Bonhoeffer specifically formulates this concept as a contrast to Hegel’s phrase, “God existing as
community,”61 arguing that Hegel conflates the divine spirit with the church community.
Bonhoeffer’s designation of Christ as the collective person of the church (1) is meant to be
faithful to the New Testament identification of Christ with the church and (2) is qualified by that
fact that the collective person of “Adam has really been replaced by Christ only eschatologically
…So long as sin remains, the whole of sinful humanity also remains in every human being.”62
From the point of view of eternity, from God’s reality, Christ has completed the church
and exists as the church.63 But the empirical church is still bound up with sin such that there can
be no simple identification of the empirical church community with Christ. Rather, Bonhoeffer
says, the collective person of the church can be identified with Christ “only insofar as God’s own
self is at work in the act of repentance. It is not the community of sinners but instead the holiness
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of this very church-community which is ‘Christ existing as church-community’.”64 In other
words, Christ does not simply exist “there” in the church, but only in the vicarious representative
action of Christ which reconciles humans with God. As Bonhoeffer puts it, “in Christ…humanity
has been brought once and for all…into community with God.”65 Thus, the concept of Christ
existing as the collective person of the church functions as the concrete unity of the church
community which avoids the pitfall of locating the unity of a community in abstract spirit, apart
from the concrete action of Christ.
Bonhoeffer further sharpens his polemic with idealism through the contested concept of
objective spirit, which he favorably credits Hegel with introducing.66 What again comes to define
Bonhoeffer’s notion of objective spirit is the concept of will. He writes that the “will of the
structure” that emerges when the wills of two persons unite is “a third factor,” not reducible to
the wills of the persons. “Precisely this structure,” says Bonhoeffer, “is objective spirit.”67
Bonhoeffer maintains this volitional structure in contrast Hegel’s intellectualized concept of
objective spirit, which he argues is “untenable.”68 Bonhoeffer is concerned that the unbroken
dialectic between absolute spirit and subjective spirit provides a too seamless transition into
objective spirit, and one in which objective spirit inevitably becomes deified. Bonhoeffer objects,
“Absolute spirit does not simply enter into the subjective spirits, gathering them up into the
objective spirit.”69 Instead, objective spirit, even the objective spirit of the church community, is
not to be confused with the Holy Spirit, but rather is to be seen as the very human product of
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human wills. For Bonhoeffer, this means that the “concept of the objective spirit cannot be
developed without sin as a constitutive element. The reality of sin makes it clear that it is
impossible to equate the objective spirit of the church as collective person with the Holy
Spirit.”70 On Bonhoeffer’s view, it is just this neglect of the concept of sin that has led Hegel to
identify “the Holy Spirit with the corporate spirit of the church.”71
Bonhoeffer’s final criticism of idealist sociality emerges from his previous criticisms and
claims that idealism promotes a false unity of persons which is based on understanding persons
as mere rationality. Bonhoeffer writes that on the picture of idealism, “the spirit is one, eternally
identical, transpersonal, immanent in humanity; it destroys the concrete person, and thus
prevents any concrete concept of community, instead replacing it with the immanent unity of
spirit.”72 Bonhoeffer has now repeatedly targeted idealism for advocating an abstract concept of
person which amount only to rational spirit. Because rational spirit is identical in each person,
unity of this spirit is achieved. However, this comes at the expense of recognizing either
individuality or plurality in persons, that is, their concrete reality.
In contrast to this, Bonhoeffer maintains that the unity of true community, that is, “the
unity of the Christian church is not based on human unanimity of spirit, but on divine unity of
Spirit.”73 In Bonhoeffer’s view, the Holy Spirit, in distinction from objective spirit, establishes or
actualizes the unity of the church through bringing Christ to the individual, who realizes this
unity in himself, as Bonhoeffer writes, “The personal unity of the church is ‘Christ existing as
church community’.”74 While the Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of the unity of the community,
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Christ is the material cause, the actual substance of the unity of the church.75 Beyond being the
efficient cause of the community’s unity, the Holy Spirit also brings about true plurality in the
church through addressing the will of individuals through the divine will. Here, persons are
recognized not simply in their unity but also at the same time in their particularity.
Finally, the Holy Spirit brings community to the church through the mediation of Christ’s
love to persons, which reorients the human will and gives it the “power to love.”76 Here, we see
Bonhoeffer’s solution to the false idealist concept of community as a unity. What stands out in
Bonhoeffer’s account is the continued insistence on the importance of the will which idealism
neglects. It is the personal encounter with wills which accounts for individuality, and it is the
reorienting of the will in love which makes possible true community.
To sum up the account of sociality given in Sanctorum Communio as an alternative to
idealism: Bonhoeffer lays out three different social-basic relations corresponding to the person in
the primal state, in human beings after the fall, and in the church community. The social-basic
relation in the primal state is the I-You relation in which the wills are oriented toward each other
in love, the I and You co-arising with one another in mutuality from the context of the
community. The social-basic relation in sin is the I-You relation in which You presents itself to
the I in the form of an ethical demand, bringing the I to ethical personhood in the moment of
address. The social-basic relation in the church community is the I-You relation in which the
power to love is restored to the will through the self-revelation and vicarious representative
action of Christ. Persons in the church community exist in and through the collective person of
Christ, while still retaining the I-You relation of sin, overlaid with the I-You relation of love. In
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this way, Bonhoeffer articulates the person and community as having been brought from a
formal, dialogical model of sociality into an ethical encounter model of sociality through the
historical reality of sin, then transformed into a revelational model of sociality in the church.
At each stage of the development of persons and communities, Bonhoeffer offers his
account as an alternative to the model developed by idealism. Persons are thought of as
intrinsically related to one another in the primal state in contrast to idealism’s positing of
subjects in opposition to their objects. The significance of the reality of sin is shown to impact
the basic ways in which persons relate to one another. This leads to the necessity of persons
relating to each other in ethical encounter, in contrast to idealism’s epistemological project of
uniting subject and object through cognition. The ethical encounter outlined by Bonhoeffer
recognizes the concrete and historical situation of persons, in contrast to the abstract and timeless
person of idealism. Finally, the unity of persons with one another in true community, in the
church, is brought about by the permanent action of the collective person of Christ and by the
action of the Holy Spirit, which both mediates that unity and ensures individuality through the
continuing address of the will. Bonhoeffer maintains this concept of the unity of the church in
contrast to idealism’s notion of the abstract unity of spirit being the locus of the unity of persons.
The Critique of Idealism and Model of Sociality in Act and Being
Bonhoeffer’s criticism of idealism and proposed model of sociality in Act and Being rely
to a great extent on the categories developed in Sanctorum Communio. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer
does sharpen his critique and refine his articulation of sociality in his Habilitationsschrift. The
basic claim is that idealism, in following through on the transcendentalism of Kant, sets the I as
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the determination of all reality.77 In the process of developing this criticism of idealism,
Bonhoeffer distinguishes between transcendental philosophy and idealism, a distinction not
present in Sanctorum Communio. Transcendental philosophy, according to Bonhoeffer, orients
thought toward a transcendent referent, toward that which exceeds the conscious act which
points to it.78 The concern of transcendental philosophy, however, is not so much to circumscribe
the object of the intentional act as it is to delimit the power of the I and to define the I in terms of
its act. Curiously, then, transcendental philosophy endeavors to say more about the subject than
about the objects of consciousness. In contrast, idealism, on Bonhoeffer’s view, attempts to
follow the path of “true ontology” in securing the “primacy of being over against consciousness
and to uncover this being.”79 In this endeavor, being is supposed to be articulated apart from the
consciousness which thinks it – as being-in-itself. Bonhoeffer then argues that the attempt at true
transcendental philosophy made by Kant and the attempt at true ontology made by idealism fail
to successful delimit the power of the I and define the object of consciousness apart from
consciousness.
While Kant undertook to set limits on the knowledge that the I can attain, because those
limits are self-imposed, through reason, they are really no limit at all for the I. Bonhoeffer writes,
despite the strenuous attempt to go beyond itself or establish its boundaries, reason
remains by itself, understandings itself not ‘in reference to’ that which transcends it, but
‘in reference to’ itself. The miscarriage of the endeavor to ascertain the boundaries of
reason is due to the fact that there are for reason essentially no boundaries, for even the
boundaries are thought away until they are no longer genuine boundaries80
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On Bonhoeffer’s assessment, despite Kant’s best intentions and protests, the logical conclusion
of his project ends in the idealist elevation of the I as the master of all things. The result of this
procedure is that the acts of consciousness, which are meant to understand themselves only in
reference to something transcendent of consciousness, always and only refer back to the being of
the I itself. That is, act folds itself back into immanent being.
Meanwhile, idealism’s attempt to construct an ontology from the concept of objective
being proves problematic, too, on Bonhoeffer’s view. While in ontology, beings is supposed to
be delivered independent of the mental act which perceives it, Bonhoeffer argues that “idealism
seems to have resolved the concept of being…entirely into the concept of act.”81 That is, in the
very process of uncovering being-in-itself, idealism has simply given an account of all being in
terms of the mental, that is, in terms of act. By reducing being (as object) entirely to the act of
consciousness, idealism transforms being into something entirely immanent, within the domain
of the consciousness of the I. This has the result that now, “to be is to be comprehended by the I
in the a priori synthesis. Without the I, there is no being.”82 Bonhoeffer’s claim here is the same
as that of Levinas: idealism is the identity or correlation of being with thought.83 Put either way,
in terms of act reduced to one’s own being or objective being reduced to one’s own act, the point
remains that act and being are conflated with each other in the immanence of consciousness.
This problematic leads Bonhoeffer back to his concern about the impact that act and
being concepts have for theology, namely, for human self-understanding and for the
understanding of God. For Bonhoeffer, because the I is now conceived of as generative of
reality, both God and the self are understood solely through the I’s own power. Bonhoeffer

81

Ibid., 40.
Ibid.
83
See Bonhoeffer’s comment that “the faulty conclusion of idealism” is “the identification of the I and being.” Ibid.,
91.
82

167

rhetorically asks, “if the I is the creator of its world, what is there outside itself from which it
might derive knowledge of itself?”84 The implied answer is that nothing is outside of the I;
therefore, “I can understand myself from myself.”85
Because on the idealist model, the self that I understand is spirit, it is not only not unlike
God, but in fact blends into divine spirit. God is understood by virtue of the I’s own selfunderstanding, according to the maxim criticized by Bonhoeffer: “Like knows like.” The
resulting self-deification is not simply a doing violence to the concept of God; it also traps the
self inside of itself, unable to experience anything beyond the creations of its own consciousness.
So Bonhoeffer writes, “All who countenance that they need only to come to themselves, in order
to be in God, are doomed to hideous disillusion in the experience of being-, persisting-, and
ending-up-turned-in-upon-themselves utterly – the experience of utmost loneliness in its
tormenting desolation and sterility.”86 The idealist I, in thinking itself to be the lord of being, has
in truth constricted and cut itself off from transcendence, that is, from any contact from the
outside.
Bonhoeffer’s criticism here has two prongs. First, the idealist model of the autonomous I
absorbs all things into itself, reducing the otherness of both other people and God into the
mastery and identity of the I. Again we see the proximity to Levinas’s criticism of idealism, that
the self-sufficient ego reduces the other to the same in its correlation of thought and being.
Nothing from beyond the horizon of the I is allowed to impact or reorient the I. Second,
Bonhoeffer claims that this autonomous I, in its command of all things, is enclosed within itself,
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unable to relate to anything genuinely other than itself.87 The portrait Bonhoeffer paints of the
idealist self is tragic: having achieved its goal of absolute knowledge, it is now isolated and
alone. “The I believes itself free and is captive; it has all power and has only itself as a vassal.”88
Idealism results in the most extreme form of individualism imaginable; in the end, nothing exists
apart from the individual self.
While Levinas, in his similar form of criticism, argues that idealism has misdescribed the
way in which persons come into relationships with each other, Bonhoeffer argues that idealism’s
description actually obtains. Bonhoeffer identifies the movement of reason encompassing all
things into itself with the state of sin. He says that in idealism, “the movement of the spirit is
turned in upon itself. In Luther’s words this is ratio in se ipsam incurva [reason turned in on
itself].”89 This formulation is meant as a natural extension of Luther’s definition of sin as the
heart turned in on itself. Thus, Bonhoeffer’s criticism of idealism is not a criticism of failing to
correctly describe reality, but rather of failing to recognize that the model it describes is an
articulation of sinful existence. From Bonhoeffer’s perspective, Levinas’s position fails to
recognize just how accurately idealism portrays much of human existence. Idealism here
champions the autonomous I which Bonhoeffer indicts as the very exemplification of sin.
Throughout the first part of Act and Being, Bonhoeffer catalogues various philosophical
attempts to solve the conflation of being with consciousness typified in idealism. Despite the best
intentions of each attempt, none is able to escape the seduction of giving to reason the ability to
set its own limits, which means enclosing all things into itself. Bonhoeffer reviews the positions
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of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, arguing that each fails to hold concepts of act
and of being separate from each other. Bonhoeffer, like Levinas, argues that all philosophy
ultimately succumbs to idealism because of its desire for the systematic closure of everything
which thought encounters.
Levinas and Idealism
Because the criticisms of idealism made by Bonhoeffer and Levinas appear remarkably
similar, it would be natural to think of the two as allies in their fight against idealist models of
sociality. It is striking, therefore, to note that despite the radical nature of Levinas’s model of
sociality, it still does not escape the lure of idealism, from Bonhoeffer’s point of view. Consider
the following objection from Bonhoeffer: “The inevitable objection against this position is that in
the attempt to avoid all absolutizing, it is the You which is absolutized. But if the claim of the I
to absoluteness is merely transferred to the You, and not the one who is above both and the
absolute, then not only do we appear to be heading toward a purely ethicized conception of the
gospel, but also the concept of history as well as of theology is obscured. And that means that
revelation is lost from sight.”90 Although Bonhoeffer’s charge is directed at the “unsystematic”
thought of Eberhard Grisebach, it could equally well be pointed at Levinas.91
Wanting to depart from the system-building endeavors of idealism, Grisebach maintains
that reality can never truly be experienced as constructed through the I; a reality in which the
subject comes to knowledge of a system is a reality only of one’s own imagining. Instead,
“reality is ‘experienced’ in the contingent fact of the claim of the ‘others’. Only what comes
from the ‘outside’ can direct people to their reality, their existence. In ‘taking on’ the ‘claim of
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the other’, I exist in reality, I act ethically.”92 Hence Grisebach appears to elude the grounding of
sociality through the idealist I, and instead declares sociality to only be legitimated through the
contingent claim of the other.
Bonhoeffer says that “Grisebach is right, and he comes a long way to meet Christian
thought, when he insists that human beings are directed into their reality only from outside.”93
However, in consonance with his development of the I-You relation in Sanctorum Communio,
Bonhoeffer continues on to say, “But natural human beings do not perceive this ‘from outside’ in
the claim of the neighbors, whose only function is, finally, to act ethically themselves by bearing
that claim. No, the ‘from outside’ is perceived alone in what in the first place enables human
beings to understand the ‘from outside’ adequately, namely in revelation through faith.”94
Bonhoeffer asserts that if “the I is called into reality by the You, is directed into its existence,
then clearly the I and the You are given the possibility of being in reality, of understanding
themselves in it, of ‘placing’ one another mutually ‘into truth’ without God, and without
revelation.”95
The problem that Bonhoeffer sees with Grisebach’s thought is first that the human You is
not sufficient to break the I out of its self-enclosure. Sinful humans do not recognize other
person’s claims; idealism is not broken. Second, when Grisebach posits the relationship with the
human You as the enactment of genuine personhood, it enables persons to “authenticate” each
other apart from revelation. Bonhoeffer argues that the mode of encounter in which I and You
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can come to genuine relation with each other on Grisebach’s account is in fact an inauthentic
encounter apart from either person being encountered by Christ.96
Bonhoeffer’s argument regarding the insufficiency of Grisebach’s thinking constitutes an
argument for the insufficiency of Levinas’s position to break free from self-enclosure. For
Levinas, the human You is transcendence par excellence, that which of itself commands the I
and brings about ethical responsibility. The fact that for Levinas it is the expressive presence of
the face that constitutes responsibility rather than the power of reason does not serve to mitigate
Bonhoeffer’s charge. For although Levinas seeks to place the human other as the boundary for
the subject in a way that is not oriented by cognition, that boundary is still determined by the
efficacy of that human other. And human initiative, whether in the rational or expressive
faculties, in itself cannot truly place persons into truth, on Bonhoeffer’s view. While Levinas
does say that the face of the Other is where God can be made manifest in a non-thematizable
way, it is not God who grounds sociality, on Levinas’s view. He warns, “A face does not
function in proximity as a sign of a hidden God who would impose the neighbor on me. It is a
trace of itself.”97 God cannot stand as motivation for ethics or for the love of one’s neighbor. The
neighbor must signify and command in and of herself. Further, as we have seen, Levinas’s
concern is the inverse of Bonhoeffer’s; Levinas maintains that the danger in including God in the
picture of sociality is that the human Other remains a second-tier citizen in the realm of
responsibility. Levinas worries that the concept of God functions to relativize the claim of human
suffering in theological discourse.98
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Another point worth emphasizing appears here. In function, Bonhoeffer’s account of the
I-You relation of demand in the state of sin parallels Levinas’s account of how the Other
engenders moral responsibility in the subject. In both cases, the purpose of the encounter with
the You is to bring about ethical responsibility. It is a concrete person who addresses another
concrete person in concrete temporality. While their conceptions of time differ, both Bonhoeffer
and Levinas claim that the revelation of the other constitutes a new sense of time which breaks
from timeless unity of idealism. However, Bonhoeffer does not leave his model of sociality at
the level of the command, the Other who functions simply to engender responsibility, but he
proposes that a further change in the basic ways in which persons relate to one another. The
social-basic relation of love is the true and ultimate relation to the other person, which is only
possible through the action of Christ. Levinas would maintain, as we have seen, that love is
included in the command, that love as the affective response to others is engendered in and with
the demand for ethical responsibility manifested in the face of the other. However, for
Bonhoeffer, the ethical demand is not sufficient to bring about the change in the will necessary
for love. The difference here has to do with different conceptions of love, to be sure. On
Bonhoeffer’s account, love has its basis in the concrete action of Christ, which makes possible
and grounds in a concrete model the action of human beings for others. A concept of love which
does not include concrete action is therefore deficient on Bonhoeffer’s view.
Because it is only the contingent revelation in Christ which makes possible this
reorientation of the will necessary for love, Bonhoeffer maintains that only divine revelation is
able to break the spell of idealism. The contingency of revelation is important because this
signifies that revelation is not embedded in human nature or institutions such that it becomes
graspable by cognition. Ultimately, no philosophical system which relies on human resources
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alone, whether that be the resources of reason or the resources of other persons to place humans
into ethical responsibility can break free from self-enclosure.99 Bonhoeffer writes, “Godless
thought – even when it is ethical – remains self-enclosed.”100 Although Levinas might object that
his account is not godless, the God he proposes is effectively reduced to the human other such
that God’s activity cannot be distinguished from human activity. God is allowed to be thought
only under the condition of the primacy of the revelation of the human other. In contrast to this,
Bonhoeffer declares, “Revelation gives itself without precondition and is alone able to place one
into reality. Theological thought goes from God to reality, not from reality to God.”101 On
Bonhoeffer’s view, then, Levinas places the reality of the human other as the condition for
thinking God and therefore reverses the proper ordering of sociality.
Note how the contrasting methodologies drive the divergence in models of sociality. On
the basis of his quasi-phenomenological methodology outlined in Chapter Two, Levinas
emphasizes that the face of the human other grounds both sociality and the approach to God.102
Bonhoeffer strongly opposes this by claiming on the basis of his theological commitments that
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divine revelation alone grounds true human relationships. Were humans able to attain a genuine
form of sociality on their own, the work of Christ would be rendered expendable.
The Barthian Inversion of Idealism
If revelation is the sole possibility for turning the self outside of itself, Bonhoeffer notes
that the dialectical theology of Karl Barth represents a strong opposition to the immanentizing of
idealism through the contingency of divine revelation.103 Bonhoeffer maintains that Barth, in his
insistence on the contingency of revelation for the disruption of the sinful self, avoids the
conflation of act and being which reduces all things to consciousness so prevalent in idealism.
On Barth’s account, “revelation is interpreted purely in terms of act.”104 The act here is the
divine act of revelation, not the mental act which grasps at what putatively transcends it. But
because the divine act of revelation functions to determine how the I can know both God and the
human, the being of both God and human beings becomes reduced to act.105 Divine
transcendence is safeguarded from absorption into the mental act through locating God’s being
wholly in God’s free act of revelation.
This position leads to an important consequence for Barth’s account of act and being,
according to Bonhoeffer. Not only is God’s being found only in God’s act, but knowledge of
human being, too, is reduced to God’s act.106 In Bonhoeffer’s view, this resolves the problem of
act and being by simply evacuating being into act. Neither the being of God or of humans is
available anywhere but in God’s act. But here, Barth has just flipped idealism’s mistake on its
head, according to Bonhoeffer. Instead of act and being concepts being reduced to immanence
Bonhoeffer affirms that Barth shares his view that in itself human “thought is a cohesive whole, incapable of
radical self-disruption.” Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 87.
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and left under control of the human subject, in Barth, act and being are reduced to transcendence
and left under control of the divine subject.
Bonhoeffer see a particular anthropological problem in this reduction of the being of
persons in Barth’s account. Bonhoeffer specifically targets the way in which Barth’s concept of
revelation appears to be unable to account for the historicity and continuity of I as person.
Bonhoeffer maintains that Barth’s placement of the act of revelation and faith in the
“supratemporal realm” and consequent avoidance of a theology of the objectification of God in
human subjectivity “occurs at the expense of the historicity of human beings and, hence, of the
existential character of act. As utterly supratemporal, the act of the new I (being the act of the
Holy Spirit) has to be thought on the horizontal plane as well as from the infinity of the vertical
perspective.”107 Bonhoeffer then argues that although Barth recognizes the need for historical
continuity, his categories are already overdetermined; revelation and the life of faith for Barth by
definition cannot reside in history. Thus, Bonhoeffer’s criticism of Barth primarily targets the
way in which Barth’s concept of revelation fragments the life of the Christian.
At the root of the anthropological problem is a faulty assumption: that the subject is to be
conceived individualistically.108 In such a case, the individual I is inevitably fragmented into the
discrete acts of revelation and faith. In a key statement, Bonhoeffer writes,
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There is a fundamental difference between thinking of revelation individualistically and
thinking of it as something related to community. All that we have examined so far in this
study was individualistically oriented. The transcendental attempt of pure actualism as
well as that of ontology, which was to establish the continuity of the I, pointed to the
individual human being and for that reason failed. In searching for ‘reality’ it overlooked
the fact that in reality human beings are never individuals only, not even those ‘addressed
by the You’. Human beings, rather, are always part of a community, in ‘Adam’ or in
‘Christ’.109
Bonhoeffer here articulates a diagnosis of both idealism and Barth’s inversion of idealism. The
key reason standing the subject-object relation on its head fails to provide an adequate
anthropology is that it assumes the category of “subject” to be that of the individual unconnected
to the persons surrounding that subject in community. Hence the solution to idealism is not to
invert its formula as Barth has done, but to throw out altogether the framing of anthropology and
revelation in terms of subjects and objects. Instead, Bonhoeffer offers a model of persons
whereby person is the key category. Persons, according to Bonhoeffer, in contrast to subjects,
can never be conceived of in isolation to other persons.
Sociality in Christ as the Solution to Idealism
Bonhoeffer proceeds to build on the account of persons in relation in terms of the concept
of collective persons in Sanctorum Communio, now framed so as to provide a solution to the
individualism both in idealism and in Barth. Bonhoeffer also develops his account as
successfully bringing together the act of revelation and the being of God and of humans without
reducing the act of revelation to the being of human consciousness (idealism) or reducing human
and divine being to the act of revelation (Barth). Thus, Bonhoeffer offers the social ontology of
being in Christ, which presupposes the notion of collective persons, as the solution to the
individualism presumed in both idealism and in Barth’s dialectical theology.
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The solution to the diagnosis of individualism that Bonhoeffer levies must provide a
concept of contingent divine revelation which is socially oriented rather than oriented to the
individual. As noted above, revelation must be conceived as something that has being over and
above being a pure act; it must be something locatable outside of myself. As the first step to
reconceptualizing revelation, Bonhoeffer writes, “God reveals the divine self in the church as
person.”110 Revelation is now defined primarily as person instead of as pure act. Further,
Bonhoeffer continues to maintain that “the church is the present Christ, ‘Christ existing as
community.’”111 This means that both the act and being of revelation are brought together in the
concept of the collective person of Christ existing as the church.112 Revelation exists through the
being of the collective person of the church and hence supersedes individual acts of
consciousness, providing the basis for a nonindividualistic source and reception of revelation.
Because the being of the church has temporal continuity, revelation has temporal continuity.
Insofar as the human being participates in the church, she receives revelation in a way that does
not fragment her personhood.113 This revelation remains contingent and non-graspable by the
cognizing I because revelation exists in the church, not as institution, but as person. The
collective person of the church is the house of revelation, not cognition. Hence, revelation can
never be reduced to my own cognizing efforts.
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Bonhoeffer thus argues that the revelation of the person of Christ in and as the church
community, the sociality of being in Christ, truly escapes both the self-enclosure of idealism’s I
and the individualism presupposed in the subject-object ontology utilized both by idealism and
Barth. This requires an alternative ontology, one which places persons at the center rather than
the cognizing I. The concept of person is different, ontologically, than the concept of the I, the
ego, for Bonhoeffer, because persons are always both individual and collective.114 This means
that human persons exist only in the context of the collective person of Adam or the collective
person of Christ.115 Persons are never simply context-less cognizing I’s, but instead relate to
other persons either in sin or in the church and can achieve authentic sociality only through the
revelation of the person of Christ in the church.116
A further point revealed here is that although there is much continuity between his two
dissertations, Bonhoeffer does shift his language and views on the encounter with the divine You
between Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being. Rather than continuing to articulate a twostage set of divine encounters in Act and Being, one as ethical demand and one as love in the
church community, the genuine encounter with the divine just is the encounter with Christ. Thus
Bonhoeffer now writes,
only through the person of Christ can the existence of human beings be encountered,
placed into truth, and transposed into a new manner of existence. But as the person of
Christ has been revealed in the community of faith, the existence of human beings can be
encountered only through the community of faith. It is from the person of Christ that
every other person first acquires for other human beings the character of personhood.117
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Personhood is here defined as being acted upon, genuinely encountered, which only happens in
Christ. While Bonhoeffer retains the encounter with Christ as having the character of a barrier,
this encounter cannot now be separated from Christ in the church. However, Bonhoeffer does
maintain a kind of encounter with Christ for the person “in Adam” which he calls “temptation,”
although it could only be recognized as such in retrospect, in Christ. Bonhoeffer writes that
temptation is the occurrence “in which Christ assails human beings through the law.”118
Bonhoeffer appears here to locate this temptation of Christ in the conscience rather than in the
encounter with another human being.119 Nevertheless, this shift in viewpoint does not
fundamentally change Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of idealism, nor the manner in which
Bonhoeffer’s model of sociality presents a distinct alternative to them. In each text, Bonhoeffer’s
ontology of persons displaces idealism’s impersonal and individualistic underlying ontology.
The Ontology of Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being
At this point, we can bring together the various strands of Bonhoeffer’s account of
ontology which serves to replace the idealist model through his two dissertations. Bonhoeffer’s
core claim in the realm of ontology is that there is no general or universal ontology, no system of
being, which can comprehend all beings, considered apart from divine revelation.120 For
Bonhoeffer, any comprehensive system of being begins and ends in the abstraction of thought
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and therefore ignores the concrete reality of revelation.121 On Bonhoeffer’s view, then, ontology
must be filtered through concrete divine revelation which is paradigmatically defined through the
action of Christ. Thus, both God and human beings are defined through the revelation of the
action of Christ wherein the reality of sin is overcome by the reality of grace.122 Humans
therefore have their being either as being-in-sin or as being-in-Christ. As we have seen, the
church community is the place where Christ exists today for human beings in revelation, on
Bonhoeffer’s view.123 Hence, while Levinas claims that the true portal to ontology is only
through the human face, Bonhoeffer maintains that the gateway to ontology is through Christ’s
revelation in the church community. Revelation, as the person of Christ, functions to define the
being of human persons, the world, and ultimately God.
Not only is the person of Christ existing as church community the basis for any true
ontological statements, but it also serves as the ontological ground for genuine sociality. As we
have noted, this is because the person of Christ exists as a collective person, and this collective
person really exists as the church, on Bonhoeffer’s view.124 In Sanctorum Communio,
Bonhoeffer puts the point like this:
A Christian comes into being and exists only in Christ’s church-community and is
dependent on it, which means on the other human being. One person bears the other in
active love, intercession, and forgiveness of sins, acting completely vicariously. This is
possible only in the church-community of Christ, and that itself rests, as a whole, on the
principle of vicarious representation, i.e., on the love of God.125
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In Act and Being, despite a new set of concerns which occupy his attention, Bonhoeffer reiterates
the same conception of sociality as grounded in the person of Christ: “The being of revelation
‘is’…the being of the community of persons that is constituted and formed by the person of
Christ and in which individuals already find themselves in their new existence.”126 The being of
revelation is the being of the person of Christ existing as the church community.
Bonhoeffer distinguishes this personal conception of being from the standard ontological
categories of existence and non-existence. He writes, “the being of revelation can be
conceptualized neither as what exists [Seiendes], as something objective, nor as nonexisting
[Nichtseiendes], as something nonobjective.”127 Instead, the being of revelation as the person of
Christ is conceptualized as the act of love in the collective person of the church. Christ
encounters persons not as an objective thing, but as an act mediated through the being of the
church. Christiane Tietz explains it this way: “Christ encounters us in Seiendem, but is not
himself Seiendes. However, because he encounters us in Seiendem, he is also not Nichtseiendes.
Christ is neither act nor being, but, rather belongs to this third ontological category.”128 This third
ontological category is that of person, what Bonhoeffer sometimes calls Personsein.129
Bonhoeffer argues that this personal conception of being stands outside of the question of
objectivity (and therefore outside of the question of subjectivity), escaping the subject-object
orientation found both in idealism and in Barth’s inversion of idealism. Only by means of the
conceptuality of the collective person of Christ, Bonhoeffer claims, can a model of sociality
escape the isolation and solipsism of the cognizing I, while at the same time grant the condition
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for the possibility of sociality, namely, love. In this way, Bonhoeffer argues, the ontology of the
person of Christ serves as the corrective of the faulty idealist model of sociality.
Bonhoeffer, Rosenzweig, and Revelation
Bonhoeffer’s criticism of idealism and alternative model of sociality bear a number of
parallels to Rosenzweig’s account. I have noted throughout the chapter how Bonhoeffer
maintains that the dialogical model of sociality and the ethical responsibility model of sociality
cannot break the chains of idealism and remain under its power. Rosenzweig’s model of
sociality, however, does not appear vulnerable to Bonhoeffer’s critiques for two reasons. First,
Rosenzweig maintains an account of the contingency of divine revelation which alone is able to
place human beings into truth and ground genuine social relations. Second, because
Rosenzweig’s account is not locked into a subject-object ontology, it does not succumb to the
individualism of Barth’s dialectical account of revelation. Recall that Rosenzweig’s account of
revelation holds it to be an act wholly located in the present moment, but that the soul’s own
faithfulness in response to that act provides the duration necessary to maintain the continuity of a
life impacted by revelation. We can further point to Rosenzweig’s insistence on the We-Thou
relation against Buber as evidenced that Rosenzweig is intent on preserving the social
relationship to the divine in contrast to the individualized I-Thou relation to God. Rosenzweig
therefore insists upon the continuity of both the individual and the community of which she is a
part in the face of the divine act of revelation. The person in this community is neither isolated
from God nor from her neighbor.
Neither does Bonhoeffer’s account succumb to idealism on Rosenzweig’s view.
Rosenzweig’s criticism of idealism focuses on the reduction of God and the world to human
subjectivity. For Rosenzweig, this results in an inability to properly relate the elements together
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in the concreteness of time and language. Bonhoeffer’s account of the contingency of revelation
borne by the Christian community insists upon the concrete, temporal unfolding of interhuman
and divine-human relationships. Indeed, as previously noted, Rosenzweig maintains that
liturgical practices of Christianity serve to draw God, the world, and human beings together in
proper relation with one another in redemption. Despite the fact that Christianity’s claims are
moderately relativized by the priority of Judaism in Rosenzweig’s account, he affirms its
legitimate role in bringing about redemption in contrast to the timeless and abstract method of
idealism.
For both Bonhoeffer and Rosenzweig, the initiative of divine revelation serves as the
ground of genuine sociality, making possible the love of neighbor in the community. Neither the
subject, the situation of dialogue between persons, nor the face of the human other can serve as
an adequate account for breaking persons out of their self-imposed seclusion. While each of
these two thinkers articulates a different alternative ontology as the solution to the ills of
idealism, we find that their models tend to reinforce the force of the attending critiques of
idealism. The call to sociality can only come through divine revelation. Both Bonhoeffer and
Rosenzweig see idealism as identifying human beings’ greatest strength as being in their power
of thought, but find that the force of reason, when left to its own devices, even in the power of
the human being who faces me, serves to restrict and isolate rather than to join together persons
in relationship. Idealism can only be escaped through a power greater than human capacity, and
therefore, for Bonhoeffer as for Rosenzweig, divine revelation must be invoked.
Bonhoeffer’s unique contribution to this project lies less in his claim that sociality is
grounded in the revelation of the divine other, though with Rosenzweig, he does make that claim.
Rather, within the space of a revelational model of sociality, Bonhoeffer’s conception of
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ontology is an innovative response to the problems of idealism as he identifies them. While
Bonhoeffer shares many of the criticisms of idealism articulated by Rosenzweig (as well as by
Levinas and Gadamer), his writing is shaped from the context of the Lutheran theological
tradition. Hence, the ontology which he articulates is grounded in the presuppositions of a
Protestant theology which is not shared by the other thinkers in this study. And it is this ontology
which drives a distinctive conception of genuine sociality, one which grounds the true social
relation in the self-revelation of the person of Christ in the church.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion – Sociality and Ontology
In the course of this project, I have organized the models of sociality articulated by
Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer into a typology of responses to idealist
conceptions of sociality. Recall that each of these figures criticizes idealism for grounding
sociality in the cognition of the subject and proposes as an alternative a ground for sociality
which moves outside of this locus. The dialogical model, here represented by Gadamer, claims
that sociality is grounded in between persons, in the context of the dialogue between them. The
ethical responsibility model, exemplified by Levinas, moves further out from the subject than
does the dialogical model. This model claims that sociality is grounded in the other person
herself who faces the subject. Finally, the revelational model, represented in different forms by
Rosenzweig and by Bonhoeffer, departs further still from the subject, grounding sociality in the
divine other. Each type of response to idealism, therefore, occupies a different point on a
continuum, a different plot in the logical space of alternatives to grounding sociality in the
subject. Although I do not claim that this topography of alternatives to idealism is exhaustive, it
is a more comprehensive mapping of the territory than has hitherto been produced.1
From this mapping of the responses to idealism, two kinds of conclusion emerge which
serve to guide further reflection on the matter of the grounding of sociality. The first concerns
previous attempts to understand and categorize responses to idealist models of sociality. The
second and more substantive conclusion is a prolegomenal assessment of the underlying

Theunissen’s work in this arena still bears the mark of the locus classicus of charting 20th century models of
sociality. See Vessey, “Gadamer's Account of Friendship,” 61.
1
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ontologies which drive the models of sociality I have thus far examined. The first conclusion I
want to draw from this project responds specifically to the typology laid out by Theunissen,
showing how my mapping out of the terrain goes beyond the project he inaugurated, both in the
sense of being more comprehensive as well as providing an answer to the central question he
raises. The second lesson I want to draw from this work has both a negative and a positive
moment. The negative aspect comes out of my initial desire to construct a multi-dimensional
approach to sociality which incorporates elements from each of the models into a grand synthesis
of views. I now argue that this approach is not viable, at least in terms of models of sociality
which are driven by differing ontologies. The positive aspect analyzes the prospects for the
engagement and evaluation of the different ontologies and subsequent models of sociality in
Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer.
Beyond Theunissen
As noted in the introduction, Theunissen sets up his categories, transcendental and
dialogical, in terms of subjective constitution, particularly around the question of how the other
is constituted. Those occupying the transcendental position hold that the other is ultimately
constituted by the subject or by the subject’s intentionality. Those who occupy the dialogical
position deny this and say that the other is first only mediated to the self in the form of the
Thou.2 In other words, my relation to the other is originally grounded in the dialogue between I
and Thou, between myself and the other in the second-person. I have extended the typology of
transcendental and dialogical in order to provide a better account of the phenomenon which
Theunissen was tracking, namely the response to idealism and to transcendental models of
sociality which were disputed by the philosophy of dialogue. This more comprehensive charting

The philosophy of dialogue “starts out from the assumption that the Other is originally encountered as Thou.”
Theunissen, The Other, 364.
2
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of the alternatives to idealism does, however, shift the terms of the debate, if only in the weight
given to certain criteria. For example, while Theunissen alludes to theological responses to
idealism in the realm of social ontology, he intends to bracket those and focus on the
philosophical models for his purposes. Hence, this project has extended further than
Theunissen’s account in more than one dimension.
As I have noted in various places during this study, Theunissen is critical of the dialogical
model of sociality as he construes it because he argues that it must in fact presuppose the
transcendentality of the subjects in dialogue which it attempts to reject.3 According to
Theunissen’s analysis of Buber, both I and Thou gain their true existence only from the fact of
the meeting between them. Strictly speaking, on Theunissen’s articulation of this problem, no I
or Thou exist prior to the dialogue between them.4 Theunissen argues, against Buber’s account,
that the relata, the subjects themselves, must be at least logically prior to the relation between
persons. Insofar as a dialogical philosophy must implicitly presuppose that subjects exist prior to
the relations between them, on Theunissen’s assessment, it must depend on transcendentalism.
However, as my analysis of the models of sociality offered by Gadamer, Levinas,
Rosenzweig, and Bonhoeffer shows, none of these thinkers denies that subjects exist logically
prior to the relations between persons. Instead, individuals exist as factical subjects rather than as
transcendental subjects. Instead of construing subjects as transcendentally constituting the world
and persons around them, the views of the figures I have examined hold that individuals are
much more constituted by their historical, linguistic, and social contexts. Sociality is grounded

Ibid., 363: “the philosophy of dialogue, the phenomenon that dispenses with transcendental philosophy, can itself
only be discovered in its essentials on the basis of transcendental philosophy.”
4
Ibid., 285: “The I and the between seem to compete with each other over the legitimacy of the point of
departure…in this conflict, Buber is primarily committed to the between…the beginning of the person is the
beginning, pure and simple: the reality of the between.”
3
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not in transcendental subjectivity, but in the conditions which ultimately give shape to a person’s
existence. For Gadamer, this means that sociality is grounded in dialogue; for Levinas, this
means that sociality is grounded in the ethical responsibility for others. And for Rosenzweig and
Bonhoeffer, this means that sociality is grounded in divine revelation. In each of these cases,
sociality is grounded in something outside of the self without the need for implicitly
presupposing a transcendental subject.
My foregoing analysis therefore provides something of an answer to a central question
Theunissen poses in his own work: Can the dialogical (or any such) response to idealism operate
independently of the transcendentalism it seeks to overthrow? Theunissen admits that his initial
hope was that dialogicalism could be successful in this regard, but that his analysis did not bear
this out. On Theunissen’s view, the ontological structures of the philosophy of dialogue are
insufficient to ground its view of sociality independently of the ontology of transcendentalism. In
the course of my project, I have shown how each of my four chosen representatives present an
alternative ontology to that of idealism on the way to proposing a distinct model of sociality.
What I have not argued for is for the sufficiency or cogency of these ontologies to stand on their
own, as successfully defeating idealist or transcendental models of social ontology. To offer
arguments to this end would take this project beyond its current scope. Instead, I have shown
how each figure must ground his account of sociality in a distinctive, underlying ontology. In
what follows, I offer a series of reflections which could serve as prolegomena to any future
evaluation of the ontologies on display in this work.
Sociality and Synthesis
One way to assess and give orientation to the models of sociality I have analyzed is to see
them as each offering important dimensions for a more comprehensive model of sociality. There
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are at least two ways for this play out. First, this approach, aimed at multi-dimensionality, could
incorporate the dialogical, ethical responsibility, and revelational models into a synthetic and
hence more comprehensive response to idealism than any one model on its own. Indeed, the idea
of such an approach is what animated the genesis of this project. The other way to construct such
an approach would be to include the idealist/transcendental model into the synthesis, showing
how each model can be integrated into a more wholistic approach to sociality.5
What the synthetic or multi-dimensional approach to sociality fails to account for,
however, is the way in which the underlying ontology of each of the models of sociality dictates
a different grounding for sociality. In order to appropriate the central features of any one model
of sociality for the purpose of incorporating it into a broader whole is to lift it out from the
ontology it presupposes. As a consequence, the dimension in question, for instance, dialogue,
once unlashed from its moorings, is transformed into a very different concept at best or an
incoherent concept at worst.6 For example, to claim that dialogue and reciprocity are essential to
sociality, one can either claim, as Gadamer does, that sociality is singularly grounded in dialogue
or that sociality, while retaining dialogue as an important feature, is grounded in some other
locus. By grounding sociality in dialogue, one necessarily allots to subjectivity, to the face of the
other, or to divinity, a secondary role in the establishment of the social relation. Casting dialogue
in a derivative role amounts to a denial of the hermeneutic ontology Gadamer develops as the
basis for dialogue. Hence, it radically revises the concept of dialogue in the context of sociality

See Dan Zahavi’s numerous writings which argue for a multi-dimensional approach to sociality: Dan Zahavi, SelfAwareness and Alterity (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999); Dan Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring
Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). See especially Dan Zahavi,
“Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2001),
166: “Ultimately, a convincing theory of intersubjectivity must necessarily be multi-dimensional and draw on
considerations taken from [multiple] approaches.”
6
One could attempt to say that each of the central features of each model remains a ground for sociality in the new,
synthetic model, but I fail to see how such a proposal would be coherent.
5

190

when it is separated from the event of understanding which maintains the persons in dialogue as
participants in being as the unfolding of language. Dialogue henceforth becomes an incidental
linguistic occurrence between persons, something very different from what Gadamer understands
it to be. This kind of revision would be necessary, mutatis mutandis, for each of the other
grounding features in the models I have explored.
Hence, a multi-dimensional account would require either an ontology of its own or a
commitment to one of the ontologies offered in the course of this study. If such an account
commits to the ontology of, say, Levinas or Bonhoeffer, it would not truly be a synthesis but
rather it would be an affirmation of one model of sociality over the others. This assessment, of
course, presumes that the ontologies underlying the models of sociality discussed are in fact
incompatible. If, on the other hand, the multi-dimensional account offers an ontology of its own,
it faces the same problem, namely, the question of whether grounding sociality in a different
ontology can do justice to the central features of the models it attempts to synthesize. The
prospects therefore look dim for the attempt to synthesize the models of sociality I have
examined in this project.7 Nevertheless, a softer approach may be worthwhile to examine, one in
which each of the models can be said to contribute to the others a feature which serves to
strengthen those conceptions of sociality.
The Contributive Approach
This approach to orienting the models of sociality in relation to each other would show
how the gaps or deficiencies in one model, X, are supplemented or corrected by models Y or Z.
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An analogous case can be seen in the discussion surrounding the quest for a synthetic religious pluralism. The
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Perhaps Gadamer’s model of sociality lacks a certain critical apparatus that Rosenzweig or
Levinas can provide. Or Bonhoeffer’s account overlooks an element of dialogue which
Gadamer’s model can provide. On this approach to the typology, various of the models can be
seen as capable of receiving insight from the other models. This path seems less ambitious and
more feasible than the synthesis approach because it does not seek to provide a wholistic model
of sociality. Instead, it attempts to enter into a fruitful dialogue among the models by seeing how
they can inform each other. The complication with this approach is still found in the different
ontologies from which these models develop. Because each of the accounts rests on a different
underlying ontology, in order to say that model X is lacking something essential that model Y or
Z fills in, we would need to do so from the basis of some ontology or presuppositions that X
doesn't itself accept. The contributive feature therefore would need to be something which could
be successfully integrated into the ontological commitments of the model in question.
Take the following scenarios as examples of this attempt. The ethical responsibility
model championed by Levinas will fault Gadamer’s model with being still too Hegelian – too
committed to comprehension and the reduction of otherness into familiarity. In order for
Gadamer’s model to more closely approach truth, it needs to include in its account the radicality
of the encounter with the other person which as such can never be reduced to thematization.
Gadamer for his part, would admit, on one level, that the encounter with the other person is
always one in which my own projects would be negated. In what appears to be a concession to
the Levinasian point of view, Gadamer writes, “The mere presence of the other before whom we
stand helps us to break up our own bias and narrowness, even before he opens his mouth to make

192

a reply.”8 This sounds like a restatement of Levinas’s claim that the expressive presence of the
face of the other functions to invert the subject’s intentional consciousness. Yet Gadamer ensures
that this experience is subsumed under the rubric of dialogical experience. This experience in the
context of dialogue, which he also calls experience of “the potentiality for being other,”9 does
not come from the other herself, on Gadamer’s view. Instead, it comes from the situation of
dialogue, even if it precedes the act of speaking.
Gadamer explains further what he means here by asking, “Who has not had the
experience – especially before the other whom we want to persuade – of how the reasons that
one had for one’s own view, and even the reasons that speak against one’s own view rush into
words.”10 The critical impulse in dialogue comes not from subjectivity nor from the other person
who faces me, but from the emergence of the Sache as the manifestation of the true, what
Gadamer sees as the deep connection between language and thought.11 It is the truth of the
subject matter itself which comes to language and which leads the dialogue.12 Hence, the
experience of being-other, of the breaking up of one’s own biases, confronts the self from the
standpoint of the Sache in question rather than from the face of the other. It is not responsibility
for the other person which is commanded but rather the openness to change one’s own views.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” trans. Dennis J. Schmidt and Richard Palmer, in Dialogue and
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SUNY Press, 1989), 26.
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While this could include a recognition of responsibility for the other, it certainly need not be
related to responsibility at all.
Although Gadamer does not directly deal with Levinas’s writings, he does indicate that
he is familiar with Levinas’s views and has an appreciation of them. In his essay “Hermeneutics
and Logocentrism,” Gadamer anticipates Derrida’s objection to his hermeneutic ontology of
understanding which would claim that “understanding always turns into appropriation and so
involves a covering-up of otherness. Levinas, too, values this argument highly, so it is definitely
an observation that one cannot dismiss.”13 However, Gadamer continues on to give a criticism of
the viewpoint that understanding otherness is always a return to self-identification in suggesting
“that to make an assumption that such identification occurs within understanding is to disclose a
position that is idealistic and logocentric, one we had already left behind after World War I in
our revisions and criticisms of idealism.”14 In other words, Gadamer thinks that the criticism that
Derrida and Levinas would make against him is in fact a criticism of a position that he does not
hold. It is rather a criticism of German idealism in the vein of Hegel which seeks to confirm a
perfect and complete identification of self with self in absolute knowledge. Gadamer thinks that
twentieth century philosophy has moved irrevocably past such a position, primarily because of
the recognition that human beings only appear to themselves through language, and language is
always a finite and imperfect mirror through which to view oneself.
When Gadamer speaks of the achievement of self-understanding, this self-understanding
“involves a moment of ‘loss of self’”15 which is never fully recovered, but is rather mediated
back to the self through the play of language over which no one is master. Thus, Gadamer would
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suggest that the intentionality which Levinas seeks to overthrow through the encounter with the
face in non-intentional consciousness has already been overthrown in the taking seriously of
language. Understanding is now not achieved through the dominance of the intention which
would seek to reflect all things back into itself, but rather through language, which both
frustrates idealist self-confirmation and is the condition which makes possible genuine
relationships with others. Because language is the medium through which truth comes to
presence, persons cannot rightly relate to one another in another way than through the reciprocity
of dialogue.
Therefore, Gadamer’s defense against criticisms of idealism also contains an argument
against the Levinasian viewpoint which claims that the self is unilaterally responsible for the
other. Gadamer’s own critique would suggest that in setting up the self as unconditional
responsibility, Levinas actually robs the self of being able to understand the other in dialogue.
Gadamer suggests that attempting to escape “the mutuality of such a relation changes this
relationship and destroys its moral bond.”16 Thus, Gadamer would claim that the self cannot be
in a genuine relationship with others if the self is the sole responsible party, if the concrete other
does not participate in dialogue.
On Gadamer’s view, genuine sociality cannot occur apart from truth presenting itself in
dialogical situations. In a similar manner, Gerald Bruns thinks Gadamer “might fault Levinas for
setting the ethical relation too sharply against hermeneutics – for having, finally, too abstract a
conception of the ethical.”17 In other words, because Levinas sets the condition of responsibility
prior to the empirical interchange of language, ethics is abstracted from the concreteness of
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everyday life which is only made present through language. For Gadamer, Levinas’s radicalized
ethics as first philosophy would actually undermine ethics because it rejects the hermeneutic
condition of understanding others in historical relationships. If ethics were to be operative at a
level wholly prior to the conversation of a subject matter, there would be no content to ethics. As
Bruns puts it, “from Gadamer’s perspective Levinas’s conception of the ethical is too purely
ethical, not sufficiently social (not sufficiently historicized).”18 Gadamer will think that because
Levinas grounds the self-other relation solely in the disruptive moment prior to dialogue, he
cannot sustain genuine self-other relations which must thrive in the language of the world.
From Levinas’s own point of view, hermeneutics does have a legitimate place in
understanding and relating to the world, but hermeneutics does not exhaust the ways in which
humans can interact with reality. Levinas writes, “In all its analyses of language contemporary
philosophy insists, and indeed rightly, on its hermeneutical structure and on the cultural effort of
the incarnate being that that expresses itself.”19 However, while accepting a hermeneutics of
culture and language, Levinas argues that the other person presents the self with a prevenient
discontinuity that is not mediated by tradition and language. Levinas thus suggests that a
hermeneutics of the other person is derivative of the primary expressiveness of the face of the
other.20 Levinas, then, rejects the Gadamerian claim that hermeneutic ontology is the medium out
of which the relation to the other first unfolds.
The outcome, then, of the confrontation between Gadamer and Levinas is less a mutual
enhancement of each other’s views and more a reassertion of the divergence in outlooks which is
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rooted finally in different conceptions of ontology. On Levinas’s view, the Gadamerian appeal to
dialogue is simply derivative of the true ground of sociality. Levinas does have a place for
dialogue; it is located subsequent to and conditioned by the responsibility engendered by the face
of the other. Likewise, Gadamer can affirm the importance of the radical interruption found in
the presence of the other who faces me, but this interruption must be grounded in the being of the
Sache which comes to presence in language and overcome in the restoration of understanding.
Philosophy and Theology
The divergence in ontologies appears even deeper when considering views which require
God to play a central role in the grounding of sociality. On the views of both Rosenzweig and
Bonhoeffer, true sociality cannot be understood without reference to God. Thus, an ontology
which leaves the concept of God out of the equation is inadequate to deal with persons in relation
to each other. For example, Bonhoeffer is especially emphatic on this score: “The goal of
philosophy is not a ‘picture-book phenomenology’ but a system. A system is made possible,
however, only by an immanent idea of God or, rather, by the exclusion of the idea of God from
the context of philosophy altogether.”21 On Bonhoeffer’s reading, the aim of philosophy is the
systematic reach of reason in to every crevice of reality. God therefore must either be entirely
explainable by means of reason (hence, an immanent God) or entirely eliminated from
consideration.
Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology, between
reason and revelation, appears particularly rigid in Act and Being. He writes, “Per se, a
philosophy can concede no room for revelation unless it knows revelation and confesses itself to
be Christian philosophy in full recognition that the place it wanted to usurp is already occupied
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by another – namely, by Christ.”22 Philosophy, on Bonhoeffer’s view, attempts to place human
reason in the seat of truth, as the ultimate arbiter of reality. Until it recognizes that it is trying to
take Christ’s place, until it renounces its inherent aims, it cannot achieve the truth it seeks.
Bonhoeffer claims that were philosophy to incorporate the social realities of sin and grace into
itself, “philosophical anthropology is able to adopt such concepts from theology only at the
expense of bursting its own framework. For in doing so, philosophical anthropology turns its
analysis of human existence, too, into an analysis of humanity’s attempt to lay hold of itself; that
is to say, it can do so only at the expense of becoming theological anthropology.”23 If philosophy
were to truly accept the reality of revelation, it would become theology. Bonhoeffer does
nevertheless speak of a distinctive Christian philosophy, which, beginning from the
presuppositions of revelation, can articulate the structures of reality which have been the
traditional domains of philosophy.24 Yet, this Christian philosophy would have already given up
the systematic pretensions of the universality of reason, rendering it a diluted form of philosophy
according to Bonhoeffer’s presentation of philosophy’s telos.
Rosenzweig, by contrast, articulates a somewhat softer division between the disciplines
of philosophy and theology, arguing that they are ultimately “dependent on each other.”25 This
begins from Rosenzweig’s distinction between the “old” philosophy, exemplified in idealism,
and the “new” philosophy, which takes as its point of departure the individual point of view. The
new philosophy, arising from the path charted by Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche,
recognizes the failure of the project of comprehending the All from a universal point of view and
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determines to begin from the subjective point of view. But, asks Rosenzweig, in what sense can
such an approach truly be a science, be a rational discipline which attains objectivity?
Rosenzweig’s answer argues that “the bridge from maximum subjectivity to maximum
objectivity is formed by theology’s concept of revelation.”26 That is, revelation is that which is
subjectively received but which informs and confirms the objectivity which philosophy seeks.
Rosenzweig holds that “the theologian whom philosophy requires for the sake of its
scientific status is himself a theologian who requires philosophy – for the sake of his integrity.”27
Philosophy requires the concept of revelation in order to reach reality without collapsing in on
itself, while theology requires philosophy to foreshadow what is to come in revelation and
redemption. Rosenzweig writes,
philosophy contains the entire contents of revelation, not, however, as revelation, but as
precondition of revelation, as created contents, that is, and not as revealed contents.
Revelation is providentially “foreseen” in creation – revelation in its entire contents, thus
including, precisely in terms of current concepts of belief, also redemption. As practiced
by the theologian, philosophy becomes a prognostication of revelation.28
Revelation becomes confirmed in its authenticity because philosophy has been pointing toward
it, without giving it away, from creation. Although this view appears to give a more generous
role to philosophy, allowing it to incorporate revelation within itself while still remaining
philosophy, it is not far from Bonhoeffer’s assessment that philosophy must undergo a
fundamental reorientation in order to bear fruit.
Bonhoeffer and Rosenzweig appear to more sharply disagree on the prospect of
constructing a system of philosophy. As noted above, Bonhoeffer thinks that philosophy’s
systematic aspirations reveal its drive for the subject to be the center and ground of reality. He
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writes, “In the system lies the master of being by the knowing I, hence its claim to divinity.”29
The system of philosophy ends in idolatry, placing reason in the place of God, on Bonhoeffer’s
view. Rosenzweig, by contrast, presents The Star of Redemption precisely as “a system of
philosophy.”30 However, what Rosenzweig has in mind by this notion of system is clearly
different from the way Bonhoeffer thinks about it. Benjamin Pollock explains that “a ‘system of
philosophy,’ as Rosenzweig understood it, seeks to understand all beings both in their plurality
as diverse, different beings, and at the same time insofar as they share in a single, common
unity.”31 The problem with idealism’s systems was that they placed the unity of beings at the
outset of the system, resulting in the ultimate inability to escape that unity in the recognition of a
true plurality of beings. Rosenzweig’s proposal, by contrast, begins with plurality and places
unity in the redemptive future.32 The unity and finality of the system is not something which can
be grasped and placed at the disposal of the thinking I; instead, it will only be experienced in its
truth in redemption. Rosenzweig is only himself able to say anything at all about this unity in
anticipation.
Rosenzweig’s articulation of the two types of system actually maps well onto the way in
which Bonhoeffer describe the relationship between system and theology. Bonhoeffer writes, “In
the system, the present is determined by the past, inasmuch as in the system there obtains the
principle of the ‘priority’ of the coherence of reason…Christian revelation must not be
interpreted as ‘having happened’…[but] must occur in the present precisely because it
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is…always something ‘of the future.’”33 Bonhoeffer’s idea here is that Christian theology, as the
“proclamation of the cross,” is not merely or even primarily the proclamation of a past event, but
more properly the proclamation of a future reality. The primary difference between the two
thinkers on this score, then, is that Rosenzweig is willing to describe his project as a new kind of
system, oriented toward future redemption, whereas Bonhoeffer leaves the language of system
behind, while his directing his project toward the same temporal orientation as Rosenzweig’s.
Whether formulated in Rosenzweig’s vocabulary or Bonhoeffer’s vocabulary, the
requirement the ontologies which presume revelation place upon those which do not is that if
philosophy is to find the truth which it seeks, it must accept revelation. This is a claim which
neither Gadamer nor Levinas accepts. While both Gadamer and Levinas are comfortable with
appropriating theological concepts for their own non-theological purposes, neither of their
projects grants the necessity of divine revelation for sociality. Hence, the ontological premise
with which Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer begin, namely, the existence of a communicative God
who is requisite for sociality, is denied by Gadamer and Levinas. While neither of the latter two
thinkers denies God outright, each of them denies that the premise of divine revelation must be
incorporated into their projects. By the same token, Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer deny that a
philosophy devoid of the assumption of revelation can adequately account for sociality. Hence,
the engagement between these projects results in a stalemate, with neither side accepting the
starting point of the other.
Ontology and Sociality
The models of sociality I have examined in this dissertation each articulate a grounding
for the social relation which departs from the idealist grounding of sociality in the subject. And

33

Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 111.
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each of these models is itself grounded in an ontology which serves to replace a subject-object
ontology. Gadamer, representing the dialogical model of sociality, Levinas, representing the
ethical responsibility model, and Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer, each representing a variation of
the revelational model, articulate ontologies correspondent to their models of sociality. As I have
noted in the foregoing analysis, these ontologies appear to be largely incommensurable with one
another, with the possible exception of the ontologies of Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer. Gadamer’s
hermeneutic ontology excludes an ontology of alterity or a theistic ontology, as articulated by
Rosenzweig or Bonhoeffer, from sufficiently grounding sociality in itself.34 Levinas’s ontology
of alterity likewise argues that neither hermeneutic nor revelational ontologies which do not
ground sociality in the expressive presence of the Other can correctly ground sociality. In the
same way, Rosenzweig and Bonhoeffer argue that ontologies which do not admit the centrality
of the divine for sociality must be radically revised so as to incorporate revelation into their
account.
If the ontologies in question are incommensurable, then a synthesis of models of sociality
requires the adoption of one particular ontology for its grounding of sociality or an articulation of
a distinct ontology which rejects the claims to exclusivity made by the other ontologies. Because
of the strong ontological grounding claims made for sociality by Gadamer, Levinas, Rosenzweig,
and Bonhoeffer, the most fruitful way to construe the relationship of the models is to see them as
alternatives along the spectrum of responses to idealism. Where idealist and transcendental

34

Gadamer does, however, take himself to be articulating the hermeneutic structure of understanding assumed by
theology. The particular theological worldview Gadamer has in mind is that of Rudolph Bultmann. Gadamer writes
that “self-understanding only realizes itself in the understanding of a subject matter and does not have the character
of a free self-realization. The self that we are does not possess itself; one could say that it ‘happens.’ And this is
what the theologian is actually saying when he asserts that faith is an event in which a new man is established. The
theologian says also that we must believe and understand the Word, and that it is through the Word that we
overcome the abysmal ignorance about ourselves in which we live.” Gadamer, “On the Problem of SelfUnderstanding,” 55. Bonhoeffer, for his part, chides Bultmann for conceding too much ground to Heidegger’s
philosophy and not taking seriously the claim of revelation. See Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 77-78 n. 89.
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models of sociality ground sociality in the subject, these models offer differing visions for the
appropriate grounding of the social life.
To the extent that models of sociality arise in contemporary philosophy and in future
philosophical endeavors which seek to ground sociality in the subject, these alternatives will
continue to offer important insights both for those who wish to develop such models and those
who wish to dispute them. Further, understanding the spectrum of responses to idealist models of
sociality illuminates the diversity of the accounts which challenged the grounding of sociality in
the subject after idealism. Finally, this project has shown that the models of sociality which
present themselves as alternatives to idealism are each grounded in an ontology which itself
serves to replace the ontology of idealism. This points to the proposition that models of sociality
in general rely either implicitly or explicitly on an underlying account of ontology which
grounds its model. Therefore, a model of sociality can be affirmed, rejected, or qualified only on
the basis of the affirmation, rejection, or qualification of the ontology which undergirds it.
Insofar as a model of sociality purports to account for the grounding of social life in dialogue or
in persons, in humanity or in divinity, such an account will be an ineluctably ontological affair.
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